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"The Theory of Economics does not furnish a body of settled
conclusions, immediately applicable to policy. It is a method rather
than a doctrine, an apparatus of the mind, a technique of thinking which
helps its possessor to draw correct conclusions".
Even this modest function it performs with less ease when it is
applied to problems of development in underdeveloped countries, for the
conditions of society in these countries, and the nature of the problem
with which they are faced, are different in many ways from those amidst
which economic theory grew; and theory, in economics, inevitably
"reflects the conditions of society to which it relates".
Yet it is very difficult to reflect on complicated social phenomena
without the help of some sort of theory. I am not sure how far modern
economic theory can be adapted to suit the problems raised by the
question of development. Since, however, no intellectually satisfying
alternative is in sight, this study is essentially a series of comments
on particular points of theory,which seemed more relevant than others
to this question.
Differences of opinion in economic science abound, and they cannot
be easily localised; every writer has his own system of thought. A
full discussion of every point raised would have taken us far afield,and
to preserve some semblance of unity of theme the argument had Id be
somewhat selective. Some of the wider considerations behind the selection
are to be found in a concluding chapter, where the whole argument is
summarised.
This study was made possible by a scholarship awarded by the
Faculty of Law, Alexandria University. Mr. F. Sadek, of the Faculty
of Science, Cairo University, was kind enough to check on the
mathematical part of chapter III.
My greatest debt,however, is to Dr. Mary Rankin, Reader in
Political Economy in Edinburgh University, who supervised this work.
Without her patience in the face of my many and often persistent
misunderstandings of theory, her toleration of many changes of plan,
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CHAPTER I.
Introduction? The Demographic Cycle.
Up to the second half of the nineteenth century, the Malthusian
thesis, in its less arithmetical form, was, generally speaking, an
adequate interpretation both of world economic history and of the
effect of the population factor on the prospects of future improvements.
Continuous increase in technical knowledge would not invalidate it,
though a modification of his argument may be required in the direction
of a shift of emphasis and interest from diminishing returns from
natural resources and from subsistence levels towards the greater
sacrifices which, if population is continuously increasing at the
"natural" rate, a given generation must undergo in order to provide
its successor with the capital equipment necessary to maintain or
raise a given standard of living.
In the nineteenth century, however, the human term of the
Malthusian calculations ceased to hold in the West, thanks to man's
increasing ability and willingness to control the rate at which he
propagates, and particularly to his willingness to be influenced, in
determining this rate, by economic considerations. Most countries,
however, have not reached this stage, and it will be interesting to
consider, in general terms, their prospects of reaching it in the
light of western demographic history.
This history can be roughly divided into five stages. It shows the
same pattern in the different countries, which come under the term "lestfj
allowing for time lags and local variations.^1'' Some countries may not
have actually reached the fifth stage, though a strong probability that
(1) Cf: "/tforld Population" bj Sir Alexander Carr-Saunders , coders \f-
I
they will reach it may >3© Inferred from the age composition of the
population and the death, and "birth rate® expected to prevail.
For convenience however, and to give concreteness to the classification,
these stages will "be dated with reference to British demographic
history, ^
The se stage s are.
1. The Mai thus!an stability stage: This Is characterised by high
birth and death rates, which tend to balance each other, and thus
maintain, over fairly long periods of time, a fairly stationary
population, while fluctuating widely about any given norm In the
short period?to allow^ for the adjustment of population to means
of subsistence which may be disturbed momentarily by internalttent
wars and epidemics, spasmodic improvements in technique, and sudden
accession to new resources, sometimes with corresponding modification
of the norm. While this cannot be proved statistically, the
comparatively slow rate of population Increase suggests that this was
the case up to the eighteenth century. The time span encompassed
by this stage, which reaches from the beginning of time up to the
eighteenth century, is so long that the short period referred to here
may be as long as, Or even longer than, the length of time which
encompasses the whole of any of the following stages. There is no
(2} This classification is based on information contained in the
work mentioned in the previous footnote and was itself suggested
by a similar classification of present world demographic trends
by Dr. C, Blacker in an article entitled "Stages of Population
Growth",^vol. 39# 3# October 1914.7,
Review,
3
reason, however, to fear that any of the following stages may
represent short-period waves of the same secular trend, since the
basis of classification is not merely changes In the size of the
population within any given period of time, but also the elements
in the situation behind this change, and these, for the following
stages, are different from those which caused the short period
fluctuations referred to above,
2. High expanding staget This was characterised by an initial rise in
the birth rate to an even higher level, at which, with minor
fluctuations, it remained stationary, and by a definite downward
trend In the death rate to an extent unreached before. The
continuous reduction in the death rate was due to advance in medical
science and improvement in sanitary and, later on, nutritive
conditions. The result was a great swarming of population. The
rate of increase of population was probably first increasing then
decreasing, then it increased again, only to resume its decreasing
course, which continued up to the present time. This stage extends
from the beginning of the eighteenth century to the eighteen seventies,
3. Low expanding stages characterised by a definite downward trend
in the birth rate, while the death rate continued to decline at an
even increasing rate. Population continued to Increase, but at a
continuously decreasing rate. The novel element in this stage: the
special influences which made for the reduction in the birth rate,
will be considered below. This stage extends from the eighteen-
seventies to the nine teen-twenties,
i}.-5. Low stationary and declining stage a t Birth rate continues to decline
while death rate is stabilised at a low level. Population may con-
s/
tinue to increase • at a continuously slower rate - but its age com¬
position contains indications of its ultimately becoming stationary
and then declining. These two stages have actually been reached
in France,
At present, the world can be divided into five similar classes
according to the stage of the demographic cycle they have reached! (3)
High stationary class: Where birth and death rates are high but
approximately balancing each other, with death rate fluctuating
more violently than birth rate. Countries in this class ares
China, Persia, Arabia, Afghanistan, Africa South of the Sahara and
most South American countries,
2* Early Expanding class: Where birth rates are high but death rates
are either stationary at a lower level or falling, the difference
making for a great swarming of population similar to that which
occurred in the west at the corresponding stage. Countries in this
class are: India, the rest of Asia with the exception of Japan
and North Africa,
5* Bate expanding class: Where birth and death rates are declining
but death rate are consistently lower, thus making for an annual in¬
crease in population. Countries in this class are: The Eir ope an
part of the Soviet Union up to I95I}., Japan, Bulgaria, Rumania,
Jugoslavia, Italy, Spain, Argentine and Chile,
Bow stationary and declining classes.: With low birth and death
rates and a unity or less than unity net reproduction rate, Countries
(3) For figures, of, the above mentioned article by Dr, Blacker.
in these classes are Western Europe, North America, Australia and
New Zealand.
Can we say that there is a universal demographic cycle at different
stages of which different countries now stand? The fact that Japan and
Eastern European countries, both of which did not originally share the
same historical developments which made the West almost like one single
cultural unit, have passed from the high stationary through the
early expanding to the late expanding stage may suggest that there are
universal forces operating, with different time-lags, in all countries,
which will enable them all to pass through this cycle. Historical
evidence, however, does not go beyond the inference derived from Japanese
and Eastern European countries, for though the high expanding stage through
which India, most Middle-Eastern, and North African countries are now
passing may resemble the high expansionary stage of Western history in
one respect, they differ from it in another. In both oases, the great
advances made in medical science, particularly the control of epidemics,
were the main cause of the fall in the death rate. In the West, however,
the increase in population was accompanied by a continuous rise in the
income - Isvels^which led to better food and housing conditions, while in
India and the Middle East 110 such rise occurred. At best, total income
only kept pace with the increase in numbers, while In some countries the
increase in numbers was at the expense of the standard of living, (U)
In Egypt the total consumption of tobacco, coffee, meat, textiles,
and cereals feTXcfuring the period I92O-I938, although population
increased by 25$. Total consumption of tea and sugar Increased,
but by less than the increase in population. Gf. Charles Issawis
"Egypt: An Economic and Sooial Analysis", for the Royal Institute
of International Affairs, P.59. Between I937 and 1%.$ the real
U ■
(!{.) contd.
income level fell still further (Seej An Analysis of Egypt's
National Income, by Dr. M, Anls). Other factors such as the
worsening of the terms of trade, the increase in the inequality
of income due to government policy in favour of landlords, tarriff
barriers whose burden fell mainly on poor consumers, and war
conditions, contributed to this, but the unmistaken pressure of
population in a predominantly agricultural country like Egypt is
indicated by the failure of the cultivated area to increase in the
same proportion as population, and the consequent failure -
despite a considerable increase in crop yields » of the total
agricultural produce to keep pace with population. For detailed
information Of. Do reen Warriner: 58 Land and Poverty in the Middle
East8, London, I9I4.8, for the E.I.I.A., P. Jl, J2,
For India Sir Alexander Carr-Saunders writess "While deaths
directly due to famine are less numerous than formerly, It is
probable that this does not indicate an improvement in the total
food supply so much as improvement in transport and organisation
which enables food to be brought to the stricken districts*,,0/3-0'*'/'-^
In Monsoon Asia the volume of rice production was less than
the increase in population from 1920 to 1935 Cf» Professor F.
Lorimer* s paper "Essential standards of living" published in
"Proceedings of the International Congress on Population and
World Resources » 191*8". P.
Hi© same tendency of per capita income to decline continues
up to the present moment over the whole region of Asia and the
Far East. Cf. "Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East, I9I+9",
United Nations publication, pp., xvii and xixlli.
7.
Because the Increase in numbers was not mainly due to Increase in the
means of subsistence, this stage is not one of the phases of the
Mai thus!en process of adjustment,, while the absence of change in economic
organization and technique such as happened in the Best at the
corresponding stage should make us lie sitate to say that they are already
on the second rung of the cycle.
Whether this cycle is likely or not to repeat itself in under-
developed countries is still a matter of conjecture. Two questions stand
out in importance in this connection*
1. Whether it Is possible for them to pass directly from the high,
stationary to the low expanding stage or - especially for those
countries which are already In the high expanding stage - to shorten
the duration of the intervening swarming period.
2. Xf a considerably long swarming stage is Inevitable, whether these
countries are ever likely to emerge from this stage and reach the
following, ones.
Somo writers would find an answer to the first question from wfirst
principlesw. Thus Mr, K. David writes: "Both reproduction and
preservation of life are Indispensable for the continuance of any
society, and therefore, through socialization, are instilled as profound
values In the minds of each new generation. It follows that with the
coming of a more deliberate innovative control over human affairs a
movement to limit fertility in unaccustomed ways will meet strong
opposition as being contrary to an e stablished value, whereas attempts to
preserve life, even is unaccustomed ways, will meet approval as being in
favour of an established value. Thus the lag of birth control behind
death control is implicit In the growing rationalism of modern life,
which first attacks the negative value (death) and only later the
Ui*>
positive value (higher fertility)*
Though this is essentially correct, it is perhaps more instructive
to study the forces which might act on the birth rate in under-developed
countries in greater detail# It will be helpful in this respect to
consider first tie causes which made for the fall in birth rate in the
West in order to see whether they can be expected to operate in those
countries# Again it is sufficient lie re to draw 011 British experience,
for the general pattern was the same in different countries of the West.
rah'o
The factors effecting the birth rate are the proportion of the
people who ultimately get married to the total number of population end
the average number of children per marriage.
Though the rate of marriage did not play an important role In the
fall of the birth rate in England,^ 5) it is probable that a higher rate
exists in underdeveloped countries, It is difficult, however, to
relate this factor to changes in the social and economic structure of
society associating with development in any relevant way. Accordingly
it will not be considered here*
The reduction in the average size of the family is partly due to
the rise in the age of marriage and partly to the practice of birth
control. The latter was dependent on the discovery of new methods of
birth control and - through propaganda - the spreading of knowledge about
them, but it is the willingness to limit the size of the family which
i
have to be explained. The new knowledge only made it possible to give
(bA) demographic St-udi&i of b&lectecj Areai £»{- 9apiJ Otrowfh Milbank Armorial
<5> Cf. Report of the Royal Commission on Population, 19-4-9#
table XIII, P. 22.
effect to a desire which was brought about by changes in attitudes and
in the social and economic organisation - It is unlikely that such
knowledge vtfouM have had a similar effect in eightsen-century England.
The so changes, in so far as they affect family limitation, can be roughly
reduced to the decline of the importance of the family as an economic
unit which, coupled with obligatory elementary education, and public
regulation of child work, made children economically a liability rather
than an asset/ the greater competitiveness of society, both in the sense
of the wish to push ahead and the greater possibilities of advance, which
made a hindrance to the parents as well as to the children themselves
of a large number of children; the higher standards of parental
responsibility; the rise in vtomerJ s status which enabled their probably-
universal aversion to the sufferings and drudgery of bearing end then
rearing a large number of children to be taken into account; and the rise
of income to the level at which consumption took the form of out-of-door
time-consuming activities for both women and men. Other factors which,
by their absence, made for the fall In birth rate, will best be
considered in connection with conditions In underdeveloped countries.
Though these causes affected all classes of the community, they had
their most powerful effect at income levels above that of the working
class. Competitiveness, and perhaps the sense of insecurity associated
with it, were strongest at middle-class level, and most of the other
factors pre-suppose a higher level of education and refinement than c an be
obtained at low-income levels. Statistical investigations show a greater
percentage reduction for higher social classes in the average size of the
family, calculated for women marrying X85I-6I end those marrying 1881-85
and also an increasing divergence between the average size of the family'
/t>.
In the higher social classes and the same in the lower social classes,
"both taken as a proportion of the average for all classes taken
together, ^
The fact that the factors which mad© for the fall in the hirth rate
in the West do not exist on any large scale in underdeveloped countries,
coupled with lack of knowledge of and facilities for birth control,
explain to a great extent the existence of large families in them. In
addition there are other positive causes. The predominance of rural
conditions in these countries make children an economic asset at an early
age. The absence, in some of them, of a tradition of strong central
government, with efficient police force capable of giving the individual
protection from personal aggression, makes him seek collective security
by tightening kinship ties? this makes the family in the larger sense of
a clan or tribe, the social unit and places on its members an obligation
to contribute, by increasing numbers, to this security. It is almost a
universal trait of human nature to wlah. to perpetuate, through one's off¬
spring, one's existence, and where death-rate, particularly among infants,
is high, people tend to think that a large number of children is an
Insurance against total loss; the imperfect understanding of the causes
of life and death, the fact that death In these countries is often more
caused by epidemic and endemic diseases rather than by diseases which
discrSminate according to income, and that any Increase in Income per
head, through a reduction in the size of the family, is more likely to be
spent on necessary food and clothing rather than on an improvement in
( 6) Of, the report of the Royal Commission, p. 25 ©t suite, particularly
tables XIX and XX.
//
sanitary and housing conditions so slight, because of the limitations
of Income, that it will not make things much better * all these tend to
strengthen this belief, and some of them give it a greater rationality
than is at first apparent-. Where the only means of earning one's livitg
Is one's physical labour, which reaches a maximum at a fairly early age
and then declines continuously with time, it is all the more necessary
to have children, the more the better, to whom one can look for support
at old age. At the game time, there is no incentive to postpone
marriage in the expectation of future rise in income. These factors
give real material content to religious and moral teachings which approve
of early marriages and large families*
Because there are real reasons - rational ones, considering the
social and economic set-up, for high birth rates, it is unlikely that
propaganda for birth control would make much lie adway. At the seme time,
it is likely to be effective, given the necessary changes in economic and
social conditions. There is little to suggest that there Is in human
beings an innate and deliberate, desire for large families for their own
sake t the fact that there were among all peoples at a certain stage of
civilization, special rites which, had the effect of limiting the size of
the family and the prevalence among them of Infanticide and abortion,
clearly suggest this. These methods of family limitation broke down with
the rise of systems of ethics which was made possible by the change from
primitive economies to advanced methods of cultivation in the early
civilizations of the Bast, We must distinguish between the obstacles
to birth limitation arising from the objection to new modes of life because
they conflict with established values, end those which arise from a
positive desire - resting on real reasons - for many children. The former
li
are likely to be overcome only If the latter are, and the latter are
certain to be overcome by changes in social and economic conditions.
There are already indications that where social and economic conditions
are favourable, birth rate is affected, both through the rise in the
marriage age and through birth control. In Egypt, for example, while
the birth rate was k5*9 per thousand in the Governorates (i.e. big
cities), it reached lj.8,6 in the provinces of Lower Egypt and lj-9,7 5n
the more patriarchal end poorer provinces of Upper Egypt. (7) Similar
differentials between Urban and rural areas were found in other countries
of the Hear East. In India, a small but nevertheless definite
differential in fertility rates between urban and rural regions, and
between bigger and smaller cities, though constant overtime, was found
to exist, and there are "hint3* of such differentials as between castes
and classes. (9)
Urbanisation affects the birth rate because the wage system which
prevails in towns replaces the rural family economy, and because
town values are more flexible than country values. But the differential
in birth rates between urban and rural regions is predominantly due
to the difference in average income between town and country. Hence
neither urbanisation nor Industrialization can be expected to have
much effect on the birth rate unless they are accompanied by rise in
income. Can such a rise be expected?
(?) C£j Clyde V. Kiser? "The Demographic Position of Egypt", in
"Demographic Studies in Selected Areas of Rapid Growth", published
by the Milbank Memorial Fund, P.110.
(8) Cf: "Prospects for population Growth in the Hear East", by Ernest
Jurkat, in the same publication, P.87*
(9) Cf1 Kingsley Daviss "Demographic Facts and Policy in India", in
the same publication, P.50.
/J
Any pise in Income is bound to result in en immediate increase in
numbers, not only because the death rate will fall sharply, even sharper
than it did in the early expanding stage in the West, when medical
discoveries, methods of controlling epidemics, and the realisation
of tire importance of improving sanitation all came gradually, and there
were net the vast accumulation of knowledge ready for use and capable
of having an immediate effect that there Is now, but also because
the birth rate may even rise to a higher level than the high level
which already obtains, This is for two reasons:
1, the first death rates to be affected will be those of the
productive and sub-productive ages,
2, Improvements In health will reduce the high rates of miscarriage
already existent.
The result v/ould be an even greater rate of increase then ever
practiced in the past, These countries then will be faced with one cf
those vicious circles with which social phenomena abound. The very
things for which we want to reduce the rat© of increase of population
will accelerate population increase. Any step towards the goal will
shift it further still. And the greater the rise of income the greater,
at least in the short run, will be the rate of population increase.
Western Europe escaped the dilemma because it was fortunate in
many ways which cannot be expected to be repeated. The opening up of
the American west, then of South Americe and Oce ana ^provided it with
cheap sources of food and raw materials. Its priority in the industrial
revolution gave it a monopoly in industrial production, and further
helped in turning the terms of trade in Its favour. In contrast with
under-developed countries, where early advances in culture mad© possible
/./
the gradual accumulation of dense populations and which thus enter
the industrial era with a real handicap^ Wets tern Europe can boast of
a longer line of primitive ancestry on the occupancy of land that was
formerly barren, which enabled it to enter the modern era with a low
density of population.
As against this, low-Income countries may have the advantages of
the vast amount of technique accumulated in the last two centur3.es, the
existence of already developed countries whose resources and productivity
may help - through trade end investment - to short-circuit the long
and often painful steps they themselves had had to take before they
reached the present stage, and, perhaps, through the historical perspec¬
tive the development of the Weat provides and through the advance in the
social sciences, a better understanding of the phenomenon of develop¬
ment than was possible at first when, its hidden connections lost in the
glare of the present and shrouded still in the mist of the future, it
slowly unfolded itself.
Whether these factors can enable these countries to win the race
against increasing numbers cannot be told from the following discussion,
nor, indeed, from any type of theory. The recognition of the problem,
however, nocc s 111a bes, a s will be argued in greater detail, a re focussing
of attention away from the problem of allocative efficiency with which
euriw.t theory is concerned to the more vital problem of factor supply,
end underly the directions in which the application of modern analytical
technique Is sought in this work.
'5
Though much of the following discussion is applicable to all
low-income countries in potential or actual rates of population
increase are high, this study i3 mainly concerned with those densely
populated countries in which the scantiness of natural resources in
relation to population rule out the possibility of obtaining high
income-levels by specialising in the production of, and exporting,
food and/or raw materials in exchange for manufactures, such as most
countries of East and South-East Asia and some Middle-Eastern countries
like Egypt, Syria and Lebanon.
The following chapter aims at providing a general theoretical
framework with reference to which the discussion can be conveniently
organised and in terms of which the purposes of development can be
stated in a general form.
CKAPTiiU II. •
WKLFAito ANALYSIS MP SCXOLOC DBVELOPfchhT.
I. The concept of equilibrium is the centre of modern economic theory.
All phenomena which have an economic aspect are divided into determinants
and determinates. Determinants in their turn are further divided into
independent variables and given factors, the latter being txiose which,
though capable of change, are assumed constant for purposes of analysis.
Botu kinds of determinants are ultimately given for the economist, in the
sense that the explanation of their magnitude, composition anu variations
lie*outside the field of his interest. The relation of determinateness
arises from some basic postulate about human nature, such as rational,
in the sense of purposive, behaviour, and the aesire to maximise monetary
gain; about the laws of nature, such as the law of diminishing returns;
and about the institutional set up, such as the existence of freedom of
contract.
Since all economic phenomena are interdependent, no hard ana fast line
separates these categories. What is assumed constant in one context may
become a variable or a determinate in another, according to the step
reached in the analysis, the period of time taken into account, or the
special purposes of the study in hand.
Throughout the course of theory's development, however, two major
considerations of a more general nature have affected the lines of
division:
1. The broad basic philosophy of Individualism which underlay the




2, The quest of theory for scientific precision.
Under these two influences, economic theory managed to slice off
for itself a sizable part of the aggregate social activities of which a
society is composed, to term these activities "economic" and to establish
theoretical models of the way these relations determine each other.
Thus taking as model a free market economy, with certain given n
institutional properties, it sets out to show that a determinate equilibrium
is bound to be reached which, it is founu, has many desirable attributes.
It secures the maximum freedom for the individuals it is for the individ¬
ual as producer to decide how much to exert himself in that part of human
activity which enters the circle of exchange ana in what line of activity
he exerts himself} as consumer, it is for him to choose between present
(limited) and future (more abundant) consumption} it is also for him
to distribute his income the way he likes among different lines of con¬
sumption. Whenever a choice is maae, and in order to make his choice
meaningful and thus adu to its freedom value, its cost, to himself ana to
society, is presented to Mm in direct market terms. Thus in deciding
between exchange and non-exchange activities, he equates the /marginal
utility of income with the marginal utility of other activities (ineluuing
rest from work). In deciding between present ana future enjoyment,
the mechanism of the rate of interest enables him to equate the marginal
utility of future enjoyment, with the marginal disutility of waiting
(or of obeying his natural inclination towards time- preference). Again
the exchange values of goods and services to which the individual equates
the marginal utilities he derives from them, are respectively equal to
their/
f
their marginal costs of production. In this sense the free market
economy achieves the base allocation of resources to their alternative
uses. By equating the cost of any factor of production with the value
of its marginal product, the economy secures the best distribution of
resources (i.e. the most efficient way of producing a given amount of a
given product). It is also efficient in another senses It maximises
the amount of exchangeable goods anu services consistent with any given
system of preferences between engaging in exchangeable activities and
following other pursuits, since every one will have «n incentive of
maximum intensity. By the same token it is all fair* every one takes
out of the system what he brings to it.
This summing-up is necessarily dogmatic$ there is no Economic
Theory, there are only economic theorists, -mu almost every writer has his
own reservations, as well as the limitations of the usthou or analysis
he used. Thus while for Wslras a free market economy meant an optimum
distribution of commodities between different purchasers and optimum
distribution of resources between different commodities, hit assumption
of constant technical co-efficients of production precluded the extension
of the optimum conditions to the methods of producing a given amount of
a given commodity. Pareto, .who formulated the general conditions of
optiEum both for exchange and fox production, did not interest himself
in the distribution aspect of welfare, since he held that utilities oetween
different individuals cannot be compared, Mcksell, who applied the
OV/T]
Walrasian general equilibrium to the sphere of production, had his/reserva¬
tions about the system of distribution reached by a free market economy.
Marshall/
Marshall is a class apart, since m hud his o» special standards fey which
t© judge the systemi the extent to which it helps in developing a certain
type ©f character which he held to he ideal* Yet it would fee on the whole
correct to say that these norm of freedom, felmess and efficiency? even
before analytical technique reached the degree of sophistication ana
integration represented fey the above formulation, ana with the eaphasie
shifting from one nam to another with tic® as well as with different
writers, represented? for the main body of economic theory? real goals to
which a free economy tends to roach.
With the trend towards scientific exactness, however , these norms tended
to fee discarded for one single autonomous nor®, derived trm. the concepts
of economic theory Itself, precisely formulated, end capable of measurement*
This nona found its most exact formulation in Professor flgou1® restatement
of the nor® of Maximum Satisfaction* Some of the previous norms, such as
freedom of choice ana efficiency, were not so much abandoned as incorporated
in the restatement, as conditions for the attainment of the nor®, ana with
evengrester methodological consciousnessf the former tended to fee rel%atea
V
to the status of on assumption in later writing®, under the heading of
Consumer's Sovereignty* This enabled welfare propositions to attain tae
status ©f a positive science,independent of vlue judgements, ascent the cne
Judgment that satisfaction should be stoxifaiaedf there is no difference
between the statements "if A ••* B will follow" which is the universal
form of scientific statements and the statement "if B is desirable then A
Should 'bo fulfilled". At the same time it enabled it to draw on on
equilibrium technique originally forged for analysing the working of a
free/
free competitive economy. This approach will be followed in this
study if only because it provides a convenient map of reference in
relation to which different aspects of the subject in hand can be
systematically studied. "Insistence on clarity at all costs is
based on sheer superstition as to the moue in which human intelligence
functions. Our reasonings grasp at straws for premises and float on
gossamers for deductions,^
II. The doctrine of consumer's Sovereignty is the corner stone
in the formulation of the norm of maximum satisfaction. It is
connected with it in two ways. It governs it, in the sense that
it makes consumption an end to which all other elements in the
situation are related. And it determines the method ox achieving
satisfaction through consumption by making it fundamental to assume
that maximum satisfaction is attained if every individual is left
free to spend his income as he chooses. The first aspect will be
examined, then the second.
Beyond a certain minimum level of income, man's economic welfare is
probably/
(1) Whitehead "Adventures of Ideas" Pelican ed. p. 91.
Z/
probably even moi e affected by the way he earns bis income- than by its
size. To the extent that welfare economics does not take this into
depends on his personal relationships with, and status among, the people
The first aspect raises questions of organization in which it is not
proposed here to enter. The second is only partly optimally arranged unuer
competitive conditions by freedom of choice of occupation and freedom of
entfry, even when these freedoms axe fuxiy substansive. In industries
where the unit of organisation is fairly big, as in sea ana air transport
i
arid in chemical industries, tae variety ox jobs peculiar to these industries
will not be open to individuals unless the inaustry offers entrepreneurial.
profits. This is not an important point in an industrially progressive
well diversified economy, and indeed it was common at one time among
literary writer's, dreaming of an iuyllic past replete with cx-eative
artisans to decry economic progress on account of the type ox work which it
tke-
offers. Yet, through)possibility it offers to everyone to adjust his
(3) Professor Pigou deals with'this, arid only partly, under tae heading
of discrepancies between total and economic welfare. (Cf. "Economics
of Welfare", p, 14 et suite). This is because he defines economic
welfare as that wfcich can be brought into relation with the measuring
roa of money. The question is, of course, one of definition ma
method} it is contended here that it is too much related to
satisfaction from economic activities to be left out anu too important
to be dealt with by way of exception.
(2) This of course doe© not apply to Marshall, It is a basic tenet of
Marshall1 s scheme of thought activities xro "enan in thv-nselvw.
His welfare views derive more from "the science of activities" than froi
"the science of wants" and the chief criterion for him by which a eystei
judged is the degree to th ich it helps in developing a certain type of
character, particularly us typified in the entrepreneur.
%
(2)
account it is a one-footed science, Man's satisfaction from work
work/
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work to Ms own talents and tents, the wide choice of jots which a
diversified economy gives may be more important to the camenity's
economic welfare than its eff-ct on the amount of e ussumption, favourable
or unfavourable.
As to the second point, that the doctrine of consumer's sovereignty
assumes that maximum satisfaction is achieved only by the unfettered free¬
dom of consumers to choose what they want, seme of the exceptions to it are
■well established since the early days of Political Economy. Consumers *
preferences may be over-ruled em political, moral, or aesthetic grounds.
The doctrine, however, can be more seriously challenged on the grounu that
consumers may not know what is best for them, Veblen^ would have said
that much of our expenditure is spent on what he calls "conspicuous
consumption". It serves as a means of repute, to show our pecuniarily
to many people. Under the simple test of effectiveness, gooos consumed
must be 'wasteful, since only then they become a sign of leisure ana
opulence. Soon, a standard of "decency" is set, and as soon as it is
reached, it becomes a point of departure for a new move in advance in
the same direction, for there is no merit in spiritless conformity to a
standard of dissipation that is lived up to as a matter of ccurse. This
type of consumption is more prevalent in town than in the country,
where more accurate information about one's wealth can be more immediately
obtained, and it increases where the human contact of the individual is
largest/
(4) "The theory of the leisure class" p. 87 et suite.
largest and mobility of population is greatest, ana where movement from
class to class is easier. His test for "wasteful cassumption" is
whether or not consumption serves directly to enhance human life as a
whole| as he puts it, whether ox* not it furthers the life process -
whatever that may be. More modern writers take the welfare analysis to
task for its assumption that the individual* s preferencesdepend oni„t on
the amount of goods he consumes and not on the amounts consumea by
others.^) Thus Professor Meade recognises four categories of external
economies and diseconomies of consumption,^^
It is not easy to take up this line of thought without invoking the
difficult question of the role of Reason in Society, and to a large extent
it can be more conveniently dealt with, and the problems raised auto¬
matically solved, under the aspect of Distribution to which we now turn,
The Doctrine of Maximum Satisfaction leads, by a well known demon¬
stration which need not be repeated here, to the proposition that, to the
extent that this does not lead to a reduction in its sise^ the aggregate
income of the community should be equally distributed. The validity at
this proposition has been questioned, particularly by Professor Bobbins,
on the ground that that it unscientifically assumes the possibility of
making/
(5) Of. Paul Pamuels «e: Foundations of Economic Analysis" p. 224.
(6) Meades "Mr, Lemer on the Economics of Control" E.J, 1245.
(7) The applications of this proviso to the conditions of underdeveloped
countries will be maa© in chapter V.
JL *■
making interpersonal comparisons of utilities, but it does not require
utility comparison between any two particular individuals. For suppose
we transfer income from « rich man to a poor man* If both persons haX
the same capacity for satisfaction from any given income, the equalisa¬
tion of income would equate their marginal utilities. Given, the
diminishing marginal utility of income, this will maximize total satis¬
faction, If the poor man has a greater capacity, the gain is increased
on that account. If the rich man has the greater capacity, the gain is
diminished on that account (and it may or may not be turned into a loss),
Ths possibility of an increase in gain offsets the possibility of the
diminution of gain since they are equally likely to occur in any particular
case, and taking a large number of cases, we are left with the certainty
of gain, which is seen by itself in the case of two inuividuals of equal
capacities,
But apart from the question ox distribution, it is difficult to see
what relevance economic theory can have to the problems with which it is
generally expected to deal if we abstain from interperscoal comparisons.
It can, of course, have the significance derived from the definition of its
nature as the "science which studies human behaviour as a relationship
between ends ana scarce means which have alternative uses."^ But this
significance/
(8) This is a slightly moaified version of a proof given by Professor
Pernor in his "Economics of control" p. £9. For a similar argument,
Cf. L.G. Melville: Economic Welfare (Note) E,J, 1939,
(9) L.Hobbinsj "'Nature and Significance", p. 16,
significance seems to be much more restricted then is suggefitea toy
Professor Kobblns. It would, of course, tell us that the price of pork
fluctuatee with variations in supply una demJi&cf. It would not toll us
whether it is desirable or not to impose a protective terrlf on wheat
designed to safeguard food supply against the duller of war. heither
would ais economic theory based explicitly ©a the value judgment that satis¬
faction should too maximised, since the latter does net exclude this norm
being over-ruled by other considerations, whether political, ethical or
aesthetic. But it would,not tell us that such a measure is uneconomical
in the sense that it imposes obstacles to the achievement of the end of
safeguarding the conditions unuer which individual demand©, as reflected
in the price system, are satisfied as far as possible under given
eonditi©KM&» ^ since this end does not enter into the definition of
"economic", while the alternative theory would, since it includes this end
in its conditions for the attainment of the optimum. But oven if we assume
- as Professor Bobbins generally does throughout his essay - that it uocs
which entails making a Value Judgment about the nature of the ends to be
satisfied, it doe® not tell us that protection imposes obstacles in the
fulfilment cf this end, if we are barred from making interpersonal compar¬
ison® of utility, since the tariff which taring© losses to consumers of
wheat also brings gains to producers, who ore at the same time consumers»
and/
(10) op. cit. leg,
(11) op. cit. p. 146.
(lb) op. cit. lao-u.
u.
and there is no method of striking a balance between the losses arid the
gains. It would tell us it is impossible to achieve at once stable
C i3)
prices and stable exchanges, *" In this sense it would enable us
to maintain consistency of achievement**"^ But it would not tell us
( V
except of the immediate implications* ' of choice. If the ends are
tangible and their number finite it would enable us to select a system of
ends which are mutually consistent and to choose with full awareness cf
the implication of choice, but if the enas are ultimate, and their numbar
is infinite, it would neither help us to achieve this consistency - since
these ends are not readily translatable into the terms 01 theory, nor make
us aware of the implications of choice, since these ends cannot be related
/ \
to each other.
IV. We must now refer to two great limitations «»aich tae equilibrium
method of analysis sets on the applicability of the welfare conclusions
derived from modern economic theory,
1./
(13) op, cit. 134.
(14) see op, cit. footnote p. 152.
(15) compare op. cit. 152,
(16) compare op. cit. 147,
It is vexy difficult to give any definite meaning to the usual
optimum conditions of production ^nd exchange except on the assumption of
equal marginal utility of income, Cf. for example R. Kahn t "Souse Kotes
on Ideal Output" E.T. March 1935 Ft 2 "our discussion will be conducted as
though income were equally distributed" Gf. also* Harrodt "Gco^e and..
Method of Economics" E.J. Sept. 1938 p.3?7"lf the incomparawility of utility
to different individuals is strictly pressed, not only are prescriptions of
the Welfare school ruled out, but all prescriptions whatever. The
economist as an advisor is completely stultified and unless his speculations
be regarded as of paramount aesthetic value, he had better be suppressed
completely"/
completely".
Professor Fraser maintdL ns that the argument against Interpersonal
comparisons it "silly" , in a special technical sense of the word,
"Economic Language and Thought" p.«$ while Mr. I.Q.I). Little argues
that "those who refuse to believe toat one compare other minus must
deny their existence". "A Critique of Welfare Economics" p. 57.
There is, however, a new school of thought which, following Pureto
in rejecting the cardinal aspect of utility and in declaring unscientific
all interpersonal comparisons,claims to have established, without the help
of these analytical tools, a new welfare economics which has a right to
be considered "as aft integral part of economic theory, capable of the same
logical precision and the same significant elaboration as its brother,
Positive Economics", Cf. J.R. Hickst The"Foundations of Welfare
Economics", E.J. lb3b./>.^lAlso by the same writers "Rehabilitation <£
Consumers' Surplus", R.E.S., 1941, "Consumers' Surplus una Index Numbers"s
R.E.S. 1942, "The four Consumers' Surpluses "R.E.S. 1543; K. Kaluor" Wel¬
fare Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility", E.J. Sep, 1559$
T. de Scitovsky, "A note on Welfare Propositions in Economics" R.E.S.,
1541, "A Reconsideration of the Theory of Tarrifs" R.E.S., 1942, For a
critical opinion Cf. Baumol; "community Indifference" R.E.S. 1946-7 and
N. Kaldor's reply: "A comment", said.
The appeal ance of Mr. Little's "Critique of Welfare Economics" in
May 1950, which have shown such better than I could have dene the
unjustifiability oi this claim, have maue it possible to uiscard -UL-Iouieub
an£ argumentative examination of this line oi thought, ana it sfaoulu be
enough to refer to this work. It must be made clear, however, that Mr.,
Little's position on other matters than this particular issue is totally
afferent from that maintained in the text. While he rejects the
utilitarian calculus^here, though recognising the value judgment implied,
it is made the basis of the study.
1, Economic Welfare depends on two tilings$ the relative abundance
of factors of production, anu the efficiency with which these factors
are utilised* Partly because the former problem ceased to be a major
pre-occupation of Western economies, partly because of the complete
victory of the subjective theory of value, and to a very great extent
because the supply of factors is not susceptible to the discipline of the
equilibrium method, the importance of the amount of factors to the welfare
of the community tended gradually to be pushed to the background, and the
economic problem came to be exclusively regarded as one of allocating
given resources to different alternatives in accordance with consumers1
preferences.Yet the adequate solution of the first problem may be
as naich a test of efficiency of an economic system as the latter* Some
factors/
(17) See the works metnioned in tne previous footnote, aau also in
footnote 2 to chapter V. This is the logical outcome of the formulation
of the economic problem as that of Choice, which has reduced the meaning c£
an increase in welfare of «n individual to a movement to a "chosen
position". Cf. I.Little, op. cit., Chapter III. Professor Pigou's case
for discriminating indexation in favour of savings (Economies of Welfare"
pp. 24-5) is an outstanding exception to this tendency - aid have earned
the necessary criticism of the purists of subjective welfare an^dy^-is,
(see Hayek, "Utility Analysis and Interest" E.J.1536,p. 46). We have to
go back to Marshall or earlier still, to the classical economists for an
adequate presentation of the economic problem as that of man agaL net
nature (for a full discussion of the economic problem as it presented
itself to the classists cf* H. %» Mylnt "Theories of Welfare Economics"
Part I). Those modern writers who occupy themselves now with the problems
of long-term factor supply find greater inspiration in Classical writings
than in contemporary writings (Cf. R. Harrod: "Towards a uynamic Economics'
p.16 and B.S, Keirstead* The Theory of Economic Change "Chapter IV), though
their pre-occupation is with the level oi employment rather than that of
income, and indeed much of what will follow in this 'work owes more to
Bicardo than to any other writer - except perhaps Malthus,
factors, such &s natural resources ana. teclmical knowledge are necessarily
given for purposes of policy as well as of theory* Population and
capital are net in the 8*ste category* Policy cannot affect population
supply airectly, hut it may affect it indirectly, through the rate of
capital formal on, and if this rata, as determined by individual preferences'
falls short of the rate which induces favourable population adjustments,
tiers may be a case for interference with those preferences*
2. The second limitation relates to the general presumption that
positions of competitive equilibrium ore optimum positions* Xt cua best
be seen by caisidering anexample of the way the equilibrium technique is
used.
To determine the price of a consumption good, we need to know its
demand end supply schedules* To get these, definite assumptions have to
be made about the prices of other consumption goous ana of ..11 factors
s
of production, that is, <»bcut all the other things which would be coo-*
siderea as the determinates of the system, if we take the system as a
whole* How it is true that'to every set of values for these other deter¬
minates, we have a corresponding determinate exchange value for the good'
in question-, but can we have a determinate value for all these things
simultaneously without either havingto resort systems of equations or
arguing in a circle?
The usefulness of simultaneous equations is mainly of a precautionary
nature, to ensure that we have not left cut of the system factors which
are relevant to the determination of its values or includeu in if more
than is sufficient for this determination* As an explanation of how the
system/
3o.
system works, they are not of much help, if only because they are title¬
less end assume instantaneous adjustments^18) whereas time is of the
essenceof the economic problem, both as a value in Itself, deriving its
importance from the finiteness of human life, and from the rythmical
nature of human wants, and as a container within which economic events
happen and sequence is accordingly of the utmost importance for any
attempt to make them intelligible. As for their literary equivalents:,
general equilibrium analysis, so-called,the demonstration that positions
of equilibrium are optimums positions does not follow - when we keep in
mind the elements left out of account in simultaneous equation systems -
from the abstract formulation of the general conditions of equilibrium,
but from the demonstration of the way these positions are reached by
particular firms and particular industries, i.e. by particular equilibrium
a0alySiS- litter
V*hen we turn to this/method, a careful examination of how it is used -
especially in the less heroically abstract text-books - will show that,
though ouch curvology may be used, no circularity is involved, because
what is really explained is not the simultaneous values of the determinates
of the system, but changes in their values due to changes in their deter¬
minants or in certain given factors. This is no defect, for no actual
situation/
(IS) This does not apply eo the new type of "dynamic" equations evolved
by Mr. Hicks and Professor Samuelson, but the welfare significance of these
new developments have yet to be worked out.
I/.
situation can ever be explains a in its totality analytically} all we
can hope ior is to explain the forces acting on a given situation.
Moreover, this is inherent in the definition of economic law© as
"tendencies'^ which, rightly interpreted, implies change and movement and
not "static approximation". This limits the explanatory power of theory,
for it means that theory can explain only change©.,, not the things which
change. It can tell us why the price of a commodity has fallen or risen,
not why it is what it is,^~^
The most important application of this limitation, for the purposes
of this study, is in the sphere of technical knowledge. The demonstration
that market forces will lead to an optimal adjustment to any given change
does not mean that if two (Changes of the same kinu or two offf©rent kinds
of change occur simultaneously, market forces will lean, to on opvimal
adjustment. This needs a special demonstration. When possible changes
in/
(19) This does not mesaa that the system is chaotic} for indcterminateness
simply means the insufficiency of our analytical apparatus to cover all„
the relevant data which in reality determine a situation. As such i<- isa
reflection on the ability of this apparatus to cope with a complicated
reality, not on reality itself. This, I think, has usually been implicit¬
ly understood, but had it been so explicitly formulated, less efiort might
have been made to force deteiminateness on situations which because of the
limitations of theory, are indeterminate in the above sense, or to argue
backwards from positions of equilibrium or stability to conclusions about
the forces which bring about this equilibrium or stability.
in technique are spaced in time, or when they occur simultaneously tut
their effects are difficult to foresee, or when a change in technique
affects different sectors of the economy in different ways and yet its
effects are difficult to foresee, as was the case In countries which
were always adapting themselves to the latest changes, this limitation is
not likely to be of great importance. But for countries which are faced
■with a vast store of inter-related technical knowledge awaiting for
application, there is no a priori demonstration that if each entrepreneur
tried to apply the possibilities of technique within his immediate field
of visioii, a total optimum will be reached.
The implications of these two limitations will be developed separately
the first in chapter IH on the optimum supply of capital ana population,
arid the second in chapter V on the optimum distribution of resources.
The full utilisation of resources will be considered in a miuule chapter.
CHAPTER Iff.
SOME NOTES ON OrTIIy'I.; RATE OP CAPITAL ACCUMULATION
AND OPTIMUM POPULATION.
I. The Meaning of the Optimum Rate of Capital Accumulation as
Illustrated "by the Case of an Isolated Individual.
Neither for the community, nor for an Isolated individual, are there
economic ends and non-economic ends. Economic theory, however, for
pragmatic reasons, traditionally concerns itself with those ends which
can he satisfied through exchange. In the case of an isolated individ¬
ual there is no exchange, hence we cannot differentiate between economic
and non-economic ends or activities. For the sake of simplicity,
however, we will assume that a certain commodity corresponds to what an
individual in an exchange economy would buy with his income and that the
amount of effort he is willing to spend on obtaining this commodity is
constant, say 10 hours work of standard intensity, whatever the
productivity of an hourfs "work" may be. Since there is only onecorn-
raodity to produce, his natural resources will not enter into his
calculations of alternatives and hence will have no economic significance,
and work accordingly will he the only "input" he uses in the process of
production. In the ten hours, he produces ten units of the commodity,
at the rate of one unit per hour.
Suppose now that one day it dawns on him that if he builds a certain
equipment, which would take him 30 hours labour of standard intensity to
build, he will he able to produce, with the help of this equipment, and
allowing for its maintenance, 2 units of the commodity per hour. We
assume also that he expects to live so long that there is no doubt that
it will pay him to make the equipment. His problem is how to divide
his input (the ten hours work) between immediate consumption and equip¬
ment making in the most rational way i.e., so as to maximise through
time the total utility he derives from these ten hours.
Let us call the amount he currently consumes of the commodity x,his
income. If the marginal utility of different amounts of x were the
same he would maximise his utility through time if he works 10 hours a
day on making the equipment from the moment the idea occurs to him.
Since marginal utility cannot be assumed to be constant, and, moreover,
since we assume that it is necessary for him to consume a certain amount
of this commodity every day in order to maintain his life and vigour, we
infer that he will divide his ten hours between production for immediate
consumption and production for increase In future consumption, that is,
equipment making or capital formation. Luring the period of capital
formation, he will arrange his consumption of this commodity so as to
equate the marginal utilities he derives from consuming it in all days
of the period. Given the regularity of the daily rhythm of his want
for it, this he will do by consuming the same amount every day of the
period. It remains to be known how many units of his total input he
will use every day in production for direct consumption and how many for
making equipment.
It is enough to know the shape of his Marginal utility curve to
solve his problem. Suppose that the MU curve in diagram 1 represents
that section of his marginal utility curve beyond the minimum necessary
to maintain his efficiency, the areas AB„ BC„ etc. being the utilities
of the 10th unit, 9th unit etc., five being the minimum number he con¬
sumes per day. AG, is the additional utility per day he gains from the
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Column I "below will show the number of hours he works per day on
equipment making, column II the corresponding sacrifice in utility
during the period of equipment making, and column III the gain in utility
after it has been made. Thus, since the equipment takes hira thirty hours
to make, he will sacrifice AB( for 30 days and gains AG, for the rest of his
life if he devotes 1 hour per day to equipment making, while if he devotes
2 hours per day, he will sacrifice AC/ (which is more than double AB,) for
15 days and gains, since he will finish making the equipment 15 days














AG, X the number of days
he lives after 30 days.
" + AG, X 15
" + AG X 20
" + AG(X 22.5
M + AG X 24.
The rate which maximises the difference between his gain and his
loss will be the optimum rate of capital formation.
This can be generalised and mathematically solved.
Let a be the number of hours he works per day,
n0 the number of units per hour he produces before making any
equipment.
n the number of units per hour he produces with the help of the
equipment.
T the total number of hours it takes him to make the equipment.
x the number of hours he works every day on making it,
T
Then x will be the number of days he will work on making the capital
equipment.
Define P(y) = the total utility of the number of units he consumes per
day.
In each day (a-x)n0 units are produced and consumed during the
capital formation period. Hence the utility from them is xF(n0a-x),
T v
(B-j?) is the number of days he lives after finishing the equipment,
where B is the number of days he lives from the instant he starts making
it. After finishing.it,he produces na units each day, hence (B~Y)F(na)
his total utility after making it.
Call U the total utility during his whole life, i.e. the sum we want to
maximise.
U = (B-|)p(na) +|F(n0.a=Y)
s X( - p(na) + P(n0fPx) ) + constant.
at the maximum,
H = |2F(na)-^2F(n0a=x) - n^F' (nQa=x) = 0
and the roots of this equation in x give the rate of capital formation
which will maximise his utility through time.
Assume now that instead of having only one size of capital equinment
37
he can choose between different sizes, (size here is defined in terms
of the number of hours necessary to make it),with different degrees of
increase in productivity. There will be one size which will maximise
the amount he produces per hour (allowing for maintenance) and there is
no doubt that, given an indefinite length of time, he will make that
particular size, sometime in the future. The question is whether he
will proceed directly to make this optimum size, or whether he will make
first an intermediate size or sizes, each of which is larger than the
preceding one, until he reaches the optimum size.
If we assume that he consumes a constant amount during the whole
period of capital formation, i.e. until he builds the optimum size, his
choice will depend solely on the productivity of varying sizes. If the
increase in his productivity (i.e. in the number of units he produces
per hour) is very great at the initial sizes, he will reach the optimum
size much quicker if he makes first a small-size equipment with the help
of which he produces the units he currently consumes, for he will thus
be able to devote a greater amount of his time to capital formation.
This however, is not the only reason why capital formation by steps may
be preferable. In the case of one size capital equipment considered
before, the amount he consumed was assumed to be constant during the
whole period of capital formation because - in addition to the regularity
of wants - an hour's work, whether used for production for current
consumption or for production for future consumption, had a constant
value in terms of its physical product throughout the whole period of
capital formation. An hour's work meant either one unit of the commodity
or l/30th of the equipment throughout. This is not the case when there
is a possibility of making intermediate sizes, for the product of an
3f.
hour's work, in terms of consumption units ,change* with the step reached
in capital formation, ancl it may he that he would maximise his satis¬
faction through time if, making intermediate sizes, he would raise his
consumption at each successive step. He will he more likely to reach
the optimum hy steps and raise the level of his consumption at each
successive step, the greater is the slope of his marginal utility curve
and the smaller is the slope of the curve which traces the relation
between the size of the equipment and the number of units per hour he
produces with its help. To find the conditions under which he would
proceed hy steps, the number of steps and the rate of capital formation
at each step would require a mathematical technique which is beyond the
reach of the present student.An interesting conclusion, however,
could be reached by simpler methods.
Adopting the previous notation, and assuming that he take5a number
of steps m, then the number of unite nr, he produces with the help of a
given equipment (of the size Tr), will be determined by the capital
productivity function, and we have,
xr
For a minimum equate the right hand side with 0.
whence P(nr_1a-xr) - F(nm) + nr-1xrF'(nr«..j_a-xr) * 0
(l) It can he shown, however, that given the number of steps he takes#
the size of each successive equipment, the amount of work he gives
to capital formation during each period,and the number of units he
consumes during that period,can all be determined.
constant
Trnr-1F'(nr-la~xr)
differentiating both sides with respect to nr-1 we get
F' (nr-1a~xp) [- nr-i|^_1 + ®^r I + nr-l^_xF'(nr-l^r >
, . o dx (
+ xpF (nr.ia-xr) + nr-1xF ^nr-ie"xr) + a"*xr I
hence ^xr — aF (np_j^a""Xp) + npi^^Xj,fi"*Xj, F (np—(^&"*xp)
0nr-l n2r-i«-^r F " ("r-ifr^r)
Putting = yr, we can put this equation in the form
dxr _ aF1 (yp) -y xpyr F"(yr) __ aF^yy)











Following Professor R.G.D. Allen's notation,the elasticity ^ 7j ) of a
(l) cf, "Mathmetleal Analysis for Economists," P. 251
function
y * f(x) at the point x is ~ 4^ •" 1 Ex y ax
In our case elasticity = =
Putting thus ^ = lm
dxr 9?(yr) + fr
dnr-l " nr>^/aa
since nr«.^ is always positive,
will he oositive when^, (yr)/xr
d«r-l ST
tt M _ q II II gJCj,
~a~
M " negative " " y fjs
a
and since nr^ is increasing from one step to another, then in the
first case xr (that part of hie total input he devotes to capital
formation) will he increasing from one step to another; in the second
it will he stationery and in the third it will he decreasing. It follows
that, computing the elasticity of the MO curve we can say that at the
zones for which the elasticity of the marginal utility of income is less
than fr, the rate of capital formation will he increasing from one step
a
-n v
to another, where will he constant, and for the zone where it
&
.X
is "bigger than -j£ it will he decreasing.
It is very difficult to evaluate the elasticity of the marginal
utility of income, even under the most heroic of simplifying assumptions.
Mr Harrod assumes that it is likely to he between 0 and l(l)
(l) (Towards a Dynamic Economics" p. 51)
//.
and even proposes an ingeneous scheme for measuring it empirically.(
Hie method, however, is open to serious objections^and we are left in
the dark about it. In our use of it, however, we always compare it
with ££. This is the ratio of input used for capital formation to total
input and on any realistic account, is likely to be a small fraction.
On the other hand, an elasticity of the marginal utility of income with
the value of a small fraction means that the marginal utility of income
is declining very quickly, which seems to be contrary to immediate
experience, and it may thus not be unplausible to suppose that the latter
will always be greater than the former, with the result that as our
individual moves from one step to another and thus rises from one income
level to a higher one, the rate of capital formation - if he is to maximise
utility through time - will slow down.
That the optimum rate of capital formation will he diminishing is
confirmed - as we shall see in a moment - by another line of approach.
The main point from the above model, however, is to illustrate the nature
of capital formation. But before turning to this we may refer to P.
Ramsay's treatment of the same problem, in his well-known article "A
Mathematical Theory of Saving".^3^
Mr Ramsay, also thinking in terms of a moving optimum, that is, a
rate which maximises utility through time, sets out to find how much of
its income a nation should save. He assumes a community which goes on
living forever, without changing in number, in its capacity for enjoyments,
or in its aversions to labour; that enjoyments and sacrifices at different
times can be calculated independently,and that there is no autonomous
(1) op. cit. 43-44.
(2) c.f. J. Be V. Graff: "Mr Harrod on Lump Saving", Economics February
1950 p. 86.
(3) Economic Journal, December 1928.
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change in technical knowledge. Particularly, he assumes no time-
preference - "a practice which is ethically indefensible and arises merely
from the weakness of the imagination". He also neglects the differences
"between different kinds of goods and different kinds of labour, and
supposes them to be expressed in terms of fixed standards, so that we can
speak simply of quantities of capital, consumption and labour without
discussing their particular forms (P. 543). Lastly, he assumes that the
*
community will be governed by the same motives as regards accumulation,
so that there is no chance of our savings being selfishly consumed by
another generation. In short, he assumes a community of immortals similar
in all respects to our isolated individual.
He then shows that:
d£ B -CP(») - V(a)3.
dt uU)
where ^ is the rate of saving (which he identifies with the rate of
capital formation). B is the maximum obtainable rate of enjoyment (i.e. the
rate of enjoyment when capital reaches a final optimum size, which he calls
Bliss), U(x) the rate of total utility of consumption actually enjoyed and
u(x) its marginal rate, and V(a) the total disutility of labour, i.e. he
shows that the optimum amount will be saved when the rate of saving
multiplied by the marginal utility of a unit of present consumption is
equal to the excess of one year's satisfaction when capital equipment is
of the (final) optimum size minus the one year's satisfaction at present
standards.He also shows that, like what has been called above the
optimum rate of capital formation, this rate is altogether independent of
the production function, except in so far as this determines Bliss.
Professor R.G.D. Allen, in a modified version of Mr Ramsay's model,
(1) P. 546
vO.
shows that, if an optimum rate of saving is followed, capital would
increase at a decreasing rate until it becomes stationary at the optimum^1^
His conclusion, however, applies to the rate at which the amount of capital
goods increase, while the conclusion derived from the isolated individual
model refers to the rate at which input is diverted for capital formation
rather than used for immediate consumption. Both conclusions contradict
the often assumed, though never rigorously proved, view that as countries
grow richer, they will be able to afford to divert more of their resources
to capital formation, and should do so. and no doubt the unrealistic
assumptions of immortality in the models here considered has much to do
with this. For, with mortals, we cannot balance the gains of a succeeding
generation against the losses of a future one. It would serve some
purpose, however, particularly since we will argue that there may be a case
for over-riding the preferences of one generation in the interest of another,
to see if the above conclusions rest on more solid grounds than mathematical
deduction.
During the earlier steps of capital formation, because capital
productivity rises at the earlier steps at a greater rate than at later
steps, a given amount of input, though, due to the psychological law of
diminishing marginal utility of income, it means a greater current sacri-
fice, also means a greater future gain in terms^physical and psychological
units than at a later stage. For example, if our individual reaches the
optimum by three steps, in period 1 making a small size equipment which
would increase his productivity from one unit per hour to 4, in period 2
using this equipment for current consumption and making at the same time
medium-size equipment which would increase it to 6, and in period 3 using
it for current consumption and making the optimum which would increase it
(l) Mathematical Analysis for Economists P. 540.
still to 7, then a seventh hour's work if applied to production for
immediate consumption will produce for him one (physical) unit in the
first period, 4 in the second, 6 in the third and 7 after reaching the
optimum, while had the same hour "been applied to capital formation (in
which case it would he the fourth hour, considering that he has only 10
hours to divide between current consumption and equipment making), it would
yield him an increase in productivity equal to 4 units per hour during the
second period, to 6 units (i.e. the increase is at a decreased rate)
during the third, and to 7 units for the rest of his life, so that we may
expect him, for example, if he devotes only six hours to current consumption]
thus giving up the utility of the 7th to 10th units and gaining 5 more
units for every hour he works for current consumption during the second
period, to devote seven hours to current consumption in the second period,
thus giving up the utility of the 29th to the 40th units and gaining 2
extra units for every hour he works for immediate consumption during the
third period, rather than devote only six hours of immediate consumption,
giving up the utility of the 25th to 40th units.
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II. Capital Formation For A Community.
Before stepping from the case of an isolated immortal to a mortal
community, we must refer to two essential differences:
(i) In the case of an individual all sacrifices and all satisfac¬
tions are referred to one single unit. This applies also to the process
of calculation itself. For a community, the sacrifices may refer to one
group of people and the "benefits to another. Moreover, the calculations
of the savers may be in terns different from those used by those who
utilise the sacrifices to increase future production. In the Ramsey-Allen
model, the question is solved along traditional lines, with the rate of
interest representing at one and the same time the marginal disutility of
saving an the marginal productivity of Capital. It will be argued in
Chapter 5 that the rate of interest has no exact sense in either capacity,
and the discussion will be continued in terms of satisfactions derived from
different amounts of income at different points of time. This will bring
out more immediately the nature of capital formation as a process of
diverting resources from production for current satisfaction to production
for future increased satisfaction. For this we assume a community of
like minded individuals similarly situated, and interested only in
organizing production so as to maximise satisfaction through time.^1^
(li) We cannot balance the satisfactions of one generation against
those of another. Here again the question is not solved by any known
method of analysis and in order to isolate, in this section, the more
important aspects of the process of capital formation, the simplest way
(l) We may assume here that the community is either run by an omniscient
dictator or composed of omniscient individuals. The first assumption
was made by Hayek ("The Pure Theory of Capital", chapters XII to XVII.)
"This assumption allows us to investigate the influence of the techno¬
logical data in their simplest form, without having to take account of
the differences in aims of a multiplicity of persons and the effects
of a different distribution of resources between them." Hayek op. cit.
p. 155. It also enables us to abstract completely from the
complications of organization.
out is to assume with Ramsey that it is immaterial from the point of view
of any one generation whether the increase in satisfaction from a given
sacrifice accrues to it or to a future generation.
We turn now to other differences which interest us here. For the
isolated individual, the diversion of resources from production for
immediate consumption to capital formation means dividing his time "between
the two occupations, with no change in productivity per houras the number
of hours worked in each occupation changes - an hour spent on current
consumption, with the help of any given equipment, will always yield the
same number of units of product, whether he devotes six, seven or eight
hours to current consumption. For a community, it means diverting a man
from one activity to another, and the productivity of the man in either
activity will depend on the number of men employed in it. To put it in
another way, the productivity per man of any given capital equipment will
not - in normal cases - solely depend on the size of the capital equipment,
as the productivity per hour did in the case of the individual, but also
on the number of men employed on it. Since this can be allowed for in
drawing up the capital productivity function - the function which represents
the relation between the size of any equipment and the productivity per
man, it does not alter our calculations about the rate of capital formation.
But it would affect the method of capital formation, for, whereas the
individual would maximise hie total utility through time by reaching the
sub-
optimum size gradually through;optimum sizes, the community may reach it,
not by gradually increasing the size of sub-optimum equipment units with
which all those who produce for current consumption work, but by gradually
increasing the number of optimum capital equipment units.
There is also another major difference. In the case of the isolated
%
individual, we may assume^as a first approach, that the productivity of
the input used for capital formation is not affected at each stage "by what
happened at the previous stage, e.g. 30 hours labour on equipment making
would always produce an equipment of a given productivity^irrespective of
the shape or size of the equipment of the previous period. All the
periods of the process of capital formation were related to each other
through the utility and the capital productivity functions, but not through
the productivity of equipment-making laboxar in different periods. VYhen
we come to the case of a community, this assumption could no longer be
maintained, for, whether an equipment of a given productivity will take,
say, 30 days or more in the second period, will normally depend on the
arrangements made for producing the equipment L\ the first period. These
in their turn have to be related to plans for the next period, and so on.
All the elements of the process of capital formation, up to the final
optimum, hove to be determined together, ae one set. There is no available
technique, in current economic theory, which would take account of this.
The equilibrium analysis partly subsumes it under the heading of external
economies, but, it will be argued in chapter 5, it aoes not adequately
solve the problem and we may well keep its importance in mind.
The complication referred to in the previous paragraph is not likely
to alter our conclusion about the rate of capital formation. if anything,
it is likely to substantiate it, for the increase in productivity resulting
from capital formation in any given period will accrue not only to the
succeeding period, as was the case with the isolated individual, but also,
through its effect on the facilities for producing future capital equipment,
to all the succeeding periods.
The rate of capital accumulation, however, is only a side line. It
.n
was not the main purpose from constructing the above model, for the
inference as to the application of the conclusion drawn about it to the
real world is not conclusive: too much was left out of account. The
main object was to stress some aspects of capital formation which are not
immediately apparent from the usual methods of analysis. In this respect
there is no difference between capital formation for an isolated individual
and for a community. These aspects can be summarised as follows:
1. Capital formation is essentially a process of diverting resources
from production for current consumption to production for increased
future consumption.^^
2. The sacrifice from any given act of capital formation is temporary
{ 2)
whereas the benefit is permanent.x '
3. In calculating the optimum rate of capital formation and in
deciding the method, account must be taken of the whole process, i.e.
until the final optimum is reached.
(1) Because we assumed that income was composed of one commodity, the
only resource which needed to be taken into account was labour.
When many commodities are introduced, the services of land acquire
a scarcity value and enter into our calculations. This, however,
does not affect the analysis of the nature of the process of capital
formation.
(2) Had this been immediately apparent from the traditional analysis of
the theory of capital ,?«S chumpetfcr' s thesis (Theory of Economic
Development) that in a stationary community the rate of interest
is bound to reach zero would have gained more acceptance. The
objection to the explanation of interest which is permanent, as
a reward for saving^which is a single act, would have also gained
more force. The realization of this underlies Keynes' theory of
diminishing marginal efficiency of capital and the theories of
secular stagnation which stemmed from it, all of which explaining
unemployment by the refusal of the rate of interest to fall
continuously. Cf. Chapter!?, p. 1.
V
III. Optimum Population.
The concept of optimum population, as well as its counterparts:
over - and under - population, is one of those highly significant (from
a welfare point of view) concepts which, as we shall see in the following
section, do not gain in clarity by applying to them the equilibrium
technique, and is best approached by analysing in general terms the relation
between the population factor and economic welfare.
Two aspects may be distinguished:
i. The relation between the size of population and economic welfare,
ii. The relation between changes in the size of population and economic
welfare.
(I) As to the first aspect, two opposing forces are here at work;
the law of diminishing returns from natural resources and the law of
increasing returns from organization - both these laws used in their
wider, classical, sense. The way in which each of them affects economic
welfare is well-known, but two points may be emphasised here.
1. The fact that capital may increase man's ability to utilise
existing natural resources does not mean that it raises the optimum size
of population, for in determining the optimum we assume that the best
known methods are fully utilised. Thus the existence of unutilised natural
resources and the possibilities, for example, of land reclamation,
irrigation schemes, etc., do not mean that there is no over-population.
2. The same thing applies to changes in technical knowledge, except
in so far as an increased number of people may be necessary to take full
advantage of the change.
It is impossible to determine theoretically whether, according to the
two laws referred to above, any particular country is over populated or not.
fo
Comparison of natural resources in relation to population in different
countries and the corresponding levels of income - vague as such comparison
necessarily must he - may give an indication, and by this standard there
is no doubt that the old-established low-income countries with which we
are concerned are over-populated.
(II) Any doubt left about this is removed when we remember that,
in practice, the question is not one of comparing two absolute sizes, each
maintained indefinitely until the best known methods are utilised, but of
increase from one size to another. To secure a given rise of income at
a certain point of time in the future by the application of better methods
involve
of production will always mean a greater sacrifice - since this application
will normally take the form of capital formation - incurred by each
generation, if population is continuously increasing. It may be that if
population increases and then becomes stationary, the stationary popula¬
tion will be able better to utilise its opportunities. Since the
populations in which we are interested are likely to be continuously
increasing during that period in the future for which it is profitable to
generalise, we may neglect the possibility - and it is very remote - of
gain which may accrue to them, when they become stationary, from having
larger numbers.
The generalisation about an increase in sacrifice resulting from
population increase is not absolute: much depends on the way the population
increase affects the average age of the population. If the increase
accrues from a reduction in the specific-age death rates, there may be an
increase in the average age of population, the extent of this increase
depending on the rate of reduction and on the ages affected, particularly
since if it affects mainly the reproductive ages, this reduction will lead
f/-
to an increase in the total brith-rate, even though the specific-age
Mrth-rates may not change, and this will partly offset the increase in
the average age of the population. If the increase in population occurs
through an increase in the specific-age birth-rates - as may well happen
if temporary prosperity leads to a reduction in the death-rates - it will
lead to a reduction in the average age of population.
Accordingly
(1) An increase in population due to the first cause, if it is not
accompanied by an increase in the specific-age birth-rates, may or may
not be an obstacle to maintaining the standard of living or to raising it,
according to its secondary effect on the total birth rate.
(2) It is almost certain to facilitate both if it is accompanied by a
decrease in the specific-age birth-rates.
(3) An increase due to the second cause is certain to be an obstacle to
both.
In all this we have abstracted from the effect of the law of decreasing
returns from natural resources. If it is true that, for the countries
with which we are concerned, the point has been reached where any further
gains from specialisation etc., made possible by a larger size of population
are offset by diminishing returns from natural resources, and it is
probably true, the size of possible gain from an increase in population
will be reduced in case (l), the certainty of gain will be reduced to a
probability and the size of the gain will also be reduced in case (2), and
the size of the loss will be increased in case (3).
It may seem paradoxical to say that an increase in population due to
a reduction in death rates leads to a reduction in the standard of living
or puts an obstacle to its raising, but we refer here, not to the generation
tt.
in which the increase occurred, "but to the following generation. Moreover,
it is possible, with the achievements of medical science, to reduce the
death-rate at the expense of the standard of living. The increase in
numbers which would otherwise have been abortive is thus given a lease of
life, at the cost of an increasingly lower standard.
It follows from the above considerations that -
(l) if it is accepted that the £tate should have an interest in
future generations equal to its interest in the present generation, (2) if
population increase is likely to be of the kind which defeats itself or
raises greater obstacles for future generations, (5) and if the optimum
rate of capital formation is not likely to increase the national income at
a rate greater than the rate of population increase.
If these three conditions are fulfilled, and they are all very big
ifa, there is a presumption for capital formation at a rate greater than
the optimum rate, the latter understood in the sense defined above.
The first condition undoubtedly entails some interference with the
individual's preferences and interests. It implies even the possibility
of deliberately sacrificing present lives - by preferring forms of capital
accumulation which lead to a rise in income at a certain point in the
future, so steep that it would overtake population increase and bring about
that level where it would react on the birth rate, to other forms which
would lead to an immediate reduction in the death-rates - for the sake of
saving future lives. How far this is Totalitarianism will be discussed
in a concluding chapter, but the necessity of choice and clarity about the
meaning of the alternatives must not be obscured by altogether evading the
issue.
The theoretical clarity of the first condition is not matched by a
similar clarity in the other two, which refer to the course of future
events. It is not at all easy to determine what would "be the effect on
the form of population increase of an immediate rise in the standard of
living due to capital accumulation. Much will depend on the form of
capital accumulation. It is probable that, if this form is left to a
very great extent to individual preferences, the increase in the average
age of population due to a reduction in the death rate will be offset by
a decrease due to an increase in the total birth-rate, even though specific-
age birth-rate may not rise, with the result of an abnormal age distribution
similar to that which obtained in Victorian England. Those under-developed
countries which experience now a "swarming period" corresponding to that of
early and middle nineteenth-century England already have a population in
which the ratio of the under-fifteens to the total population is similar
to that of the English swarming period and in some of them it is much
higher. ^ ^
Because the choice referred to in the previous paragraph is a choice
between two very great evils, there is a presumption for the fftate
interfering with the form of the rise in the Standard of living, to the
extent that this interference may alter the form of population increase.
A conspicuous example is education. We do not refer here merely to
propaganda for and the spreading of knowledge of birth control. To the
extent that people are influenced towards birth control by irrational
motives - we must remember, however, that it is not a very great extent -
(l) Compare the table in page 62 in the Report of the Economics Committee
(Papers of the Royal Commission on Population), London, 1950, where
figures are given for the age distribution of the population of
England and Wales, 1841-1944, with table 104, page 318 of the United
Nations: "Survey of Asia and the Par East, 1949", where figures for
the present age distribution in that region are given. While in
England the figure for the dependants under 15 never rose beyond 36.5%
of total population and was considerably smaller over the whole period,
it shows an average of about 40% for the latter region. Figures for
old-age dependants are not easy to compare. In England the over 65
rose continuously from 4.4% in 1841 to 10% in 1944, while in Asia the
over 60 are around 5%.
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general education, perhaps with special stress on education in the social
sciences, should "be carried beyond the point determined by economic
considerations alone,particularly in the higher stages of education,
since, in addition to the fact that probably only at these stages can
education instil in the individual some rationality of behaviour, such
education will also raise the age of marriage. The force of this argument
e
will be increased if we remember the gain from the dissimination of the
habit of late marriage, by the power of example, through the less educated
classes of society. Another, though less certain, example is that of
infant mortality. The preservation of human life is an end in itself, and
to the extent that, even after a redistribution of wealth, in the manner
and subject to the qualification set forth in the previous chapter, parents
may spend less of their income than is necessary for preserving the life
of their infants, there is a case, on ethical grounds, for state interfer¬
ence with private expenditure so as to secure that more is spent for this
purpose than private individuals are willing to do. But apart from this,
if it is accepted that a large number of children are desired partly as an
insurance against total loss, public expenditure to reduce infant mortality
pnrp ose
may be a less wasteful method of achieving the same o¥£ee-t and at the same
time a means of reducing the birth-rate. A third example is that of
old-age pensions. To the extent that a large number of children is desired
as a provision for old age, direct pensions may lead to a reduction in the
birth-rate.
The third condition refers to the rate of rise in national income in
.4
(l) State encouragement of education has for long been advocated by
economists on cultural and economic grounds. Professor Meade,
"Economic Analysis and Policy" pp. 214 et suite, treats it as a
question of investment in which the wealthier groups of the community
has a monopoly, and argues in detail that the best use of resources
will be achieved if the marginal return on capital invested in
education is equal to its return elsewhere. The point here is that
there is a case for investing in education beyond this point.
relation to the rate of population increase. Here again there is no
availableMethod - theoretical or practical - of knowing the rate of rise
in income which would correspond to the optimum rate of capital formation.
Much will also depend on the future course of international trade and of
international investment, both of which were left out of account in the
previous discussion. The same difficulty arises with regard to the
probable rate of population increase, though rough guess work - while more
difficult for under-developed than for other countries - has a much more
solid basis than in the case of income.
Because of these difficulties, great care must be taken before
applying conclusions drawn from the above analysis to policy in any
particular country. They do not, however, deprive it of all use, for the
recognition of the existence of the problem must be the starting point of
all rational policy, and it is hoped that future research would throw much
more light on it, both theoretically and from the point of view of the
applicability of the second and third conditions to any particular country.
SI
IV. Optimum rate of Capital ormation and Optimum Population.
In considering the optimum population we have already related it to
optimum capital formation. This was done in two ways.
1. By considering the effect of the rate of capital formation on
changes in the size of population we have studied the reaction of changes
in one factor on the optimum supply of the other.
2. Focusing attention on changes in the size of population, rather
than on absolute size, the effect of changes in population on the rate of
capital formation was made an integral part of the optimum theory of
of
population. This was done by the rather crude method/concentrating on the
effect of changes in the size of population on its age-composition, for a
very young population means sweater percentage of dependents and hence a
slower rate of capital formation, as compared with the optimum rate had
population been stationary.
This way of relating the two concepts is somewhat unsystematic, but
it is the only way which would make them relevant to welfare theorising.
Policy - and welfare theory must always be subservient to the possibilities
of policy - can affect the size of population only indirectly, through the
reactions of numbers to the rate and form of capital formation, whereas it
can affect the latter directly. Accordingly, an optimum theory of capital
formation is needed only to set a standard by which the effects of changes
in population on economic -welfare can be studied. For thiB, we study
capital formation on the assumption of a stationary population. But when
we take into consideration the effect of population on economic welfare,
the optimum rate of capital formation becomes the rate which induces
optimum changes in population size.
The usefulness of this procedure can perhaps best be seen against the
background of the current theory of optimum population. This was first
precisely formulated by Cannan in his "Elementary Political Economy".
"At any time." he wrote in 1888 "The amount of labour which can be exerted
on a given extent of land, consistently with the attainment of the greatest
productiveness of industry at that time is definite. Assuming (what
within short periods is almost exactly true) that the total amount of
labour exerted on a given territoi^r increases or diminishes, we may word
the law thus - at any given time the population which can exist on a given
extent of land, consistently with the attainment of the greatest productive¬
ness of industry possible at that time, is definite"^^ (italics mine).
Prom the context, prefacing the statement of the law with the words "at any
given time" is meant to exclude changes in technique, but it is not clear
what are the assumptions made about capital. Professor Robbins, however,
elaborating on Cannan's theory and contrasting it with earlier views on
the subject, stresses the static nature of the theory, particularly with
regards to capital. "Among the assumptions enclosed in that ceteris
paribus" he writes, "is the assumption that the amount of capital remains
(p)
constant."x ' But, if by a constant amount of capital is meant a constant
amount of previous sacrifice - whatever this may mean - then we have to
assume that in utilizing this sacrifice it is best adapted to the size of
population, and productivity per head in this case is bound to be smaller
for a greater population, while if it means a constant amount of physical
aids to production - the same number and sizes of dock-yards, rail?/ay lines
(1) P. 25. The Theory was first formally stated by Sidgwick, (Principles,
Pp. 150-1) but not so precisely. Gannan's statement of "the law of
population" was later developed into a theory of optimum population in
Viu, the "Wealth". On the history and implications of the theory, cf.
L. Robbins "The optimum Theory of Population" published in the
"London Essays in Economics", ed. Df. H. Dalton, 1927.
(2) L. Robbins: op. cit., p. 121.
etc. - the relation between the size of population and natural resources^
and to throw light on this relation is the purpose of an optimum theory of
populationy is obscured, since the productivity of the population will
depend as much on the existing amount of capital as on the natural resources,
If the effect of capital is to be impounded in the ceteris paribus so as to
isolate this relation, the statement must refer, not to a population whose
(l)
size is "instantaneously varied"x ' but, as argued above, to different
sizes which are maintained stationary in number for such long periods that
should be
the final optimum capital equipment has been made?and the comparison/made
between the two sizes at this optimum. Directly the theory is so stated,
it will be seen that it has little relevance, for no country has reached
this state of bliss, and for the purpose of this study, the underdeveloped
countries are so far removed from it as to make the effect of change in the
size of population on the rate of capital formation the dominant aspect
of the problem.
t
The effect of population on employment was not discussed in this
chapter because we abstracted completely from different forms of organisa¬
tion and "in the last analysis, unemployment of every type is a problem of
organisation.In the following two chapters, we consider the relation
between organisation and development, first from the point of view of the
full utilisation of resources, that is, full employment, then from that of
the optimum distribution of resources araong different alternatives.
(1) ibid, p. 107. In the third edition of wealth, 1928, Oannan, in
deference to various criticisms of his previous formulations explains
that ".... what we have to look for is not the best population at any
particular moment of time without reference to what has gone before
and what is to follow after, but the best at all moments taken
together." This explanation is based on the fact that technique
changes and population does not actually vary instantaneously. It
is not related to the supply of capital. (See op. cit. , pp. 59-6l)
(2) Report of the Economics Committee, Papers of the Royal Commission
on Population, p. 47.
V
CKArTBRIV.
FULL E...PLOYI-RKT jL DEVELOPING ECONOMICS.
Classical economic theory did not, on the v*hole, claim to have established
a rigorous demonstration that a free enterprise economy would automatically
(1)
secure full employment. Lord Keynes specific contribution was to
demonstrate that, far from there being a presumption that full employment
is the normal state of such an economy, it is normal - in the sense that it
is compatible with a position of stable equilibrium - for it not to secure
this objective. His Theory, however, is essentially static,^) ana there
is a growing acceptance now, among those who devote special attention to the
subject, of a corresponding dynamic or secular theox*y of "stagnation" or
"economic maturity" or "increasing unuer-employment".^) The essence of the
theory/
(1) Cf. D.H. Macgregor: "Economic Thought and Policy", 1949. pp. 111-129.
(2) Cf. Keynes: "The General Theory ..." p. 245 and R. Harrou "Towards
Dynamic Economics": p. 10.
(3) This theory is particularly advocated by Professor Al^vin A. Hansen in his
"Full Recovery or stagnation" (1938), "Economic Progress and declining Popula¬
tion Growth" (American Economic Review, March 1939, reprintedMn "Readings ..in
Business Cycles Theory"), "Fiscal policy ana Business Cycles" (1941) ana
"Full Employment" (1947) and was further developed - among others - by
Professor A. Sweezy: in "Secular Stagnation" (in "Post Wax* Economic Problems"
1943), "Declining Investment Opportunitles" (in "The New Economics", 1948)
in "The Doctrine of Economic Maturity" (in American Economic Review, March
154o)y*"Concepts and Criteria of Secular Stagnation" (in Essays in Honour of
A.H. Hansen" ls49) and "The Theory of Increasing Under-Employment" in Economic
Journal^ July 1950, and B.S. Keirstead in "The Theory of economic Change*
(1948), and arrived at independently by Mr. E.H. Harrod in "Towards Dynamic
Economics" (194S). For a dissident view of J. Schumpeter: "capitalism,
Socialism and Democracy" and D. McC. Wright "The prospects for Capitalism"
(in "A Survey of Contemporary Economics", H.S. Ellis.)
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theory, which is a development of the Keynsian system of thought, is that as
the economy progresses and income p«r head rises, it becomes increasingly
difficult to maintain full employment* In Loth theories, unoer-employment
follows from these economies having a rate of investment less than that which
would secure full employment. They have a special relevance to our subject ^
in that, if it proves difficult or undesirable to maintain full employment
by reducing the rate of interest, increasing consumption, or increasing
investment within the highly developed economies, external investment in
under-developed countries may be a means of securing this end. This will
be considered in chapter eigStSH.. In this chapter we consider, assuming a
closed system, the prospects of maintaining a high level of activity in these
latter countries under a free enterprise system. In this, we lose much of
the help derived from the modern theoretical mooels, since they assume an
economy different in fundamental ways from the economies with which we are
concerned.
The/
(4) Because of this, it may not be out of place to devote a lengthy footnote
to the main elements of this Dynamic Theory. Its novelty lias in giving a
general theoretical interpretation, in terms of long term trends, of the
progressive incapacity of the capitalist system to provide full employment,.
Based on the Keynsian analytical scheme, ana proceeding from the general
premise that aggregate income is determined by the three independent variables:
the propensity to consume the marginal efficiency of capital ana the rate of
interest, it sets out to explain that, within the context of the dynamic
factors, these variables develop in such a way that full employment becomes
more and more difficult to attain. It is not an analysis of the cycle,
(though the cycle may be an integral part of some individual formulations),
it is an analysis of long term trend. ho necessary assumption is made
about the trend of one national income or of the marginal propensity to
consume. It only demonstrates that as the economy matures, the trend of
realized national income diverges more and more from the trena of potential -
or full employment - National income, hence It is compatible with an upward
trend in the former (cf. Keirstead, op, cit, figure 4, p. 146 and Higglns:
"The Theory of Increasing Under-Employment" Economic Journal, July IbaO p.fob,
footnote 2), It is sufficient for the purposes of this theory that the
Marginal propensity to consume be less than unity. It is essentially da
analysis of the demand fox* investment in the long period. The increasing
deficiency in this demand in the long run are attributed to the decline in
the rate of population increase and the passing over qa the geographical
frontier. To counter-balance the effect of these two factors on the rate
of investment, a rate of technical change greater than ever before would
be required. The possibility of this is discounted on three grounas.
1, the disappearance of great technical innovations - an admittedly weak
argument,
2, the capital-saving nature of these innovations,
3, their self•financing nature, through corporations' resort to the accounting
device of allowing for technical dbsolesence in calculating amortization
funds.
These elements in the situation enter in various combinations in
different individual formulations. Thus while they all appear in Professor
Hansen1© fcrjaulatiom, Professor Kiersteaa drops the concept of the frontier
and introduces the factor of increasing monopoly, Mr, Harrou also aoes not
make use of the frontier concepts - he assumes constant returns from luna -
and assumes that technical inventions will be neutral as between capital anu
labour-saving.
Til© predominant activity in underdeveloped countries is agriculture
and it is pursued? on the wiiole, in a non-capitelisticway, in the sens©
that the ownership of the means of production is not divorced £vm the
function of actually using theta,(&) This vital for the theory of
employment, since the location of ownership affects the stability of the
Col
amount of work acme at different prices for the product. For a non-
capitalist producer - that is, tn Owner ox the means of production - in
an exchange economy, the amount of work done would be determined by the
intensity of his desire for the various products obtainable by eaceharging
the product of his work for them, the disutility of work to him, the
effectiveness of his work and the terms on which he exchanges his product
for other people's product. In a capitalist industry, the level of
activity, which is controlled by the capitalist owner, is noo determined
by these four determinants, but by the principle of equating marginal
revenue with marginal cost. The first two determinants thus disappear
and are replaced by another* the terms on «hich owners of fixed capital
can get the other factors of production to collaborate with them. This
difference affects the reaction of producers to the trade cycle^ Jin a
general recession, as the output of ethers declines, their demand for any
individual capitalist's output in terms of goods decline too. Obeying
the principle of equating marginal cost to marginal revenue, he restricts
his activityj by so doing he may reduce his marginal cost, and more
commonly/
(5) In this paragraph we follow Mr, Barred's analysis in his "Trade Cycle",
Chapter 1,
(6) Actually it is the location of control over activity and the scale of
output which masters. Hence this analysis applies to lease-hold as well as
to peasant farming.
n.
commonly, raise his marginal revenue• But the non-capitalist producer
sees the reduction of demand as a reduction in the power of his labour
to acquire the goods he wants by exchange * It is analogous to a weakening
in his own power to produce, and if the inverse relation between the .power
of work and the level of work is correct, te will increase his activity.
This explains why, in depressions, agricultural outputs have been obstinate¬
ly maintained and prices have fallen out of all proportion. This tendency
is aggravated by the comparative lack of mobility from one branch of
agriculture to another or from agriculture in general
Another notable feature of these economies is the absence of widely
used systems of credit. Savings, when they are not embodied in money
hoards, are invested in buying land. Because of population pressure,
land is bound to be always in great demand, and rent is continuously in¬
creasing, Two things follow from this: land is a very liquid asset to
which savings are canalised and returns from it also govern the rate
of interest, for the latter cannot be lower than the rate which equates the
capitalised/
(7) Cf. Harrod, op, cit, pp, 32-33,
(8) Cf, Keynes: "The General Theory..." " It may be that in certain
historic environments the possession of land has been characterised by a
high liquidity -premium in the minds of owners of wealth; and since land
resembles money in that its elasticities of pr©auction and substitution
may be very low, it is conceivable that there have been occasions in
history in which the desire to hold land has played the same role in keep¬
ing up the rate of interest at too high a level which money has played in
recent times. It is difficult to trace this influence quantitatively ow¬
ing to the absence of a forward price for iana in terms of itself which is
strictly comparable with the rate of Interest on a money debt, We have,
however, something which ,has, at times, been closely analogous, in the
shape of high rates of interest on Mortgages", p, 241. Compare, however,
with the following footnote.
ct
capitalised value of rent with the price of luna as determined by supply
(9)and demand £or it. Whether individual savings are embodied in money-
hoards or are used for buying land they d© not lead to any real saving on
the part of the community, since in these two forms they are not balanced
by investment. This however, does not mean that these savings are
"wasted". For the community as a whole, there is no reduction in
aggregate consumption, money-hoarding' leads merely to a reduction in prices
while investment in land means only the transfer of purchasing power from
one/
(9). This is the exact reverse of the accepted theory of capitalization.
According to this theory, the vaLue of an existent asset is the uiscounted
sum of the series of its future yields. The rate of discount - the current
rate of interest - is determined independently by the disutility of saving
and the marginal productivity of capital according to one school of thought,
and the liquidity preference and the quantity of money according to another.
In the text it is maintained that it is the rent of land which determines
the rate of interest. Kent is an independent variable, determined by the
pressure of population in land. The price of land is another independent
variable, determined by its supply, which is fixed, and the demand for it
which is, for these communities, the same thing as the supply of saving,
in the ex-ante pre-"General Theory" sense. Between them they determine
the rate of interest - that rate of discount which equates the series of
future renws with the price of land. It follows that for any given amount
of savings, the greater the size of the population the higher the rate of
interest will be. It is extraordinary that some writers who still adhere
to the Ricardian concept of rent (Ricaruo who had no specific theory of
interest aid not have to face this dilemma and Marshall was too cotre.rui to
fail in the trap) would at the same time use the above theory of capital¬
ization in explaining land values. The two things are incompatible and
perhaps, more thin anything else this is why the Ricardian concept of rent
has fallen out of favour in modern formulations of the general equilibrium.
This however may be excused by the fact that rent - in the Ricardian sense -
h«s become such an unimportant fact in the economic life of modern com¬
munities and land itself a neglible outlet for savings that the incompatibil¬
ity may be overlooked. "The division of the determinants of the economic
system into the two groups of given factors and independent variables is,
of course, quite arbitrary from any absolute standpoint. The division must
be made entirely on the basis of experience, so as to correspond on the one
jiand to the factors in which the changes seem to be so slow or so little
relevant as to have only a small and comparatively negligible short-term
influence/
influence on our ouaeaitma: ana on the other h^sod to those factors in
which the changes are found in practice to ex©j else'a dominant influence
on our cmaesitum." (Keynes "The General theory", P* 272 cf. Also supra
chapter III p, 2.) For under-developed countries, which has no history
of great individual investments in capital assets other than land, where
holders of wealth, in general, are not accustomed, for many reasons, to
relate their savings to the rate of interest which could be earned on
these other assets (this, however, in some countries is rapidly charging)*
and where land, having an elasticity of substitution and of supply equal
to zero, land, is the main receptacle of savings and at the same time
has a dominant part in the economy, rent must be considered, together with
the supply of savings, the determinant of the rate ox" interest. For this
reason great care must be takenapplying modern economic theory - macro-
economic theory even more than micro-economic theory - to the economies
cf these countries.
If this is accepted, the high rate^of Interest on mortgage referred
to by Lora Keynes in the quotation in the previous footnote must be
explained, not by a high liquidity-premium, but by the fact that the
appreciation in the yield of land - as population pressure increases -
is anticipated. This indeed - it may be remarked en passing - is not the
only instance in dhich inference from "The General Theory" analysis to
other economies than those for which it was especially designed, does not
seem to be particularly happy. The Ancient Egyptians did not need to
build pyramids to stimulate employment} their economy - admittedly a
sad reflection on planning - was centrally planned! Kor did the Middle-
Agers, for that matter, whose economy was predominantly agricultural,
need to build Cathedrals.
u.
one set of people to another. The high rates of interest which
obtain in these countries can be explained partly by high llquidlty-
preference and partly by the (comparatively) high rent from land. The
first cause can be dealt with by expansionary monetary policy but the
latter is likely to become more difficult to overcome as popuh tion
increases.
The high rate of interest sets a limit on investment, but because of
the agricultural nature of the economy, it does not affect employment.
The question, however, is not that of maintaining a high level of
activity in these economies as they are, but of the prospect of its
maintenance during the process of industrialization. Both from static
and dynamic analysis, it would seem at first while that under-developed
countries would have much less difficulty in maintaining full employment
during the process of transition than fully developed countries. Thus
we find in the General Theory; the richer the community, the wider
will tend to be the gap between its actual ana its potential production;
a poor eciaannity will be prone to consume by far the greatest part of its
output, so that a very modest measure of investment will be sufficient to
provide full employment; whereas a wealthy community will have to discover
much ampler opportunities for investment if the saving propensities of its
wealthier/
(10). For this reason the margin for Investment which some writers on
development (see for example: Industrialization and Foreign Trade: League
of Nations Publication 1946) infer to exist from the "hoarding of treasure"
is an illusicnary margin, unless these treasures are used to obtain foreign
exchange. Also the often-stated phrase "in underdeveloped countries land is
a bottomless sink for savings" must be interpreted only in the light of
the previous footnote.
wealthier members are to be compatible with the employment of its poorer
members, •.. But worse still. Not only is the marginal propensity
to consume weaker in «. wealthy community, but, owing to its accumulation
of capital being already larger, the opportunities for further investment
are less attractive unless the rate of interest falls at a sufficiently
rapid rate,^ as for the dynamic setting, population is bound to be
increasing, perhaps - initially at least - at an increasing rate, and this
is generally held to facilitate employment.
The reasoning with which Keynes relates the remarks quoted above t 9
his theoretical model is this "••« the greater the marginal propensity to
consume, the greater the disturbance to employment corresponding to a
given change in investment. This might seem to lead to the paradoxical
conclusion that a poor community in which saving is a very small proportion
of income will be more subject to violent fluctuations than a wealthy com¬
munity where saving is a larger proportion of income and the multiplier
consequently smaller. This conclusion, however, would overlook the dis¬
tinction between the effects of the marginal propensity to consume and
those of the average propensity to consume. For whilst a high marginal
propensity to consume Involves a larger roportionate effect from a given
percentage change in investment, the abaolute effect will, nevertheless,
be small if the average propensity to consume is also high, ... Thus
whilst the multiplier is larger in a poor community, the effect on employ¬
ment of fluctuations in investment will be much greater in a wealthy
community/
(11). "The General Theory..." p. 31, Italics Keynes.
tsr,
community , assuming that in the latter current investment represents a
(12 )
much larger proportion of current output" •
This may also he supported by the fact that, in agriculture, fluctua¬
tions in demand do not very much affect aggregate output - a reduction ■
in demand may even increase it, so that, if agriculture is a large sector
of the economy, fluctuations in investment are not likely to affect very
much the siae of the aggregate income. If, however they lead to violent
fluctuations in prices, or if these fluctuations are caused by any
extraneous cause } such as the agricultural cycle itself, their effect on
employment in the industrial sector may be altogether out of proportion
to their effect on aggregate real income, since output in industry is
governed by money demand, Also, because^at the level of income obtaining
in under-developed countries, industrial products are, comparatively, in
the nature of semi-luxury goods, fluctuations in aggregate real income due
to causes other than fluctuations in investment will affect more heavily
the demand for industrial output and hence employment in it* Great
fluctuations in employment would not, however, at least in the initial
stages, be due to reasons inherent in the industrial process itself, and
the difficulties of securing full employment would be much less than they
are for high-income countries.
It is when we turn to dynamic factors, particularly the increase in
(13)
population, that doubts of another kind begin to arise, Mr, Harrod
in/
12. op, eit,, p» 125-d
15, "Towards Dynamic Economics",
in a model specially constructed to study whether there is any natural
tendency for the community's propensity to save to adapt itself to the
rate of capital accumulation required by the two fundamental conditions
(14)
which, in his opinion, govern growths population and technical change
has shown that, where the rate of actual growth (G) is rapid (because
population growth is rapid) there will be a chronic tendency for (ft) to
exceed what he calls "warranted" rate of growth (G ), and consequently a
chronic tendency for required capital accumulation (C ) to exceed actual
capital accumulation (G) since Gw and GC are both, by definition, equal
to(S\,tae average propensity to save. This situation leaas to a chronic
inflationary gap, in contrast with slowly maturing economies, where Gw•w
will tend to exceed G and C will tend to exceed Cx. and a chronic deflation¬
ary gap will appear/1^ Thus when thriftness is deficient, the
"warranted"/
(14) Op, cit, p, 22 et suite.
(lo) Mr, Karrod distinguishes between G, Gw and Gr, and between C and Cr
G, is the increment of total production in any unit period of time
expressed as a fraction of total production, that is, it is the actual
rate of income growth, Gw is the increment which leaves entrepreneurs
satisfied with doing what they are doing and continuing to do the same,
and Gr is the rate of growth in income which the fundamental cnnditions -
population growth and technical improvement - allowff. C is the increase
in capital outstanding at the end of any given period over that outstanding
at the beginning of the period divided by the increment of prouuction in
that same period, that is, the actual rate of capital increase, Cr is the
rate of capital increase required by G. s is the fraction of income
saved. GC s b by definition; the equation G*Cr - a expresses the
equilibrium of steady advance. By relating these two equations to each
other he w±±iis'm. able to see whether the actual rate of growth within the
framework of the fundamental conditions whose requirements are related to
the above two equations by the third equation GrCr*or ? s, is compatible
or not with full employment, Cf. op, cit, lecture three.
"warranted" rat© of capital accumulation is less than the rate required toy
steady progress with full employment. She actual rate of accumulation
will therefore pursue a cyclical course, una over a long ^uiea, the
actual rate ©i accumulation is hula in caeck toy toe fact that the full
capacity rate of saving * yields a rat© of increase in th© stock of
(15A) (lo)
capital less than the required rate* From this Href EobineoBr * uraws
the conclusion that* since .(if population is increasing} to© stock of
capital will to© growing more slowly than the available labour. while the
/ . d-
amount of employment associated with/given/ stock of capital la continually
falling as technical progress takes place, there will toe a progressive
increase in unemployment. This unemployment, she points out, is not
susceptible to Keynsim remedies, fox*, if the level of effective Uamuud
were boosted up, for example, toy public investment schemes, th© demand
for consumption goods will be raised above th© capacity output of existing
plant, inflationary rise in prices would set in*
Because of the speculative nature of the now '*dynamic analysis11 on©
must not dogmatise about inference® drawn from it. That the above con*
elusion may not be implausible, however, Buy to© seen from a mere pedestrian
approach to the question, "What is there about additional people that
makes thorn a stimulus to investment end indirectly to general business
activity did employment rather than a problem for th© relief auszLnlstration*
v.© amy apply th© four ways in which Professor A.H, Swreesy^*^ answers this
jgdcatlai?/.,
(15A) Cf. op. cit. lectures three and four, /for.
(16) "Mr. Harrod*a Dynamics", Economic Jeuraal,/ UM9„p 8'8 ■
(17) A.E. Sveeayi 'population Growth ana Investment Opportunity^
Quarterly Journal of Economics LV, 1640, p. *<*£.
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question to the particular circumstances in under-developed countries*
(1) through its effect on'aggregate demuna, It is usually argued
that population increase, by increasing the number of dependents, will
Increase the marginal propensity to consume. Whether this is true or
not for high-income countries may be open to question - it depends,
anyway, on changes in the rate of increase, not on the increase itself -
but it does not apply to low income countries, where, among those sections
of the community which - by their sheer size - would provide a very great
proportion of the increase, the marginal propensity to consume is almost
equal to unity.
(2) Through its effect on the composition of demand. It is claimed
that a growing population uirects a relatively large proportion of its
expenditure towards goods and services which require heavy investment for
their production; the usual examples being housing and agricultural
produce. This argument again is only relative to high income-ieveltfCM/ft/K/eSj
at the levels obtaining in under-developed countries, it is unlikely that
increase in numbers, Tfcjy itself, will lead to much more than re-sharing of
the same amount of food and housing rooms there is no great margin to„,
transfer. Moreover, housing there is not of the type which needs much
investment, and any favourable effect on investment from the transference
of expenditure to food will probably be more than outbalanced by trans¬
ference of income to the land-lord class, whose marginal propensity to
consume is probably lower than the marginal p. to c. for the whole popula¬
tion, and in so far as this clas~ does not have a lower marginal propensity
tc consume - it is difficult to form an opinion about this - the transferred
income/
n.
income, in view of the well known very unequal distribution of land
property in these countries, will he spent on luxury goods and services.
This would have a multiplier effect on industrial activity in general,
hut probably less than had there been no income transference.
(3) Through its effect on the supply of labour# An increased
labour supply would raise the marginal productivity of capital xxxxxx&ors?
relatively to that of labour and hence encourage invest¬
ment. The condition for this to happen, however, is that foodstuffs «nu
raw materials are in completely elastic supply,which is far frem
likely in under-developed countries,
(4) As an essential part of certain broader phenomena which vitally
affect investment. Population increase would be a contributing factor
to the maintenance of an atmosphere of optimism, vigour and buoyancy in
the economy, but only if the economy is, for other reasons, expanding
and the standard of level rising. Moreover, this effect takes place
because of the resultant change in the avei age-age of the population.
Where population is already young, the effect of this factor may be totally
discounted.
We may conclude therefore, that, in view of the population pressure,
there/
(18) op. cit, p. This is a restatement in modem terms of the
Ricardian theory - an essentially dynamic one - that as accumulation in¬
creases and raises the market rate of wages, population would increase at
a rate which keeps wages steady at the subsistence level. Accordingly,
the share of labour in the marginal product wculu rise, uhe amount of real
wages remaining constant, hence the real profit per unit of capital would
fall. Cf. Barredj Towards A Dynamic Economics" p. lo.
there is no greater guarantee that private enterprise alone weulu be able
to secure a 'high level of activity than there is for fully developed
countries, though, because there is no large sector already industrial¬
ized, this would take the form of a depressing effect on potential new
investment rather than that of unemployment#***
(19) A more conclusive result would perhaps be reached by approaching the
question in accordance with footnote eight. As population increases the
rate of interest, as determined by rent ana the supply of savings, would
also rise ana this would have a depressing effect on investment, A
systematic development of this line of thought woula have required a
restatement of the modern theory of Aggregates to suit the conditions
of underdeveloped countries, a task which proved to be beyond the present
student's ability. I believe however, that much advance cculu be maae
along this line.
V ,
Optimum Distribution of heoourcea in Unuer-devolooed Countries.
I, The Central question of development, as of all e concmies, is how
far the entrepreneurial profit motive cdB he entrusted with the process,
of directing resources to their various uses. It is generally agreed
that the optimum distribution of resources between ti.eir alternative uses
will he achieved if the price oi .each commodity is equal to its marginal
(1)
cost. ' It i© also agreed that the entrepreneur, in hie attempt to
maximize his profit» will always try to equate his marginal revenue from
selling a commodity with the marginal cost of producing it -»u that only
under perfect competition will marginal revenue fro© selling a commodity
equal its average revenue *» that is its price. It follows that the
optimum distribution of resourcea will he achieved only if conditions of
perfect competition obtain o. are at least approximated. If tiugr do
noti the entrepreneurial profit motive must be either supplemented or
replaced hy public action in accordance with the rule of the optimum.s '
(1) ve abstract here from divergences between marginal private cost ana
marginal social cost* v.e also as- ume perfect competition among factors
of ,rouucticn. The above rule therefore becaaea equivalent to Professor
Pigou*s rule for the optimum distribution ox resources ana this particulja*
form was chosen for convenience of exposition. For various alternative
formulations of the same thing cf. A.P. Lerner> "Economics of Control,"
Chapter 9.
(2) ;;ueh of the present chapter was influenced, beside# the standard works
on the theory of value ana or. imperfect competition, hy the great debate
on the possibility of rational calculation in a planned economy. Dee
narticularlvj F. Hayek: (ed.) "Collactivist economic Planning",
"Individualism and Economic Order"; M, Dobb, "Economic Theory ana the
Problem of a Socialist Economy" E.T. 1933, "A note on Saving ana Invest¬
ment in a Socialist Economy," 1939,"Soviet Economic Development since
1917" (Chapter I); H.D. Dickinson, "Price Formation in a Socialist
Community" E.J. 1933, "Economics ox Socialism": E. Durbin "Economic
Calculus in a Planned Econ©Hy"/fxa. Lange, "On the Economic Theory of
Socialism" R.E.S,, October 1936 and February 1937. A.P. Lerner "A
note on Socialist Economics" R.E.S., October 1936, "Statics and
Dynamics in Socialist Economics", E.J. 1937; J.B. Hoff: "Economic
Calculation in the Socialist Society". The adjustment of the presentation
of the theoretical points raised in this subject to the c^naitions of
under-developed economics makes it difficult to make more than a general
acknowledgment.
It will be necessary therefore, in trying to answer the question
with which this chapter was opened to find out how far competitive •
conditions are likely to prevail in countries undergoing development.
of the entrepreneurial actions in the short run under conditions of
perfect competition. In the short run, costs can be divided into two
parts: fixed and variable. Fixed costs are those which have already
been incurred, and therefore have no influence on the entrepreneur's
out-put policy during the period of time contemplated; whether it will
be worth his while to produce a given output or not will depend on the
relation between his irarginal variable cost and his marginal revenue,
which latter, under the assumed conditions of perfect competition, is
equal to price. He will maximize his profit on current out-put if that
output is pushed to the point where its marginal variable cost = marginal
revenue = price. The accompanying diagfMurwi2i illustrate this.- -
II. It is convenient-and customary - to start with the analysis
tviv6
Curve a f c represents his
fixed cost. Since, by
definition, total fixed cost
is not affected by the scale
of his out-put, this curve
takes the form of a rectangular
hyperbola, with average fixed
cost decreasing as out-put
increases. Curve a v c
represents average variable
0




indicating decreasing average variable costs, at the earlier stages of
utilizing the fixed factor, then if turns upwards as the increasing
utilisation raises this cost. Curve m v c represents the marginal
variable cost ana is. derived from a v c according to the usual rules of v
derivation, Curve ate represents average total costs and is construct¬
ed by summing up for any output average fixed costs and average variable
costs, Since only variable costs affect the curve marginal to the total
cost curve, it follows that m v c, which is marginal to a v c, is also
marginal to a t c and cuts the latter also at its minimum point. It
follows that for output at which average total coot is at a minimum,
marginal cost is equal to average total cost.
If the price is less than A N, the entrepreneur will not produce
anything, since at this level, marginal variable cost is less than
average variable cost, with the result that if he equates his marginal
variable cost with price his proceeds will be less than his outlays
on the variable cost factors alone^and hence he will be making a loss.
If the price is at any level between A M and B P, he will produce that
output which equates his marginal variable cost with price, for, though-
he will be making a loss - price being less than average total cost -
what he earns above average variable cost will be a net gain on current
account and will reduce his loss on capital account. If the price is
at B P he will be making neither profit nor gain, while if it is above
B P he will be making a net gain. If we include in the fixed cost
"normal" earnings of entrepreneurship, then at an average price of B P
there will be no inducement for the firm to leave the industry or for
other/
other firms to enter it.
III. So far we have assumed the size of the fixed factor to be given.
It is when we try to find out how this size is determineu,while con¬
ditions of competitive equilibrium are maintained,that difficulties
(
begin to crop up. The equilibrium size is usually illustrated by the
use of a long period individual firm cost curve. To each size of fixea
an
equipment, there ccrresponds/anaverage total short run cost curve Similar
to the curve a t c of figure (3). If we posit a series 01 tre se curves
beside each other in descending order of the size of the fixeu factor to
which they correspond, the minimum point on each of these curves will be
lower than the minimum point on the preceding one, up to a point after
which they begin to rise. The curve tangential to this series of
curves is the long run cost curve for the firm, and if the variation
in the size of the plant is continuous so that we have an infinite series
of short run average total cost curves, the corresponding longrun cost
curve will be a smooth parabola. The reason my it slopes downwards
and then upwards is that over its declining range the economies of large
scale production out-bulance the diseconomies arising from the increasing
difficulties of co-ordination, then they just balance each other, then
the latter prevail. • #■
Before further comment we must be perfectly clear* about what is
meant by a long-term cost curve. According to Professor Stigler^*^, #
"long run/
(1)"The Theory of Price" p. lc&.
aP
"long-run average cost is defined at the lowest possible average cost of
producing any output when the entrepreneur has aaequate time to make d 1
desired adjustments". This definition is almost a compressed summary
of Marshall's explanation of what is meant by long-period in economic
analysis* Yet though the term "adjustments" in Stigler's definition
and the general drift of Marshall's explanation may suggest a curve which
traces through Lime the average minimum cost as the firm continuously
adjusts itself to new circumstances, e.g. to changes in demand or in
factor prices, it ccula not properly he so interpreted, for then there
would be no reason why it shoulu take the usual form of a parabola. To
understand the nature of this curve we must visualise a businessman, like
Marshall's wool manufacturer, drawing for himself a series of hypothetical
cost curves corresponding to different hypothetical sixes of fixed plants
and deriving from them a hypothetical long-run average cost curve.
Marshall reconciles this concept of the long-run average cost with the
applications in which he uses it by creating the concept of the
Kepresentative Firm, "one which has had a fairly long life and fair
success, which is managed with normal ability,and which belongs to that
aggregate volume of production..This firm would have the site
which would correspond to the minimum point on the IfiAg-run average
cost curve, or, as he calls it, the long run individual supply curve, ,
It does not reach it directly, it approaches it by steps, ehrarging its
site as it builds up trade connections and acquires greater disposal
over capital, and it does not stay there, it becomes senile and declines.
The/
(2) "Principles" p. 317.
The individual normal supply curve woulu trace the average cost ox the
firm as it grows with time until it reaches the size of the representative
firm. Yet it is not a historical curve, it remains a theoretical curve,
with time, so to speak, as one of its dimensions,^ Much doubt,
however, has been cast on the usefulness of the concept of the Representa-
(4}
tive Firor and the normal individual supply curve is now replaced by
the long-run cost curve,and for welfare analysis purposes this concept
is rather a hindrance than an aid. Fox*, if individual business cannot
reach the optimum size except gradually, for example beemuse of the
difficulties which entrepreneurs woula find in obtaining the necessary
capital, there is a case for the State seeing to it - uirectly or by
subsidies - that this size is directly reached, since only at it are
the average costs at a minimum, The natural gradual process would be a
costly one from the point of view of the community. For the same reason,
because integration may be a large source of economy, the concept of the
fina/
(3) I am not sure that I have rightly interpreted Marshall, He does not
use an individual supply curve in his "Principles", but X think this
represents the situation he |sixxi Xxxc nstructC^-
(4) Cf. Robbins: "The Representative Firm" Rconosiic Journal lbbS, also
"Synopsism 011 the Representative Firm ana Increasing Returns" by S.F,
Shove, P, jZrraffa and D.H, Robertson, Economic Journal, lb30.
firm, for the purpose of this study, must be taken to be an economic
concept and not a legal one. The long-iur* average cost curve woula trace
the relation between different sizes t,nu the minimum average co-1 of the
■f-j-iane* ,roquet, irrespective of whether» in tne actual economy, firms ore
integrated or not.
The condition for the optimum distribution of resource tnrough the
action of private enterprise is that there be a number of firms of the
optimum size - that is, the size which corresponds lo the minimum point
on the long-run average cost curve - so large that none of teem will be
conscious of the effect of its output policy on the price of the product.
IV. Two questions now arises
1. Whether the optimum size is likely to be reached directly by
private enterprise in unaer-devloped eccnoinies.
2. If it is lix.el^ to be reached, whether conditions of perfect
competition would still prevail.
In actual life, the two questions are inseparable. If the optimum
size is fairly small, as it is in retail trade, or rather was until the
development of multiple-store organization made it sisuch larger, and in
most branches of agriculture, ttse private firms are likely to reach it
directly and to be under competitive conditions. On the other hand,
firms whose optimum size is fairly large - and it is only in co nection
with these that the question arises - are likely to be in competitive
conditions only if they have historically grown to it gradually.
Theoretically, however, the two questions are quite distinct. The first
depends on the entrepreneurs1 degree of foresight, their willingness to
take/
tL
take risks, and their command over the necessary capital. The second
relates to the nature o± the productive process. We will aeal, for
the moment, only vsfith the second question.
Whether a firm would he of optimum size arid still operate under
competitive conditions or not, will depend first on the largeness of this
size, second on the extent of the laarket for its products.
1. Whether there is a limit set on the economies secured from
large-scale production and integration and where this limit lies is
a matter of empirical research ma not of theory.
2. As to the extent of the market, it will depend on the transport¬
ability of the commodity, on its elasticity of substitution and on the
level of income of the community;
a. Thus, where a commodity is not by its nature transportaolej
such as the services of roads between two geographical points, or
where its transport involves a heavy cost, such as coal where sources
of supply/ which could be operated only by single or by a very limited
number of firmsf are widely dispersed from each other^or where/ if the
commodity is to be produced efficiently at all^ the producer must have
a local monopoly, as in public utility services, conditions of perfect
competition would not obtain. Vie call monopolies arising from this
factor geographical monopolies.
b. The elasticity of substitution for a commodity will depend
on its intrinsic utility and on the ability of producei-s to differentiate
it in the minds of consumers. The utility of producers'goods is
derived from the utility of their findi product, ana the size of their
market/
market will depend accordingly on the siae of the market for the final
product and on the versatility of their product.
Differentiation, whose importance is restricted to consumers1 goods,
will be either due to advertising or it will correspond to real benefit
conferred on the consumer. In the latter case whatever monopoly profit
the producer is able to obtain from differentiation will fee balanced by
a corresponding real service to the consumer, except in so far as the
consumer may not be given the choice between the differentiated product
and a cheaper standardized product which have essentially the s«me
utility.
c. The level of income-given the above factors - will determine
whether or not the demand for the commouity will be large enough to
require more than one source of supply of optimum size. In general,
the lower the level of income the less will be the number of sources
required to satisfy the demand for any one commodity. But the level
of income has also another aspect which works in an opposite direction.
In a low-income country, capital will have a high marginal productivity
relatively to that of labour and hence will be a scare factor relatively
to labour. High rates of interest will prevail. The higher the rate
of interest the less will be the optimum size of the firm, and according¬
ly, the smaller the total output corresponaing to that siae. The lownes
of income-level therefore has two opposite effects. In as much as it
makes the demand for any given product smaller, it leads to monopoly,
and in as much as it reduces the optimum size of the firm, it enhances
competition. fthieh of these two effects will prevail in any particular
industry/
n
industry will depend, other things being e^ual, on the nature of the
productive process. More specifically - the marginal analysis fails
us here - it will depend on the degree of discontinuity in the long-
period average cott curve and on the rate at which the average cost
decreases as the size of firm increases. Thus, for example, in the
steel or shipbuilding industry, wis re, if the production is to be* efficient
at ail, the minimum size of the production unit has to be fairly large,
or, where, as in the motor car inuustry, there is no continuity of scale
from the ordinary methods of production to the conveyor-belt system and
wfcsjre the ratio of the efficiency of the two sizes is probably much
greater than the ratio of the two sizes themselves, the force working
against competition which results from the former aspect of income-level
is likely to outweigh the force making for it which results from the
latter aspect, in contrast, for example, vdth the textile inuustry,
where there is a continuity in the graduation of the size of the firm.
V. Let us assume that the curve D In figure 4 represents the demand
schedule for the product. 51 R is the marginal revenue curve. L A is
the long-period average cost curve, L M it's long period marginal cost.
S A , S A , S A and S A o^short period total average eo t curves.
1 ? £> 3 4
Since the demand curve cuts the long-run average cost curve to the left
of its minimum point, one firm will be sufficient to satisfy the total
a
demand and if this firm is run by/private monopolist , cutput 0 Mp from a
plant where sise corresponds to short period average total cost curve
S will be produced, since at this output - for & ich marginal revenue
is equal to marginal cost - his monopolistic profit N P will be at a
maximum. This ..ill be a necessary outcome if the limitation of the
market is geographical, in the wider sense used above.
If it is uue to other causes, it is not necessary. Another
entrepreneur, seeing that he can produce with normal profit at price
f
Mg may enter the field, establish a plant where short period average
cost curve is S A£ and outbid the monopolist. The condition for this
to happen is that he himself be content with normal profits, a matter
which depends on the possibilities of monopolistic profits in other
sectors of the eeonoay, on the supply of entrepreneurs, and on the supply
of loanable funds for investment, and that he will resign himself to
probable loss during the remainder of the life term of the plant of
the first producer, since during that period it will pay the latter to
sell at short-period marginal costs, if only to minimis© his loss. The
gain to the community from both producers selling at less than long
period average coct is not a net gain, for it is the result" of over¬
investment/
PL
over-investment in this particular line, which is a waste. Bygones are
not bygones if they en be avoided.
Let us maintain still the assumption that the demand curve for tjU
product cuts the long-period average cost curve to the left of its
minimum point ana let us see what the optimum size of the fixed factor
should be in this case. It may seem that this should be the size which
corresponds to short-period average eo;.t curve S A( since only at this
w
size would average long-run cost equal average revenue, and hence neither
abnormal profits nor losses are made. This, however, would be contrary
to the general rule of the optimum distribution of resources, which
prescribes that price should be made equal to marginal cost and not to
average cost* According to this rule, 0 M^s and not 0 M , should be
produced, with a fixed factor size which corresponds to short-period
average co.t-curve S A^, the product being sold at price *b Q , with a
loss of QgKg* That this is the optimum position cm be shown by
looking at it from the aspect of consumers' surplus.
0
figures.
In figure 5, where the relevant portion of the long-run average cost
curve is reproduced from figure 4, the gain from producing OMg rather
than GMg , measured in terms of consumers * surplus, would be the area
OjOoN Nr0o» and the loss would be the rectangle 0,QgH^(l with a net1 ° 3 2 3 "
gain of OgNgKgPg.
This is Marshall's famous argument for subsidising increasing
returns industries, although of course, lis analytical scheme was
sbehaiLig different# For him, the falling curve is the total supply
curve, not the firm's cost curve. The presumption he established for
subsidising increasing returns industries would hold whether the increase
in returns is due to economies internal to the firm or external to it
(but internal to the industry), though it is not clear?as has been &>
often pointed out by manywriters - why, if returns are increasing, the
firm, by expansion and integration - does not establish itself into a
monopoly. By using in the above exposition the firm cost curve and by
assuming that at each si&e the firm is optimally oigonisea, the relation
*
'between increasing returns and monopoly is brought to the foreground and
external and internal economies are dealt with from a welfare point of
view at the same timel0'1
Professor Pigou's argument^ for subsidising increasing returns
industries is in one respect narrower and in another wider than necessary.
On the on© hand it refers only to external economies within the industry,
whereas/
(5) We abstract here from economies external to the industry,
(b) Gf "Economics of Welfare", Part II ch. XI,
whereas the presumption fox* subsidising is applicable botu to external
and internal economies. On the other hand, it includes - through the
use of the debatable distinction between the supply price from the point
of view of the community, from which transfer elements are excluded,
and the supply price from the point of view of the industry - the case
where though physical costs are still declining the decline is more than
offset by a rise in the supply price of the factors which the inuustry
uses. Also the concept of the equilibrium firm, like Marshall's
representative firm, obscures the relation between Increasing returns
and monopoly.
It will be argued that where the entrepreneurial p*ofit motive
does not lead to rhe optimum distribution of resources, public enterprise
is preferable to fiscal measures (taxes and subsidies) as a method of
securing this optimum. This means t^at, in the case we are c ens icier ing,
public enterprise will have to be run at a loss. Under normal competitive
conditions, the loss and profit account plays a great role in the rational
distribution of resources. Investment decisions are made in anticipa¬
tion of consumers wishes, ana losses and profits are the pointers which
indicate whether these wishes have been correctly anticipated ox not.
By resigning ourselves beforehand to losses in the case considered
above - which is a necessary outcome of equating price with longxun
marginal cost - we lose the services of these pointers and the door will
be open to persistence in miscalculation. But the risk is unavoidable,
and, I think, worth taking, for increasing returns are the vehicles
through which economic progress is transmitted. Moreover, this risk is
inherent in the situation} it may not be possible to avoid it merely
bv/
producing that output which equates long run average cost with price,
for if we establish the fixed factor at the size indicated by the
intersection of the demand curve with the long run average cost curve,
it may still be necessary to produce at a loss, for the long period average
cost curve may touch the short-period average cost curve, not at its ^he l°hrt&
minimum point, but to the to ft of it. In this case the short-period
marginal, cost curve (S1S3 in figure 5) will intersect the demand curve
not at the point at which the latter intersects the long run average
cost curve, but below it (at R in figure b) so that if the short-run
demand curve turne<^but to take the place of the anticipated long-run
demand curve, the output indicated by the intersection of the demand curve
with the short-run marginal cost curve (and we have seen that cutout must
be determined by these two things) will have to be produced at a loss,
since so long as the minimum point on the short run average cost curve
is not reached, the marginal cost curve will be below the average cost
curved This situation cm be avoided only if price is rnaae to be
determined/
(7) This situation will not arise if the long-run average cost curve
touches the short run average cost curve at the latters minimum point.
Some writers argue that so long as the long period c-rve is downward-
sloping, it must touch the short-period heurve to the left of its miniaum
point (See for example, R. Harrods "Analysis of Supply" Economic
Journal, Dec., IbSi, p. 575). As Professor Chamberlain has shown
("The Theory of Monopolistic Competition", 6th edition, Appendix B)
there is no theoretical necessity for this.
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determined, not, by short run marginal cost? but by short run average total
cost? which is highly uneconomical sines? especially in investments which
have a fairly long life, it precludes the adjustment of output from
existing plant to fluctuations arid changes in demand.
A similar situation arises in the case of lumpy investment, like
canals, bridges, roads, dams, irrigation schemes, which, if they are to
be made at all? have - for technical reasons- to be made on a large scale?
and whose short-run marginal cost may be so negligible that it would not
rise to cut the short-run average cost curve at its minimum point until
the point of intersection of the latter with the demand curve has been
passed on the left. In this case equating short-run marginal cost with
price will necessarily mean that the cot of the investment will not be
completely covered, tut the gain to consumers may be much greater than
the loss,
VI. The case is different where the demand curve cuts the long-run
average cot t curve at its minimum point or to the right of this minimum
point, Kere increasing returns ceasef to exist. Conditions of
competition, however, would not obtain unless the demand curve is so far
removed to the right of this minimum point that there will be room for
a number of optimum-size firms so large that none of them will be
conscious of the effect of its output policy on price. Failing this con¬
dition? imperfect cospe tition^^ conditions would obtain. No A priori
analysis of the effect of such a situation on the size and output of
different firms is possible} it all depends on who come first, what
size/
(S) We use these two words to include cases of duopoly, oligopoly and
monopolistic competition.
<7/-
size he established ana what output policy he adopted, on how producers
who Cairn afterhim react to his. actions, and on whether they act in co¬
ordination or in competion, hut there is a nrima facie case fin-
believing that the optimum distribution of resources will not he secured.
This is a sweeping statement, but it is, I think, unavoidable. The
received analysis of imperfect competition is limited to the comparison
between competitive prices, outputs arid sises, with the same things
had any of the infinite variety or situations which fall under the head¬
ing of imperfect competion obtained. It does not teal us, given the
fact that the market is not wide enough to he competitive yet not so narrow
to establish a pure monopoly, which of these situations would obtain, and
in aenei ai, it establishes that, besides higher prices, both output
and the si&e of the firm would he less than required by the conditions
of cost and demand. This by itself is enough to establish a presumption
in favour- of public interference, in the relevant sector, with the
direction of resources, in accordance with the rule of equating marginal
cost with price7even though the form of divergence from the optimum,
whether with respect to price, output, or sisse of firm, naa this direction
been entirely left to private enterprise, may not he ascertained before¬
hand,
VII. The question now arises whether this interference should he by
fiscal measures - subsidies and taxes - or by direct public enterprise.
Two arguments, I think, tip the balance in favour of the latter,
1. The rule that the optimum distribution of resources would be
secured if price is equal to marginal coot in any particular industry
would/
would held if the rest of the economy is competitive» Accordingly', if
imperfect competition is likely to be widespread, enforcing the rule
would mean that the State woulu have to calculate, besides the loijg-
run marginal cost for the optimum-size firm, the uarginal cost
of every firm prodlicirg the product in question, in order to estimate
the amount of the subsidy. It would also have to estimate the long-
run demand schedule for the product, in oraer to find the number of
r
firms of optimum-size necessary to- satisfy this demand, ana if the
existent number is too large it would have to close the superfluous
(b}
number or tax it out of existence; ' in a publicly managed industry,
it would need to estimate only the long run marginal cost of the optimum
size fix®. The number of firms that would be necessary to satisfy demand
would be approached automatically: as long as existing publicly directed
firms are making abnormal profits,-it is not contemplated on any realistic
assumption that the State would start by building simultaneously a number
larger/
(b) Mr. Kahn, in his little masterpiece7"Some Notes on Ideal Output", B.J.
March lb35, following Professor Pigou in formulating the conditions of
the optimum in terms oi the imrginal product of the factor rather than the
marginal cost of the product, suggests taut, inafairly uncompetitive
economy, since it is no longer possible to equate private ana social
marginal products in all industries, we should make the marginal social
products diverge from the marginal private products to the same extent in
all industries. To achieve this result we should arrange iw industries
in descending order of the amount of monopoly they enjoy, this being
measured by the elasticity of demand for the individual firm's product.
Production then should^ encouraged in the industries which enjoy more
than the average o£*w$iopoly by a complicated system of taxes and subsidies
whose calculations involve the measurement of such magnitudes as the
marginal physical productivities of entrepreneurs. The limitation of such
an analysis, extremely elegant and theoretically satisfying as it was,is
not only that it has to wait until the "empty boxes" are filled - one must
be careful not to throw too many stones from glass houses - but also until
the inappropriate sizes of fixed plant has been chosen and the factors
unoptimally used before the system can be worked out.
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larger than the optimum number • their nymbar is less than the required
one. It may seem contradictory to speak ox alnormul profits while it
is prescribed that prices should be equal to marginal cost since, ii the
firm is of optimum size its long run marginal coat is equal to average
coot and hence no profit would be made. But this rule, applies only,
as far as output determination is concerned. Where demand requires more
than one firm it also serves to determine the number of firms. In the
short run - that is, for output determination from existing firms -
price should be equated with short run marginal cost. The shape of the
demand curve would thereforebe needed only in a rough way, to help in
estimating whether total demand is likely or not to be big enough to
support a competitive number.
2. Tx.e other, and more important, argument is this. The method
of subsidies is essentially an ex post method. It seeks to correct
errors already made in an actual situation which has been already reached,
and is a natural offspring of the equilibrium method of analysis, which is
in the main concerned with formulating competitive equilibrium positions,
giving them welfare significance, and then prescribing cures for the
economy when it actually diverges from them. psf^PH-ngs of e=tt±SE^Etiei.
It is not designed for dealing with these errors before they actually
arise* Perhaps this was all that can be legitimately expected from
theory in the historical situation in the context of which it developed.
Technical innovations which made the optimum size grow larger ana larger
were historically spaced in time^ana accordingly made it possible for a
competitive number of firms to grow up to this size gradually in a market
continuously/
continuously expanaing and thus able to sustain this number. Also
the innovations *.'hich accounted for a big jump in the optimum sisse would
not have had their significance fully perceiveu except with tiae^and had- •
f
had to be first put into practice by some enterprising entrepreneur before
the market verdict could give an actual test of their possibilities.
Ex postff argument from the competitive equilibrium is tss& essentially
an argument from the results of a method of trial ana error, . The market
forces sanction the action of the entrepreneur who introduces,at his own
risk, more efficient methods of production, or predicts more accurately
the conditions of demand, and censors that of the entrepreneur# who fails,
For this the community pays three prices. First, the cost of the
errors of the entrepreneurs, a cost no less heavy for the entrepreneurs
as a class than for the community at large. Second, it foregoes the
advantages of co-ordinating entrepreneuris 1 action, for,economic theory
being capable, as we argued in Chapter II , of explaining only changes
in a given situation, establishes a presumption that the adjustment will
be of an optimum kind only if these changes are, in the nature of the
situation, incapable of co-oraination. If the changes originate from
entrepreneurial action in other spheres of the economy than those
to which a given entrepreneur's foresight, knowledge, or interest is
limited, there is no guarantee that the adjustment of each to the
immediate situation in which he finds himself will oe of a total optimum
nature. Thirdly, it risks the loss from any divergence from the
optimum which might result from an investment whose scale is determined
only by monopoly profit considerations. These three prices may have
been/
*iS.
been, in the historical situation in which theory developed, worth the gain.
For underdeveloped economies, things are different;
A. The first price is unavoidable in any case. Mistakes in
prediction are as likely to be ma^e by a public agency as by a private
entrepreneur; the bigness of the mistakes of the former on account of
the bigness of their unit of decision -Tape likely to be offset by the
greater efficiency of their* predictive machinery and, let us hope, by
a greater knowledge of comparative economic ana social history than a
private entrepreneur, on the average, is likely to master. Because,
however, mistakes are likely to be made, and there is no ether way of
discovering them, it is necessary to retain the market sanction, but the
balance on that count as between public and private enterprise, is
undecided in favour of either.
B. As to the seccna price, the losS from lack of co-ordination,it
would be, in the special circumstances in which these countries find them¬
selves, too heavy to pay, yust because it is uncalled for. For, thanks
to the path-breaking experience of fully developed countries^the effect
of the necessary innovations, particularly with regard to efficiency ana
to the amount of demand they are capable of stimulating can be more
easily calculated than was possible when they first occurred. They do
not have to unfold themselves gradually; they are reaay for application,
so to speak, in one dose, For this reason they en be more reauily
integrated. This of course, does not mean that these countries should
proceed directly to apply the latest methods of production or reproduce
in their economies an exact pattern of the most advanced economies.
This/
1L.
This would bo highly uneconomical, even if it were possible. The
point can best be illustrated by means of an example.
Suppose that a prohibitive tax is imposed on a certain branch of
textiles where private enterprise was hitherto unable to compete with
foreign producers ajgqafcy because there was not enough trained labour
to operate the machines, ana no entrepreneur was willing to undertake
the necessary sacrifice entailed in training them for fear that another -
en
entrepreneur might come along ana attract his labour* by higher wages.j
that the demand conaitions were such that a competitive number of textile
producing firms can be maintained} and that there is neither a machine-
making nor a steel industry in the country, so that the textile manu¬
facturers woulu have to import textile machinery from abroad. Suppose
alwO that, once a demand for machinery was known to exist, a competitive
number of textile machinery-making firms would crop out to satisfy this
demand, and lastly, seeing that there is such a uemand for steel, a
competitive number- of steel-making firms would be established within toe
country to supply the necessary steel to toe machine-making firms.
These assumptions are maae in order to provide as favourable conditions
for the optimum distribution of resources through private enterprise as
can be imagined. At the end of the period contemplated, say forty
year's, there would be fully competitive conditions in ill stages of
necessarily
production in thatbranch of textiles. Yet it. does not'follow that,
over this period of years, and viewing the processus a whole,the optimum
u)ill
distribution of resources^!**\t£been achieved. It may well have been
better first to establish a steel-producing unit, then, with home-produced
steel/
°)7'
steel, to produce textile-machineiy which in its turn helps in
producing the final product To make the comparison between the two
methods correct we have to assume that at the end of the same period
there would be the same number of steel factories, machine-making
factories and textile factories. We have also to assume that the same
amount of textiles was consumed curing the forty year's period. The
possible superiority of the seend mathoa would be cue to this. Because
of the cheaper labour in unaerdevelopeu countries, it may be much more
economical to utilise it in producing steel, then using the product, with
the help of similarly cheap labour, for making textile-macbinary^than
to import high-price textile machinery from high wage countries, and
then import high-price steel to supply the home textile-machinery
manufacturers. Two arguments can be made against this line of
reaswring. First, that higher wages are the result of higher effect¬
iveness of labour. This of course is true to a very great extent,
but it is beside the point. This argument is correct only as an
explanation of differences in wage-levels. It assumes a given degree
of effectiveness in the two countries compared, and explains the
differences in wages accordingly. In our case, where effectiveness is
to be changed by xhe very act of developing the new industry, it is
differences in wage levels which has to be taken as given in calculating
how b.st this effectiveness can be increased. The second possible
argument is that the amount of sacrifice - through capital formation -
involved in the first method is smaller than in the second. In the
in -fttich
first method, whose development proceeds by three stages, first importing
textile/
textile machinery, then steel, then the machinery necessary for building
steel works, the amount of resources necessary to produce a given amount
of textile in the first stage is locked up for a shorter time, the period
of time for which it is locked increasing in the second, then in the
third stage. There will be thus a progressive deepening of the process
of capital formation, in contrast with the second method, where capital
is locked up from the beginning for a longer period, with the same
process being reproduced again; that is, there will be a progressive
widening of the process of capital formation. The first at thou, it
would be argued, would be mote appropriate, since the community is better
able to afford to wait for longer periods of time for the fruits of a
given amount of resources as its income rises with time. But this is
not necessarily so in this particular case^for as against this must be
set the amount of resources released through not having to purchase from
abroad the high price machinery in the iirst stage of the first methou
ana the high price steel in its second stage, so that, if these
resources, released over a n^x-iod of forty pears are worth more than
the resources which must be usea for buying from abroad curing the initial
stages of the second method, the textiles necessary to equate the amount
of consumption in the two cases, there would be a net gain in adopting
the second method.
It is of course cjuite conceivable that a number of entrepreneurs
would foresee this- presumably it is the function 01 the rate of
interest to tell them vtiich methoa would be more productive in the long
mn - and act accordingly. Since we are as aiming a long-run uemand
so/
so large as to enable competitive conditions to proved all along the
line j in this case private enterprise would secure the optimiss uis-
tribution of resources. It is highly unlikely, however, that, with
the existing levels of incase, the demand would be such as to enable
competitive conditions to obtain. In this case the State should
carry out production in the stages affected. Thus if demand was so
large as to maintain a large number of textile firms but not large
enough to require a correspondingly competitive number of machine-
making or steel firms, there is a case for the State operatlxgthe
latter, and leaving the former to private enterprise. As income grows
the demand may grow so much as to require a competitive number of
machine making or steel factories; but so also may the optimum size
of production unit. The result will differ from one industry to
another and from one stage to another and can be judged only in the
light of actual circumstances.
The previous example was particularly chosen because it is often
argued that because underdeveloped countries are lacking in capital
they should concentrate on the production of final consumers* goods
and light industries. This is not necessarily correct, and each case
should be considered on its own merit. The Inference from it applies
even with greater force where no internationaltrade complications
enter into the situation. The obvious illustration is the industrial
power industries, such as electricity undertakings,and' the constructional
industries. Because the demand for their products is dependent on the
pre-existence of industries cf the lower order, and because the optimum
unit of the former, evenkt the existing levels of income, is likely to be
/00.
very 1urgB, their development will either dreg behina ana at the same
time limit the development of the industries which depend on them or
fall into the handsbf a monopoly, and there is a case, accordingly, fox-
public enterprise in this field.
C. We have already, in dealing with tne question of co-ordination,
dealt with the question why there is no need for the waste which occurs
from an investment whose scale is determined by monopoly profit.
VIII. Before attempting to give a general view of the picture
which emerges we must now reconsider in some detail the question of
distribution. It was argued in Chapter XI that it follows from the
principle of diminishing marginal utility 01 income, that, to the extent
that this does not lead to a reduction in its total si&e, income shoulu
be equally distributed. This conclusion^©! course, like all conclusions
of economic science, is subject to modifications on non-economic grounds.
For example, it may be that certain values ana impox'tant non-economic
services to the community, cannot be maintains d and supplied except at
higher income levels. If the national income is not big enough to
secure to everyone this level, redistribution would involve the danger
of extinguishing these values and losing these services, and it would
then be wise to maintain a class of relatively high income individuals
who would set the tune, in culture, refinement anu sense of public
duty, to the rest of the community, and would supply each generation with
home-trained new members who would carry forward the standard. Obviously
the question cannot be judged on a priori grounos; it has to be judged
in the light of the role the rich have historically played - or perhaps
more/
more relevantly, intend to play - in the cultural, political, and even
economic development of each particular country • Not in all countries
are the rich the salt of the earth! arch coaaiueraeions are important,
hut they fall outside the scope of this study, and only the economic
qualification to the general principle;©*' equality will be here considered*
This question is complicated by the fact that redistribution refers
to individuals - more accurately, to households - while earnings refer4 to
economic categories, and that the earnings of one factor may react on
the supply of another* For underdeveloped countries» however, it is
KKsotfb&x simplified by the fact that, for all practical purposes, re¬
distribution will take the form of the distribution of the burden of
public investment and of social services such as education and public
health, if these are to be at all commensurate with the requirements of
development.
1. The easiest factor to oeal with is land# To the extent that
its earnings are pure rent, they can be appropriated without any danger
to the size of the national income!1^)
2# Labour is more difficult# We are not concerned here with the
aggregate supply of population* This has been dealt with in Chapter HT,
and should affect only the rate ana forei of investment; it woula be no
more/
(10) Th&Q practical problem of how to distinguish pare rent from other
earnings such us interest on capital development is much easier to solve
in underdeveloped countries than elsewhere. In these countries of
notorious absentee-landlordism, the great majority of land-development,
reclamation,and Irrigation schemes mve been State financed ana rtate
executed and are State managed, (in one country at least, from the
standpoint of regulating roductiei , the whole cultivated aiea is like
"one 'huge managerial estate", cf. Dor©en V.an inert "Lona on Poverty
in the Miacile East", for the R.I.IJU, Chapter III on Egypt). The
prevalent method of cultivation is that of the open field system.
Whether ownership is located in multiple-thatsand acre landlord or a
fraction of an acre peasant proprietor, lana holalnas are subdivided
into small scattered strips where "even the plough may not be used
on many small farms.,, (and) the use of the spade and hoe becomes more
common" (R. Mukjeree: "Pood planning for Four Hundred Millions"
quoted by K.S. SheIvanker in "The problem of . 1940, p, 109"
The land hunger caused by population increas^xhis method rather than
capitalistic farming in the western sense the most profitable way of
utilising the land. If any c§> ital is used on the land, a cow, a
plough, or a pair of shovels, it is usually supplied by the lease
holder himself, or hired from a wealthier neighbour, (Per handy
references, see besiae the above two works, "Egyptt An Economic and
Social Analysis" by Charles Xssawl, for R.I.I,A.: "The Agrarian
Problem in India", by L.A. Ahmfltfd.)
The organisation of land property itself cannot be discussed here
in great detail; but this general remark may be made. As industrial¬
isation proceeds and industry Absorbs the redundant increase in
population it is to be expected that methods of cultivation would change
towards the modern farming system. Since agriculture is one of the
most perfectly competitive industries anu the optimum si&e is fairly
small, it is. desirable that peasant proprietorship be encouraged by
State action towards the breaking up of feudale states ana the creation
of inhei'itence systems which would prevent their fractionaliaation into
small strips.
more logical to object to redistribution because it leads to an increase
in population than to object to any rise in income on the sam ground.,..
Here we are concerned only with toe effect of redistribution on the
amount of work every individual is willing to do.
Labour is a factor of production. At the same time it is attached
to human beings, who are the recipients of income, Everyone owns it,
and it is o^en to everyone to utilise it. Its supply is more directly
connected with its earnings than any other factors, but the relation
is not always in the same direction) anv.increase in earnings may increase
or may decrease the supply of labour. Also labour is not one homogeneous
quantity, and the supply price differs from one kind to another. because
of all these considerations, it is not easy to draw clear cut conclusions.
The problem however, can be approached piece-meal in the following ways
a. Though taxing pure rent up to its full amount may not be required
on distribution grounus where it provides income in a small way to small
land owners, it is highly desirable on account of its favourable effect
on toe supply of the labour of those who live wholly or partially on
it.
b. It may be that, at the levels of rewards prevailing in under¬
developed countries, the supply curve of certain categories of labour is
downward sloping, because work is so exhausting as compared with its
rewards that any rise in the rate of remuneration which would provide incoae
above subsistence level would give a welcome opportunity for some relief
from it. If we follow the "preferred position" school of welfare, then
we have to accept this situation as given and do nothing about it - with
disastrous/
toy.
disastrous effects on development. Since we may safely assume that
after* a certain point this curve curls forward lor some length (after
which it curls backward again because of the time-consuming nature of
consumption at high income-levels) , ana since - this is a pure value
judgement - it is desirable that the level of remuneration should reach
this middle section, individual preferences between work ana leisure
should not be an ultimate determinant. It does not fellow, however,
that because an increase in the rate of remuneration may lead to a
reduction in the supply of labour, tliSl income should not be equally
redistributed. It merely follows that redistribution should not be
of the type that leads to this result, as would be the case, for example,
if it took the form of direct subsidies to wages or to the price of
necessities. It should take the form of either long term investment
which would lead, at a later period of time, to a rise in real wages so
rapid that the dangerous patch of the curve would safely be Je ft behind,
or of social services, such as education, housing, ana improvements in
health conditions. These elements of real income are probably not
related in the minus of wage-earners to their own labour supply and at
the same time,by their very nature, increase the willingness and ability
to work.
c. Labour is a hold-all term for all sorts of work, including
entrepreneurial efforts, but these are better dealt with as a separate,
category. To the extent that there is an equal opportunity for every®*
to choose his work, the earnings of different kinds of labour will
represent, in a market economy, its supply price, and interference with
these earnings on distributional grounus wauld be prejudicial to the
'0f.
sise of the national income. Where there is no ©quality of opportunity >
the earnings of those groups which require more expensive training contain
an element of monopoly. It is unlikely that, at least in the initial
stages, underdeveloped economies would he able to give to everyone the
opportunity to do the type of work which he may desire, for this means
free education at all stages for all who desire it. On the other band
it is very desirable, for obvious reasons, that State expenditure be very
much extended in that direction. It follows that the earnings of higher-
grade workers, as determined by market supply ana demand, would contain an
element of monopoly which is also State-subsidised. Also it may be that
these grades - whose services are more urgently required in under-develop¬
ed countries than the services of any other group - have reached that
section of the labour-supply curve where it curls backwards for the second
time| hence a reduction in earnings would lean to an increase in the
amount of work offered. If this is true, there would be thus three
reasons why their earnings should not be exempted from a full share in
m the bdrJen of
I State expenditure.
3, Normal entrepreneurial profits in a purely competitive economy
are as much wages as the earnings, say, of professional workers, though
of course, they are subject to greater risks and fluctuations than the
latter and requite a different type of training am aptitudes. The
above remarks apply to them only to a minor extent and they should be
least interfered with. Monopoly profits do not raise any problems
since we argued that the- State should cany out production^ in those
sectors of the economy which are likely to fall under monopoly. There
is however, a certain hybrid type which is neither monopoly nor normal
profits/
Jot.
profits, which accrue to the entrepreneur as a result of introducing
technical innovations which may require time-because of patent rights
or because of natural inertia on the part of other entrepreneur's - before
they spread to other competitors. These profits played an immense part
as an incentive for the entrepreneurial innovations which revolutionised
the Western economies, and it is open to question whether any progressive
economy can do without them. For underdeveloped countries, however,
the immediate question - and it is likely to be immediate for quite a
considerable time - is not whether they are to contain within themselves
an incentive for continuous progressive transformation or not} this c«n
be settled afterwards. The crying question is that of the best methods
of distributing the necessary sacrifices involved in introducing innova-
tions already made/ No doubt, in economic matters, every application
of technical knowledge, however well known and tried elsewhere, contains
an element of adventure, and requires a certain amount of incentive. But
the incentive should be much leas in magnitude then is needed for the
original act of creation. Because the required innovations are, on the
whole, mere adaptations to local circumstances of innovations made
elsewhere, much less protection should be given by the .State to
innovators and greater efforts towards the dissimination of technical
knowledge should be made by it. Taken in conjunction with each other,
these two steps should eliminate this type of monopoly profits without
impairing the efficiency of the competitive sector.
4, There remains the supply o± savings, which earn interest* The
question, it must be noticed, is not whether taxation of rent, earned
income/
/b7.
income, ana profits,according to the above rulesywoulu reduce savings^
For the amounts thus taxed are saved and used for State investment ,in the
widest sense of this word. Where the nature of the investment permits,
it should be carried on as if it were private investment, i.e. with the
rate of interest on the investment entering into the calculation of the
most profitable channels and forms of investment. If the taxed amounts
are capable of earning a higher rate of interest in private hands, the
State should lend them for private investment, for, once it is accepted
that equalisation of income is the general rule, leaving these amounts
to be invested by private individuals « if they are saved at all and not
spent on consumption - instead of gather ing them in taxation would mean
that the rich would enjoy the rewards of the abstinence of the poor.
The question here is whether interest on individual savings made from
income net of taxation should Itself be taxed. These savings themselves
cannot be taxed, since this would jeopardise the maximum supply of labour
and enterprise, But would taxing interest on them ixiterfere with the
supply of voluntary savings? It would if there were a functional
relation between savings and the rate of interest. The controversy on
this point is familiar and need not be entered into in detail - the details
are irrelevant anyway, since they assume the existence of institutions,
such as widely spread credit systems and life insurance companies,
attitudes, such as interest - consciousness, arid habits such as the
on
purchase of annuities for old age which;do not exist at any large scale
in underdeveloped countries. Savings may be made for the sake of the
amenities of holding wealth, for old age (Mr, Harrod's lump saving), for
heirs/
he ire, or simply "because, by earning interest, they would be a means of
earning additional income. The effect on the amount of saving bene for
all these purposes of a reduction in the rate of interest - for taxing
interest is equivalent to a reduction in interest rate - is uncertain,
'but it is probably true that a higher rate <f interest would call forth
j
a greater amount of savings. As against this maybe set the fact that
to the extent that savings would have been made anyway, interest or not
interest, their earnings, like rent, are in the nature of surplus, and
may also have an unfavourable effect on the supply of labour. We will
after
retain to this question when we consider the determination of total
investment.
IX. interest is the earning of savings. Savings are necessary for
capital formation, which increases the national income* In what sense
can m say that the rate of interest measures the marginal productivity
of capital and is a cost of using it? The question is vital to the
treatment in the following chapter of international trade theory. It
belongs to the theory of the optimum distribution of resources between
their alternative uses rather than to the distribution of income between,.,
individuals, but it is more conveniently dealt with here. No full-dress
treatment of the subject can,of course, be attempted, and a passing
reference is not facilitated by the existence of a vast controversial
literature on it. Because of its importance, however, it is proposed
to merely reproduce here the simplest and clearest exposition that was
found on the subject - contained in Professor Meade* s "Economic Analysis
and Policy1 ^
(11) 2nd edition, Part IV, III
lot
Suppose that, of a total supply of factors of 3 units of land ana
300 units of labour, all previously employed to produce wheat directly,
1 unit of land and 100 units of labour were used to produce ploughs
and the remaining 2 units of land and 200 units of labour were employee
with the ploughs to produce wheat. There would now be a constant capital
stock of ploughs in existence arid the 1 unit of lend and 100 units of
labour would be c onstructing just sufficient ploughs to r eplace the
existing stock of ploughs as they wear out. The output Ox wheat woula
almost certainly be greater if the 3 units of land and 300 units of
labour were employed in this way than if they were all employed directly
to produce wheat without any stock of ploughs. Up to a point "gs soon
as the capital stock has been increased, a larger output of finished
goods will be produced by the given amount of labour ana lunu, but while
the stock of capital gooas is being built up, the output of consumption
goods will be smaller than before. Only by going without consumption
goods, which could otherwise have been produced,•can a greater stock of
capital goods be produced, in order that the output of consumption goods
may be permanently increased in the future^^
To show how the marginal proauct of capital should be measured, let
us suppose that one more plough is to be adaed to the stock. "If the
same amount of labour* and land were to be used directly with one more
plough in the production of wheat, this would add something - let us
say/
(12) op. cit.| p. 274. Italics Professor #eade*s.
//D.
say 20 units of wheat, to the annual output of wheat. We may call this
the gross marginal product of a plough. But as one more plough has
been auded to the stock of ploughs, more labour and land will have to
be used to produce ploughs to maintain this greater stock. Let us
suppose that 1 more unit of land and 2 more units of labour must in
future be regularly employed in the production of plough© for this
purpose. The net addition to the output of wheat will therefore be 20,
minus a reduction in output due to the fact that 1 less unit cf lanu and
2 less units of labour are available to produce wheat directly with the
increased stock of ploughs. This reduction in the output of wheat is
equal to the marginal product of a unit of lanu used directly in producing
it, plus twice the marginal product of a unit of labour used in the direct
production of wheat. If the marginal product of land used directly
for the production of wheat is 5 units of wheat a year and the marginal
product of labour used in this way is also 5 units of wheat a year, then
the net or true marginal product of a plough is o units of wheat a year.
Its use -would add 20 units to the annual output if it were used with
the same amount of land and labour, but its maintenance requires the
withdrawal of a certain amount of labour and land from the direct pro¬
duction of wheat anu so a consequent reduction in the annual output of
wheat by Id units. If the farmer who intends to ada one plough to
his stock decides how much he would ada to his output of wheat by using
one more plough with the same amount of labour and land, and multiplies
this by the curient price of wheat, he will thereby calculate the value
of the gross marginal product of the plough. If he subtracts from this
sum/
mm the amount which he must set aside for the repair ana maintenance
of the extra plough, then - on the assumption that factors of production ■
are paid rewards equal to the value of their marginal product - the result
will give the value of the net marginal product of the plough. If,
therefore, all products are sold at prices corresponding to their marginal
costs, so that the cost of maintaining an extra plough represents the
value of the product which the factors so employed might have produced in
any other occupation, the marginal product of a capital unit instrument
may be measured by the value of its gross marginal prouuct minus the cost
of its upkeep and maintenance. The marginal product of capital may best
be measured as a percentage rate of profit in order that the value of the
marginal products of different forms of capital instruments may be com¬
pared," ^13 ^
From this discussion, Professor Meade concluded that the community
should continue to accumulate capital until its marginal productivity
has fallen to zero, for "If for example, the marginal product of
capital is still 5 per cent,, this means that by spending £1000 on the
construction of m adaitional capital investment - i.e, by one single
sacrifice of consumption goods valued at £1000 enabling the factors of
production to be released to produce the capital instrument - the
community can add for evens net amount to its real output valued at £b.
At the end of 20 years the community will have received an additional
income equal in value to the sacrifice of consumption goods necessary
for/
(13) op. cit. pp. 274 et suite. Italics Professor Meade's.
for the investment, tout the increase in annual income will last forever,
since we have allowed for the cost of permanent upkeep of the capital
(14)
toefore reckoning its net marginal products,"
The excuse for quoting extensio is that this exposition throws
(15)
very much light on the nature of capital and the interest which it ean s~
two questions which have been befogged in the literature on the subject
by identifying this interest with interest proper, which is merely a
payment for "loanable funds". No doubt the latter is partly "explained"
by the former, but it is determineu quite independently, aria a full
explanation of the determination is partinent only to an understanding of
how a given system works. To understand the welfare issues involved
in capital formation we have to resort to some such simplified model
as Professor Meade*s.
One of the matters it clarifies is that interest on already existing
capital does not represent any cost to the community, 3o long as there
J
is a gain from transforming factors from production for immediate con¬
sumption to production for future (increased) consumption, that is, so
long as the marginal productivity of capital has not fallen to aero, there
will bo a demonu for loans with which to perform this transformation,
and a demand price for these loans in the form of an offer to pay interest
on them. These loans will represent a real cost to the community only
if they are made at the expense of current consumption, that is, if they
are taken from current income. At the same time, so long as there is a
price/
(lw) It will be noticed that the basic idea in this presentation is the
same as the one which was developed in chapter HI Section I on the optimum
rate of capital formation.
(14) op. cit., p. 277. Italics Professor Meadds.
price offered for new savings, the same price will be demanded for the
maintenance of existing capital. Consider the case of the farmer who,
saving a hundred pounds in one pear, spends it on the construction of a
plough the productivity of which is %> pounds a year. After 20 years
he will have received an additional income equal in value to the sacrifice
of consumption goods which was necessary for the investment.He will
also have the plough, since in calculating its marginal productivity he
deducts its maintenance cost. Since he can always realise the value of
the plough in the form of amortization funus ana lend it for (netf;
investment, he must make an interest charge for maintaining the services
of the plough, and this charge enters into his cost of production.
Yet neither for him nor for the community is there any real cost correspond¬
ing to this charge. In maintaining his capital intact he is not doing
^ny act of saving, for savings are made only from current income. He
can, of course, consume the value of the plough and forsake the interest
on it, but it would be stretching the words somewhat to call refraining
from/
(16) It is assumed hare that he does not discount future utilities, that
is, that he has no pure time preference. For a full discussion of the
value of tills concept as an explanation of interest cf, R. H&rrods
"Towards dynamic Economies", Lecture 2. It is also assumed that the
marginal utility of income to him Is constant overtime and that his
ability to earn income is also constant. These two assumptions for any
particular individual are, of course, wide off the mark, but for a community
—and itwonly with the sacrifice which a community incurs in the act of
capital formation that we are concerned in this paragraph - they are quit©
justifiable, provided that the community is not increasing in numbers at
an increasing rate, for then it will have to save from too current income
to provide the future extra numbers with the same amount of capital with
which it was itself equipped. On these two points «t eni&4 refer again to
Mr, Harrod' s book.
///-
from doing this a cost for which interest is a necessary payment, since
by so doing he will forego the permanent current income derived from the
services of the plough. Moreover, stepping out of this simplified
example to a modem community with universal capital-accounting and an
organised market for capital assets, it is impossible for the community
as a whole - under normal circumstances - to diesave. For suppose that
some of the holders of capital assets sell their assets and spend the
money on consumptionj the result will be an increase in producers' profits
which, by raising entrepreneurial expectations, will lead to a demand for
capital goods which enter in the production of the consumers' goods whose
price has risen. If the "dis-saving" of these horders is not counter¬
balanced by savings on the part of other recipients of current income,
there will be an inflationary pressure, and real capital will be maintained
by means of "forced" savings all the same.
Interest on existing capital is not an element in the cost of
j,reduction, though it enters as a cost in the calculation of the entre¬
preneurs . The analogy with rent from land is in this respeet complete117^
Yet there is this striking differences whereas surplus from land
represents the meanness of nature ana its amount measures - in a vague but
nonetheless real sense - its refusal to meet man's demands on its services
(rent is surplus only to the owners of l^nd, not to the community) §
interest on existing capital is a net surplus to the community, a permanent
gain/
(17) It must be noticed that we do not refer here to the Marshallian
ouasi-rent concept of the earnings of capital already sunk in physical
aids-to-production.
/'f,
gain from previous acts of sacrifice, a bounty given to '-Uiii cuwuiuuity
by its history, by one aspect of its "conjuncture".
Because interest on existing capital is not, to the community, a
real cost, it boos not follow that entering a charge for it in the cost
of prccuding any given commodity does not fulfil a real function, any
more than the fact that rent is not a real cost to the c carnality is an
argument for not entering a charge for it in the cost of producing any
given commouity which requires the services of land, Both rent and
interest are two of the most powerful instruments evolved by man for the
rational distribution of resources among different alternatives, for they
provide the necessary "weights" for the rational distribution of con¬
sumption among different commodities whose production require their
services, and for the most efficient way of producing any given amount
of any given commodity. But they are none-the-more cost for tha4^&^
Interest on new investment is different. For, Just as marginal
land earns no rent - the analogy does not go beyond mere illustration -
marginal capitcH, lor a period of years during which the cost of the
original investment is recovered and after which capital ceases to be
new - does not earn any surplus, and interest on it - for this period -
represents this cost.
(18) Cfs Lord Keynesi "The General Theory", pp. 213-217. "It is much
preferable to speak of capital as having a yield over the course of its
life in excess of its original cost, than as being productive. For the
only reason why an asset offers a prospect of yielding during its life
services having an aggregate value greater than its initial supply price
is because it is scarce; and it is kept scarce because of the competition
of the rate of interest on money,.,.. I sympathise, therefore, with the
pre-classical doctrine that everything is produced by labour, aided by
what used to be called art and is now called technique, by natural resources
which are free or coit a rent according to their scarcity or abundance,
and by the results of past labour, embodied in assets, which also command
a price according to their scarcity or abunuance. It is preferable to
regard labour including of ccurse, the personal seivices of the entrepreneur
and/
//(,■
X. To the extent saving is done for the purpose of earning interest?
taxing interest on savings will reauce the amount of voluntary savings.
This would be an argument against taxation if the institution of financing
new investment from voluntary savings through the mechanism of an organised
loan max-het secured to the community an optimum balance between present
sacrifices and future gains? in the same way, say? as the market for
labour or commodities secures an optimum balance between work and leisure
or between individual preferences for different, lines of consumption.
Interest on saving done for other purposes would still be in the nature
of surplus, but could not be taxed because it coula not be distinguished
from saving induced by the reward of interest.
Much doubt however? has been cast on the sufficiency of this institu¬
tion to fulfil this function in any optimal sense? particularly on the
ground that the set of forces which determine the aggregate amount of
savings are different from those which determine the aggregate amount of
investment? and that the two types of decisions are taken by two different
groups of people For undex'developea countries, this doubt is enforced
by the following two considerations.
and his assistants, as the sole factor of production, operating in a given
environment of technique, natural resources, capital equipment and
effective demand." (Italics Lord Keynes')
(lb) For a list of the assumptions under which market forces may be
said to bring about such an optimum, even after disregarding full
employment considerations - cf I.M.D. Little: "A Critique of Welfare




(1) The pressure of population in a poor country, rather/stimulate#
investment» is likely to have a depressing effect on it. Manufacturers
are likely to become increasingly cut of the reach of the majority of the
people. Also because of the subsistence level of wages prevailing,
there will be little Incentive to substitute machinery for labour. A
poor country where population is increasing will end up by living on hand-
to-mouth current labour, This conclusion is modified by the fact that,
in practice, the substitution of labour for capital is not continuous.
No amount of labour can transport goods or men ay&ast as a train. Also
some gooas - motor cars, wireless sets, electricity light, etc. - cannot
be produced at ail without the help of some capital. Investments of
this kind, however, are limited by the smallness of the income groups
which can afford to buy their products, ana in so far as these products
can be imported they will be obtained by exchanging the products of current
labour for them. Savings may even be invested abroad.
(2) Savings, where there is an oiganisea market for loans, is an
exchange of present for future money. In deciding how much of his income
he will save the individual will be influenced, not onxy by his estimate
of the shape of the stream of his future needs, bus also by that of his
future earnings from future efforts. -This latter estimate will be based -
no doubt in a hassy and uncertain way - on his observation of the earnings
t'-
of different age-groups of individuals persuing the same occupation; he
will not take into account the rise in earnings - whether it takes the form
of reduction in prices or a rise in money wages - which will result from
his own act of saving. This is Wcausethe effect of his savings on the
facilities/
//h
facilities for future production in the whole economy is so negligible
that he will not notice it. Also the veil 01 money obscures to him the
relation between his savings arid the future rewarusto his efforts. The
faulty telescope is not a subjective one directed to the future, but an
objective one whose area of vision over the present is very restricted.
In a progressive economy)(we abstract here from the effect of saving on
employment) this is rather a blessing} if everyone foresaw the future
rise of income the aggregate amount of savings would probably be reduced.
In a stagnating economy, this aspect is also lost sight of, and cannot be
j&t
allowed for by bringing it into light and preaching/saving, for everyone,
in arranging his own stream of income, will take into account the future
rise in earnings ana defend on his neighbours for doing the necessary
saving,
The difficulty is net solved by arguing that it is the entrepreneurs
who actually do the investment, and that, realising the advantages of capital
formation, they will bid for loans until the high rates of interest induce
an optimum amount of saving. This would be the case only if interest
absorbed the whole gain from capital formation, A more important con¬
sideration is that entrepreneurs base their investment decisions on their*
expectations of future effective demond. These expectations are based
for the most part on present experience, and the very poverty of a
country , whose effective demand even for necessities is very limited, does
not make these expectations very bright, particularly xor manufactured
goods. . Yet supply, if balanced and co-ordinated, creates its own uemand.
Where there is a great demand for a commodity, as in the case of absolute
necessities/
H°).
necessities such us food, there is no necessity for such co-ordination}
, V ■
an entrepreneur can always depend on being able to sell any amount of
food he can produce, though even in this ease, if population pressure
is great, he may not find it profitable to use capitalistic methods of
production. Where the demand for the commodity is sensitive to the
level of incoBie, and the economies from large-scale production are great,
investment on such a scale may be deterred, not by the meagreness of
savings, but by the insufficiency of demand, while, had there been,
simultaneously with investment in any particular branch, investment in
other branches on which wages, interest, rent anu proiits are spent, the
supply of every commouity will form part of the effective demand for the
rest. The lack of co-ordination, together with the other limitation on
Ctfi'iinj
the sise of the market*from the very unequal distribution of wealth
rather than the meagreness of savings, seem inueed to be the most
important factors limiting development in underdeveloped countries. The
phenomena of rural over-population cannot be otherwise explained. It
(if)
has been estimated that, in Egypt, one-fifth of the present labour, with
existing/
(20) Cf: W. Cleland, "A Population Plan for Egypt", L'Sgynte Contem^or&ine
May 193b. For a convenient reference, cf Borreen Warrlner, op, cit., p.33
Processor Cleland further estimates that, with half the degree of mechanic
ation on American farms, 10 per cent of Egypt's farmers could do the work
now done.
For similar calculations for Eastern anu South-Eastern Europe, cf:
P.H, Rosenstein-Hodan: "Problems of Industrialisation of Eastern ana Gouth
Eastern Europe", S.J. , June-Sept, 1943, p.202, where to was estimated that
an agrarian excess population amounting to 20-25 millions existed.
existing methoas of production, might be able to maintain th© existing
volume of agricultural proauction, ana, on a sai'er estimate, the surplus
would be one-half the farm population. Thus the number of farm workers
could be cut by 2 millions and the farm population by some 5 millions
without any reduction in output. Employing these millions in builuing
power stations and factories ana operating them, would not be an act of
saving ana investment, since current output would not be reaucea, it would
be an act of organisation. A private entrepreneur whose power is limited
to one part, of the process would not do this because his expectations
about future demand conditions are based on present ones;5^ Even a
gigantic monopoly which perceived these possibilities and had behind it a
credit machinery which would supply it with funds to p^y the slightly
higher money wages necessary to induce the men to leave their present un¬
productive jja natura employments, would not be able to do this since,
devoia of the power of taxation, it will not be able to curb the subsequent
inflation. Also unless the whole economy was unaer its authority, it
will not have the power to pursue in the agricultural sector the shovealing
*
in the land-lease system which -would enable a smaller number of men to
produce the same output.
Exempting interest on savings from taxation can be justified only tn
the ground that it interferes with the optimum balance between present and
future/ «
(£1) For a.detailed illustration of this point, which he considers to be
a case of external economics, cf the above-mentioned article- by Mr.
Hosenstein-Rodan, p. 20b,
/z/>
future satisfaction. If, because of the above considerations, the
institution of financing investment from voluntary savings is not
likely to lead to such an optimum and the rate of investment is better
determined, by the State, there is no reason why savings should earn a
reward equal to the marginal productivity of capital. In rich countries,
there is already a growing tendency towards the elimination of this type
of earningand poor countries can less afford to maintain a class
{23} .
of rentiers. This does not mean that interest should be abolishedj
if savings are not left free to find their own tevel of reward, there may¬
be/
(2b) See on the theoretical side, Keynes* "The general Theory.p. 221,
K. Harrod "Towards a Dynamic Economics", Lecture five.
■
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(23) This, however, is for a different set of reasons, The elimination
of pure interest is advocated in rich countries mainly on employment grouncs.1
In poor countries, where the majority of the population live near or at
starvation level, the question oi distribution assumes a greater importance
and its significance is increased when we consider the effect of inequality
dn internal development. This is in-agreement with the views of the United
Nations Sub-Commission on Economic Development* "It is the view of the
Sub-Commission that internal inequalities of distribution in income ana
wealth are detrimental to economic development in so far as they reduce
the nutritional, health and general living standards ox the people, create
an excessive demand for imported luxury consumption goods further an
excessive transfer or funds abroad and prevent the growth of internal
markets. Where such conditions exist, fiscal methods are appropriate to
bring about a more equitable distribution of incomes and channel additional
resources into economic development." (Summary of the report of the third
session, published in "Methods of Financing Economic Development in Under-
Developed Countries" by the United Nations Department of Economic Affairs,
194S p. lib.
/u
toe a tendency for them to toe invested, not in their most productive uses,
tout in those particular lines of business which the savers themselves
pursue. A compromise would toe to maintain a free market for loans ana
at thesame time tax part of their earnings.
XI. We may now try to put different parts of the picture together.
In Sections I - VII an attempt was made to map out those spheres where
public enterprise is more likely than private enterprise to lead to an
optimum distribution of resources. It was argued that an ex ante apprcach
to the (Question of competition is more appropriate. To secure the
technical economies of integration, all stages of production whose inte¬
gration might result in an increase in efficiency should toe taken into
account when determining the relation between cost ana size. If demona
conditions were such as to require less than an optimum number of
competitive units, production should toe in the hands of public enterprise,
"•here it requires one unit whose size is less than the optimum size, a
unit larger in size than that which would be determined toy the point of
intersection between the demand curve and the long run cost curve should
toe established and output sold at a price less than total average cost.
In sections IX and X it was argued that population pressure on the one
hand and lowness of income levels on the other are likely to leau to a
rate of investment, if it were left to toe determined toy market forces alone,
*
less than is desirable, ana that this rate should toe determined toy the
State.
The question now arises whether these conclusions are of much use as
guide to policy and whether they fit in with each other. In deciding
whether thsfpreduction of any given caamoaity shculu toe left to private
nz.
enterprise or taken over by the State, it will be remembered, it was
necessary to know the shape of the long ran cost curve and the demand
curve for that commodity. This procedure is difficult enough when
dealing with a single commodity $ if applied over* the whole economy, it
is quite impracticable, since we can no longer take the supply price of
the factors and the demand for other commodities as given, as a private
entrepreneur would. We cannot resort to the "competitive solution"
advocated by most socialist planners since, apart from the fact that it
by-passes the question of what is to be the sphere of public enterprise,
it is part of our argument that demand for any commodity is partly
determined by the supply of other commodities and that the scale of
investment should be determined, not by the supply of savings ana the
marginal productivity of cepital but by an act of policy. A return to
this last point, however, would open the way for a tentative solution
of the rest. How should the scale of investment be decided upon?
One of the reasons, it was argued, far the insufficiency of the
institution of financing investment from voluntary savins to secure an
optimum rats of investment is that each individual will not be able to
foresee the full benefits of his savings. It follows that, even if the
Stat© took steps to solve the other difficulties, for example, by co¬
ordinating investment plans, the limit set by voluntary saving© will
be below the desirable limit. At the ©am© time, there is m upper
limit to the State*s power to supplement voluntary savings by other
methods which aim at diverting resources from production for current
consumption. "Direction" of labour is undesirable, and forced saving
by/
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by inflationary finance tonus to defeat itself, partlcularly where the
greater part of saving takes the term of holuing fixed-yield assets»
as if would when the State play® a akj or. part in the development of
the economy, It wipes out xnaivioual past savings, ana is thus en act
of baa faith, ana if also discourages current voluntary savings# There
is thus one method left; taxation, tut'this also has a limit beyond
which if impairs either people1© utility or willingness to work. Since
work of all kinds is ultimately the only means.of raising the standard of
living ana since even future production depends on the amount of work
currently aone, taxing beyond this limit will defeat its purpose. This
limit, vague ana unascertslnabie as it is, is, 1 think, m good a
determinant of the rate of investment j in Malthus-rldden countries, as caa
be founa.
Even if this source of investment is tupped to the limit, it may
prove insufficient to increase total income at the same rate as that of
population increase, if this increase is of the type which ©at© an
obstacle to the rise in income# In this case it will not be possible
to accelerate the rate of investment by directing more current resources
to it. But it will be possible to accelerate the rate of income increase
some time in the future by influencing the form of investment in which
current resources reserved for this purpose are put# As the United
ihabej (So*}
nations* Sub-Commission on Economic Development/has put itl ' "Progress
in economic development involves a variety of projects with different
degrees of direct productivity and different degrees of self-liquidating
properties/
(£4) Cfi report of the fourth session, la&y, lbfcC, document E/CK#180,
paragraphs 11-12,
1*5
properties in terms both of their total yield for liquidating the invest¬
ment required to be financed and the yield in the form of foreign exchange
that may be necessary to service the investment. Any programme of
*
development, of necessity, contains a proportion of low-yielding and slow-
yielding projects which are as yet essential pre-conditions for the high -
and rapid - yielding projects. They constitute "Social and Economic Over¬
head Capital". Examples of "Social Overhead Capital" are health,
education and housing projects, and of "Economic Overhead Capital" are
transport, power ana public utilities. This distinction between slow -
and low - yielding investment on the one hand and rapid - and high -
yielding investment on the other was made by the Sub-Commission in
connection with the question of international investment in underdeveloped
countries which will be considered in chapter VII, but it is equally
serviceable in connection with the question of the form investment
should take:
Social overhead investment is at the same time expenditure on current
consumption. Education, medical service and housing, satisfy current
needs as well as increase future ability and willingness to produce. It
is this latter quality which - beside other non-economic reasons -
justify spending on them more than individuals would be willing or able
to pay if they were left to provide these services for themselves.
Economio over-head investment: improvements in transport facilities,
exploitation of industrial motive power sources, constructional industry,
and, for those countries which, by their natural resources and by their
size, are able to make full use of large-scale production, heavy industry
JZG>.
in general, offer many applications of the theoretical points discussed
above. Often they are geographical monopolies. The fixed cost is
usually very large relatively to prime cost, ana the boundaries within
which the size of the fixed cost can be varied 'without serious loss to
efficiency is strictly limited by tecnnicaL conditions. Demand for
the products of any one type of investment is likely to be less than is
re^uii ed to cover the cost of the fixed factor. They are also versatile
their products enter in different degrees in the production of almost all
consumer's goods. They are the most important source of general in¬
creasing returns: they provide lower- order industries wi'ch cheaper-in
terms of human effort una sacrifice - construction costs, raw materials
ana industrial power, and tfcey also make it possible, by the increase in
demand their efficiency occasions for these industries to make full
utilization of large-scale production within their own sphere. In a
private enterprise economy, unless the unit of decision is very large,
in which case it is unlikely that competitive conaitions would prevail,
the development of the higher-order industries will wait on the development
of industries of the lower order, which, in view of the population factor,
may never take place. But from a welfare point of view, the development
of the latter is prior to the development of the former.
If the limit set on investment by the taxable capacity of the
population is too low to secure an increase in total income, rapia enough
to cope with population increase, there is a case for pushing forward with
these slow - and low - yielding projects, tor they will provide a wider
basis on which high - and quick - yielding projects can be established in
the/
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the future. They do not all offer the sam opportunity in this respect:
it would obviously be wasteful, after building one power-station, to
withhold resoui ces from investment in consumers1 goods industries which
would utilise this power, ana direct them to builaing more power stations,
but it would not be wasteful to utilise this power station to supply
cement factories which will further facilitate the building of more
factories, or to lay more stress in the initial stages on improvement in
transport facilities rather than on builuing power stations.
The decision as to the proportion ox' toWl investment aevoteu to
social and economic overhead investment and to the distribution of this
proportion between different lines is bound to be somewhat arbitrary.
This is generally recognised for the case ox social overhead investment
ana of special types of economic overhead investment, such as road-
building. Other types of investment which fall under this heading are
not essentially different from activities pursued by private entrepreneurs,
and it would seem therefore that, even though it may be conceded, on
population grounds, that the proportion ox resources devoted to them may
also be arbitrary fixed, the decision as to whether any particular project
should be undertaken or not, at what scale, and at what time, if not ^uided
by some test of profitability, or at least by the same accounting system
as used in the private sphere, may involve a serious misallocation of
resources. Such calculations when many projects are involved, are
extremely difficult to make, since the constants of any one process of
calculation become the valuables of the whole group. It would be only too
easy, to escape the difficulty, to argue that economic overhead invest¬
ment projects are not technically independent of each other, The
evnl n-5 +.s>+_-l rtn /
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exploitation of a certain source of inuuatrial power or a mineral resource
will usually be tieu up with another project for developing transport
facilities to transfer the products to a source of labour supply or to a
consumption centre. Of the many projects which offer themselves for
consideration at any one time, it will be possible to weave a connected
pattern (e.g. of the T.V.A. type), in which every part is complementary to
the other . The general outlines of this pattern will be determined by
the physical make-up of the country in question,by the geographical
distribution of its population ana by the general conditions of deiaana
expected to prevail. Such a pattern will usually rake a number of years
to execute, and the order in which different parts will be executed will
be determined by technical conditions* The method of carrying out any
particular year's part of the total scheme will be dependent on the
general conditions of supply and demand prevailing in that year*. Trough
these are important factors which, in practice, woulu limit the possib¬
ilities of serious error, it must be admitted that they uc not provide a
basis for accurate calculation having the same elegance portrayed in the
theoretical analysis of autonomous entrepreneurial actions. But then
this elegance rests on an ex post approach to the problem which, rather*
than take into account the advantages of co-ordioatuon referred to above,
merely side-track them. Perhaps the whole problem is incapable of being
satisfactorily solved within the existing framework of theory, and until
some other, more appropriate technique is evolved, it must be confessed
that the advantages of muddling through in a big way seems to outweigh
the advantages of muddling through by infinitessimal adjustments to
existing conditions.
tp>.
Assuming that decisions as to the scale and distribution of
overhead social and economic investment will be reached somehow,
we may pass on to other questions. These decisions will be prior
to other decisions directly related to individual preferences
(whether these latter are made by entrepreneurs or by consumers),
in the same sense as normal budget expenditure is prior to all other
expenditure. Though the general outlines of the chosen pattern of
economic overhead investment would cover a fairly long period,
detailed decisions shout implementing different parts of it would be
made at short, say, yearly, intervals. This would enable cost
estimates to be more accurately assessed, una ulso would make it
possible to take into account the changes which occurred in the
economy as a result of past decisions.
As each part is completed it will give rise to various "prime
investment" opportunities, which are directly related to consumers'
demand for different commodities. The products or services of
economic overhead investment projects would be sola at those quantities
which equate marginal cost with price. The amount of resources
devoted to prime investment projects during any given period would
be made up by the difference between total investment as suggested
above (taxation plus voluntary savings) and social ana economic
overhead investment plus ordinary government expenditure. They
■would be distributed between different lines according to the usual
rules of business accounting i those projects which are aile/to pay
a higher rate of interest will be given a prior claim on investment
funds, until the total amount is id exhausted. This would apply
whether/
no.
whether prime investment funds are demanded by public or private
enterprise.
If an attempt is to be made to ensure beforehand that the scale
of investment in any particular project of this type is not influenced
by monopolistic considerations, advance information about private
entrepreneurial plans need to be possessed by the central authority,
as well as a power of veto over these plans. This etjQ be secured
if the credit machinery is in the hands of the state. It will then
be possible, of the various prime investment projects proposeu at any
given period, to select those which yield the highest returns, and
also to see to It that investment resources are distributed in an
optimum way. The problem of solving thousands of simultaneous
equations referred to above will not arise where there is already
a great effective demand for the commodity in question, which is
satisfied from local inefficient production. Both inefficient ana
efficient methods are likely to continue to exist side by side with
each other for a considerable period of time and uhis will prevent
investment decisions from being influenced by monopoly considerations.
*';v
A similar case is where the demand for the commodity was previously
satisfied by importation from abroad. In these two cases, invest¬
ment decisions can be left to private initiative, anu there will be
no necessity for calculating cost and demand schedules by the central
authority. There would still be the possibility that, because
entrepreneurs may not be accustomed to taking the big risks entailed
in large-scale production, private initiative may lead to less than
optimum/
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optimum fixed-factor siae, or that, where there is foreign c a&petitlon,
may not enter the field at all. There would also he the cases of
geographical monopolies, of commodities which do not enter into
international traae and the existent demand for which is not
sufficient to maintain competitive conditions, and of products for
wnich the economies oi large-scale production ar* judged to outweigh
the gains to consumers from product differentiation• In these cases
private initiative would be supplemented 02 supplanted by public
initiative.
There would still remain the difxiculty that the optimum size of
txxe fixed factor varies with the rate of interest. It is not
certain that this difficulty Is adequately solveu by any systems in
a purely private enterprise economy, the rate of interest offered
at any time by the banking system will partly depend on the credit
facilities granted to entrepreneurs in the immediate past ana there
is no reason to expect that the accidental temporal order in which
credits are applied for and granted will ensure teat an optimum
allocation of credit will be achieved, A possible solution might
be to inaugurate each year a merry Investment Season during which
private and public entrepreneurs bid, k la Walras, for loans, or,
better still, be allowed hugeworth-fashion, to contract and recon¬
tract , until the total investment funds reserved for that year are
exhausted. If publicity of .future plans is maue obligatory I
entrepreneurs would also have a greater knowledge of what is going to
happen in different sectors of the economy than would otherwise be
the/
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the case. This should also enable them to take into account the
increase in the demand for their commodities which would result
from the increase in the supply of other commodities, alttough,for
individual consumption goods, this consideration is not likely to
be of great importance$ its relevance is greater in the field of
economic overnead investment. The effect of such an institutional
innovation, it may be adaed, (as a further recommendation for it)
on the morale of economic theorists, is bound to be very great!
In the last paragraph but one, competition from foreign sources^
of supply was mentioned as a guarantee against monopolistic tendencies
in those commodities which enter international traae. This brings
us to the relation between underdeveloped and other economics, which
will be taken up in the following two chapters.
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CHAPTER VI.
International trade and Economic Development.
I. Tilt general rule is: given that the prices of different com¬
modities, are equal to their marginal costs, the free traae mechanism will
ensure that every country will specialise in those goods in the production
of which they have a comparative cost advantage, with corresponding gains
to all countries^1) Neither rigidity of prices, whether due to monopoly
in selling goods or in selling factor services - nor immobility of factors
within a country is an argument for restrictions on international trade
in that country; the proper procedure is to remove the rigidities^)
and increase the mobility, not to restrict trade. Also, it is immaterial
from/
(1) We do not deal in this chapter with gains which might accrue to a
country from improving its terms of traue if she imposes m import or
export duty, or with the effect of international traue on the level of
employment or with the effect of economic development on the standard of
living of highly industrialised countries, for this latter aspect cfs
H, Frankel: "Industrialisation of Agricultural countries and the Possib¬
ilities of a new International Division of Labour", E.J, 1943; Inter¬
national Labour Office: "World Economic Development", 194b; League of
Nations: "Industrialisation and Foreign Trade" 194o; A.J, Brown:
"Industrialisation and Trade" 1943; "The Report of the Economics
Committee" (papers of the Royal Commission on Population,)
(3) If these rigidities cannot be removea, for example, because of trade
union policy, there may be gains from protection, cf: G. Haberler "Some
Problems in the Pure Theory of International Traae", E.J, June 1950,
p. 228©t suite. It will be argued in chapter 8 that one of the advantages
redistribution of income by state policy is that it removes the necessity
of developing trade unions, which are after all, a sort of workers monopoly.
from the point of view of any particular country whether this ccnuiticn
is approximated abroad or not, "the best that a particular country can
do for herself is to make her own price structure cor-respond to her own
cost structure and to enter into such foreign trade as is consistent with
that condition ana with the prevailing world structure,"
II. There are three exceptions to this rule,
(1) Where the inuustry in which a country has a comparative cost
advantage gives rise to more than the average external economies over
the whole field of prouuctionl^
(2) Where an increase in the production of a commodity in which a
country has a comparative cost disadvantage results in a reduction in cost
so great that it will shift this commodity to the comparative advantage
classic)
(3) The third and most far reaching - though least easy to formulate
exception/
(3) Harrod: "International Economics", 2nu edition, pp. 47-48.
(4) cf: G. Haberlerj "The Theory of International Trade", pp. 206-207}
also the above mentioned article pp. 236-8. It is one of the limitations
of the production - opportunity curve technique which Professor Haberler
uses that it limits the discussion to two commodities and two countries}
this obscures the fact that the exception arises only when the industry
gives rise to more than average amount of external economies.
(5) It is enough for this exception to hold that the commodity be shifted
to the intermediate class, where it ceases to be either an impost or an
export. This again is obscured by the production - indifference curve
technique. This is the familiar infant inuustry argument ana its most
important aspect is where the industry is subject to the lass/ of increasing
returns} whether this is due to economies internal or external to
the firms which compose the industry. This case was very much debated
since F.D. Graham wrote his famous articles "Some Aspects of Protection
Further Considered", Q.J.E.,1923, (cf /"Some Fallacies in the Interpretation
of Social Cost", Q.J.S, vol. 38 (16241 ana Graham's reply ana Knight's
rejoinder/ * flight-.
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rejoinder, vol. 39: also J. Viner, "Studies in the Theory of Irvtematiai-
al Trade" pp. 476-61j Haberlers "Some Aspects of the Pure Theory of
International Trade", E.J., June 1960). Professor Graham's case was _
considerably weakened by following tne traditional procedure of assuming
two countries producing two commodities in isolation, then trade "opens
up" between them, and it was easy to shew that, unless the increasing
returns were due to external economies, the case he constructed was in¬
compatible with equilibrium. This is not how things work themselves oat
in practice. Almost all the increasing returns' industries are new
inuustries which developed first in our country ana then spreau toothers.
If the size of the optimum unit is fairly large, the mere precedure of
the former country would give it an apparent comparative cost advantage
over tine others, so long as they attempt to reach this size by gradual steps
as would be the case in poor countries whose entrepreneurs are not accus- '
tomed to large-scale enterprise, whereas had they reached directly for
this optimum size the comparative advantage may shift to them*
Professor Kuberler, in the above-cited article (p.£39) represents the
infant industry argument by a deliberate movement on the production-
opportunity curve which would shift the curve itself, and cites as examples
for the cause of this shift the cases where with the expansion of the
industry, methods of production will gradually be perfected ana skills
acquired. Internal economies cannot be represented in the same way,
since they are taken into account when we draw these curves. But then
we must remember that in seme cases we have to "argue to diagram* ,not
from diagrams." In the case of new industries which have not yet been
established a country does xxot slide up and down opportunity curves
according to market conditions.
*
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exception arises from the fact that costs which enter in entrepreneurial
calculations are not commensurable. Rent is not cost in the same sense
as labour, nor interest. For an isolated community, this aces not
matter; they all enter* on equal footing as calculi ting categories which
are necessary for the optimum distribution of resources between different
alternatives; the question of distributing the earnings of different
factors is to be regulated, not by the price mechanism but by the central
authority, according to the principle of equating marginal utility from
income. Where a community enters into economic relations with another
this position can no longer be maintained* Two of the main reasons for
the existence of a separate theory for international trade arc that the
actions of the central authority in any one political area is limited to
the inhabitants of this area, ana that it attempts to define the policy
which maximises the welfare for the inhabitants of that area, to the
exclusion of all others!0*5 The concept of cost which is appropriate
for/
(6) Indeed it can be argued that but for these owe considerations the
theory of international trade loses its raison d'etre as a separate branch
of the science. The immobility of factors between different countries are
no more reason for a separate analytical technique than their immobility
between two regions of the same country, Professor Onlin, in his "Inter¬
regional and International Trade", 1938 applied the ordinary technique of
the theory of value to ohe two cases ,: with very fruitiul results as to the
proximate causes which determine the course of international trade, but
with dropping the doctrine of comparative cost all criteria for commercial
policy also disappeared
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tox the isolated economy is not appropriate here. This will be caxeiuered
{interest,
with respect to rentyana wages of skilled labour.
1. Whether rent is earned by awturel resources whose services are not
demanded by the community or by natural resources, whose services have been
diverted from use tor home consumption, the case for free trade is un¬
affected. In the first case - for example pure different!*1 rent earned
by specific natural resources - rent will be a windfall gain, in addition
to "who usual gain from trade* In the second case the foreign demand
will raise the price ox the cowodities which require the services of
these natural resources te home consumers,ana those who consumed more of
these commodities than others may suffer a loss of welfare, but provided
that income is equally distributed, the welfare ox the com, .unity as a
whole will be Increased*
2. It is different with interest on capital^ Interest (us we
argued in the last chapter) on already formeu capital, except for a com¬
paratively short period during which capital pays its cost and after which
the community is permanently lifted ilntc a highex1 level ox current income,
is a net surplus. Yet it remains a calculating category and enters, like
x-ent/
(?) "The logical difficulty for the doctrine of comparative costs created
by interest charges is not that they can be shown to result in a deviation
of money costs from real costs, 'but rather that there is no satisfactory
way ox showing whether money cost© which include both wages aid interest
costs do ©r a© not conform to real costs". Vines', "Studies , p. &1*
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rent, in the cost of particular commodities. For technical reasons,
seme commodities require more capital than others, while for entrepreneurs
wages ana interest charges are on an equal footing, so that, if a carntry,
at any given moment of time, has a comparative cost advantage in a labour-
intensive commodity - and the mere Abundance of labour, relatively to
other factors, particularly if population is increasing at a great rate,
that is, the mere poverty of a country, will give it a comparative cost
advantage in such commodities^- they wiiajproduce more of this commodity
and exchange it for capital intensive commodities produced in other
countries. This is consistent with the entrepreneurs equating the
marginal productivity of capital in all lines of proauctlon. The argu¬
ment v/ould cease to be valid on account of this if capital formation
depended solely on the supply of savings, or if it were desirable tnat
it should, and if all commodities -were amenable to capitalistic methoos
of production to the same extent. Then entrepreneurs will use this
supply in improving the methods of pioducing the commodity in which the
given country has a comparative cost advantage. But capital formation
is as much a result of entrepreneurial activities as of the supply of
saving, ana not all commcditles offer thejsame opportunities for the use
of capitalistic methods of production. If a country las a comparative
cost advantage in a commodity in the production of which, for technical
reasons, comparatively too much labour- and too little capital enters,
entrepreneurs/
(S) For an exhaustive analysis of the way in which differences in re¬
lative factor endowments in different countries determine international
specialisation, cf. the above mentioned work by Professor Ohlin.
13°?.
entrepreneurs will not be induced to make the community undertake those
"single" acts of sacrifice by which income is permanently ruisea. Yet
it Is just by these acts of capital formation that a poor community
can hope to raise its level of income^even though they mean a great
present sacrifice on her part.
3. The same rule also applies to skill. Skill, like capital,
once it is acquired, transmits itself to future generations from the
extra income it earns, ana this extra income is no more coat to the
community than the earnings of already formed capital. If, at a given
moment of time, a country has a comparative cost advantage in the
production of commodities which require less skill than others, it will
gain from international trade only to the extent tnat its skill is taken
as given, ana incapable of augmentation.
III. These exceptions are theoretically distinco, but only after
a fashion, and their practical application is not easy. A particular
industry may be more amenable to increasing returns than others, yet
create less than the average amount of external economies, or require
less than the average amount of skill, though it will usually employ
more capital. If, however, we contrast broad categories of commouities
such as agriculture or raw material and manufacture, it will be found
that, in general, they all group on one side, that of manufacture.
Manufacturing industries create more than the average degree of external
economies, their possibilities of increasing returns are much greater
than in agriculture, they employ more capital and require much skill.
In fact, when we take such a broad view, these exceptions lose their
distinctiveness, and are seen to be different aspects - and not all the
aspects - of the general phenomenon of increasing returns. Consider
the/
the case of the training of an industrial labour force, which is of
particular importance in those economies which are still predominantly
agricultural. The new methods of production which has developed since
the Inuustrial Revolution require a new set of habits: discipline,
acceptance of factory routine, regional mobility , etc., which are
totally different from those demanded by the traditional occupations
which man has pursued everywhere for hundreds of yearly and a familiarity
-with mechanical devices not acquired in these occupations. Such a
training may come under the heading ox increasing returns to any particulaj
manufacturing industry, of external economies created or enjoyed by it,
of development of particular kinds of skill, or even of the formation of
capital invested in human beings. Or take the case of the growth of
technical knowledge, which was probably the most important immediate
cause ox the phenomenal rise in income which occurred in modem economies
, the.
in recent times. Whatever 'original causes which gave rise in the second
half of the Eighteenth century to the Industrial Revolution which has
since been going on in different parts of the world may have been - and
they probably have much to do with the growth of Rationalism anu the
emergence of the Capitalist Spirit - there Can be little doubt that once
it was started, it became self-propelling. Each invention gives rise tc^a
host/
(9) These new habits - like all habits • run against natural inclinations,
(for the difficulties which the early pioneers of the Industrial Revolu¬
tion in England iound in recruiting agricultural labour for work in their
factories see T.S. Ashton: "The Industrial Revolution 1760-1830", p,!13$
A. Bedford: "The Economic History of England", pp. 144-145), and it would
seem that something similar to the Enclosure movements which occurred in
England in the Eighteenth century and in Germany in the Nineteenth9! ore iblfc
drove surplus agricultural labour off the land is a pre-requisite of
industrialisation. This can be acne by granting liberal credit facilities
to farmers, which would enable them to use mechanical equipment at terms
with which labour cannot compete.
host of new ones which could not have been conceived without it. Ho
improvement in textile machinery industry could have taken place if
there were no mechanical textile industry, ana this improvement coula net
have taken place in England if there were no textile industry in England*
There is a fundamental propensity of technical devices to increase at a
continuously increasing rate, for the more tools there are , tne greater
is the number of potential combinations I**-®} Progress thus becomes
its own causej ana so does backwardness. This growth oi technical
knowledge can be subsumed under the heading of increasing returns to
particular industries, of external economies which each industry creates t
a greater or smaller extent, or oi development of particular types of
skill, but it probably transcends - and is even cbscured by - statical
classification, "In fact we are here verging on the high theme of
economic progress5 and here therefore it is especially needful to
remember that economic problems are imperfectly presented when they are
treated as problems of statical equilibrium ana not of organic growth.....
The Statical theory of Equilibrium is only an introduction to economic
studies/
(10) This is the "Principle of Technology", the importance of which was
stressed by VCblen in his many writings, and which 'was recently propounded
at great length by Professor C.E. Ayres in "The Theory of Economic Progress
Professor Ayres quotes A, Koerwuuski's "Law" that advancement in scientif¬
ic knowledge and technical power proceeds at the rate of rapidity increas¬
ing geometric or logarithmic function, ana supports it by tne fact that
the entire development of civilisation has occurred within roughly one
hundred generations, which is such a small fraction of human history.
Within the definition of tools comes methods of business organisation,
such as, zc quote examples from modern developments, the machinery of
personnel administration, of stock-taking ana inventory control, of
efficiency management and cost accounting.
jit.
stuuy ox the progress and development ox inuustries which show a
tendency to increasing returns."
The growth of knowledge and its application in one part of the
world is not a substitute for fostering its growth and application in
other parts. Apart from the advantages to the world as a whole from
having as wide a basis as possible for scientific research and from
the experimental application of new knowledge under varlea sets of
circumstances, aiad apart from the economic benefits which accrue to any
one country from its priority in any particular line, there is the fact
that industrial knowledge does not flow with much ease from one c cuntry
to another. Even the admirable free masonary of fundamental
scientific knowledge from which amy of the new inuustries directly
stemmed,would not by itself meet this point, xor it is a long way from
abstract/
(11) Marshall: "Principles." , p. 4dl. Cf also Allyn A. Young :
"Increasing returns and Economic Progress", E.J. Dec, 1928.
(12) Even within the same country knowledge aces not move so freely.
"Tno e firms which spend large sums on their own research organisation
inevitably have strong commercial reasons for keeping certain of their
activities to themselves, at least until they have reached the stage
at which protection by patent is possible. In some cases where patent
protection is regarded as impracticable the process oi technique may be
kept secret as long as possible." (Board of Trade, working Party
Reports: Cotton 194o, H.M.S.O.,p. 134). As between countries, there are
in adoition, the difficulties of language, geographical aistance, and
national sentiment. This immobility of technical knowledge, or know-how
as the Americans would call it, is probably the most important immediate
reason for the low income levels prevailing in underdeveloped countries,
arid the United Nations Programme of Technical Assistance for Economic
Development in Underdeveloped Countries set under General Assembly
resolution 200 (III) may well become fcseflsnost effective instrument for
raising the standard of living in these countries.
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abstract knowledge to its successful economic embodiment in machines,
processes, and products, v/hich depends on the pre -existence of a supply
of trained technicians and of a high state of development in many
supporting industries. A hundred first-rate nuclear physicits will
not prcouce an atomic power-station in a country devoid of metallurgical,
electrical-engineering, and chemical industry, much as this country m«y
be fitted for this type of project.
IV. Both the importance ox international exchange or goods anu
services ana the limitations it may set on a country's development, if
this exchange is left entirely to the free play of market forces, are
very great. The low income-level^ now prevailing in China, India, aid
the Middle East, is itself a comment on the comparative cost doctrine,
for these are the countries which adopted free trace, or rather hau it
imposed on them by what is known as the Open Door Policy, up to the last
two or three decades.
Much has been made of the obstacles to economic progress arising
from the existence in these countries of sets of beliefs, attitudes and
social institutions different from those which prevail in Western
Europe, These may explain why these countries failea to aevelop
autonomously in the Western manner\ they do not, by themselves, explain
why the Western development failed to spread to them. Rationalism
spreads, geographically, and from one sphere 01 social life to another}
buo/
(13) Great Britain, whose priority in the Industrial Revolution gave
it a special advantage, is the only high income-level c euntry which
adopted a free trace policy for a considerable period 01 time, aid she
resorted to protection in those inuustries, such as rayon and motor cars
and accessories in which she lost the priority. 1
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but only to a very limited extent, and very slowly, by abstract argument¬
ation: Man is essentially inert# Also, especially in poor countries,
acfuirinj
few have the leisure and training necessary for''whatever measure of
objective reasoning Kan is capable of. But he is readily impressed
by concrete demonstration; his interest is engaged when this demonstra¬
tion is integrated with his day-to-day activities, and is heightened
when it is related to his wants, "The world ceased to believe that
Joshua caused the sun to stand still, because Copemican astronomy was
natation
useful in mining; it abandoned Aristotle»s physics, because Galllio's
theory of falling bodies made it possible to calculate the trajectory of
a cannon ball; it rejected the story of the floou, because geology was
(14)
useful in mining; and so on." The new type of activity, which
tangibly ministers to essential human needs, has a universal potency
which sweeps away all obstacles, AIso^ much lip-service as they may
pay to them, men, most men, that is, seek Heavenly Kingdoms only when
they despair of being able to establish their own little ones here ana
now; and they are quick to shake them off their minus, once they see
that hunger, cold chid heat, disease, and unending, unrewarding toil,
are not part of the eternal order of things
Historically/
(14) Bertram Russell: "Powers A Hew Social Analysis", p. 142,
(15) Religion, in so far as it affects man's conduct in his every day
life, or rather the interpretations placed on the relevant religious
texts (and few are the texts which do not bear many interpretations)
and the selectionfin effective practice, from many contradictory texts,
of those on which stress is made (and a religion wholly consistent with
itself in a watertight system of logic would have little chance of
surviving the charges in the conditions which affect the livelihood of
its adherents) seem to be very much a reflection cf the material conditio®
which surround man. It is interesting in this connectioii to note the
early affiliations of Calvinism, which some writers hola to be responsible




sanction to acquisition, invested the pursuit of worldly success with
the blessings of a "call", and established in it a sign of devine
favour. According to Professor Tawney ("heligion arid the Kise of
Capitalism") it wa^Lsrgely an urban movement, carried from country
to country partly by emigrant traders and workmen, and finding its
stronghold precisely in those social groups to which the traditional
scheme of social ethics, with its treatment of economic interests as
quite a minor aspect of human affair's, must have seemed irrelevant or
artificial. It had its most influential adherents in great business
centres, and its leaders addressed their teachings primarily to the
classes engaged in trade arid industry who formed the most modem and
progressive elements at the time. "In doii% so, they naturally started
from a frank recognition of the necessity of Capital, credit ana banking
large scale commerce arid finance ana other practical facts of easiness
life", thus breaking with tradition which regards preoccupation with
economic interests * beyond what is necessary for subsistence1 as
reprehensible, (Op. cit,, chapter IX), In England, the growth of
Puritanism, the off-shoot of Calvinism, was "by meanes of the City of
Lonaon ... and by reason of its universall tr ade throughout the Kingdome,
with its commodities conveying ana deriving this civill contagion to all
our cities and corporations, and thereby poysoning whole counties",
(quoted by Professor Tawney, op. cit* p, £03, pelican edition, from
"An orderly and plains Earration of the beginnings and Causes of this
Warre", by an unknownwriter), It is interesting also to note that
within Puritanism itself, there were two opposing tendencies as to tire
social system to be established, the one for authoritarian discipline
and the other for unrestricted individualism. Cf. Tawney, op. cit.,
Chapter XV, particularly section ii. The change in social values 1
thus does not seem to have been in the nature of a "first cause". It
did not occur spontaniously, it embodied, rationalised - in a psycholog¬
ical sense - arid sanctified the values of a commercial class which
gained, through the unequalled expansion of trade, increasing importance
in the life of the community, access to political power, and the support
of thinkers on matters political arid economic, whose rationalism freed
them from old traditions ana habits of thought ana enabled them to supply
the new forces with a new philosophy for the social order. To stress
the economic origin of the new social values aoes not mean minimising
their historical importance as a new ana henceforth independent and
extremely powerful force, which first paved the way to the industrial
revolution by breaking the old system and old beliefs, then positively
created it.
/</(.
Hitrtorically , it was part of the specific function oi ©litre-
...x^eneux-a - that is, oi those individuals whose conception ox private
e&rthty paradise went u little further in that direction then that of
(16)
most men and who hah the means mo knowledge with which to realise
their hopes - to create -via the impact of the revolution they intro¬
duced, the milieu favourable to their activities. In a world lute-
*
grated by intexTiational traue, the same process aoea not tear
repetition in all countries without seme help from the Statej the
priority of one or a group of countries would give them a temporary
cost advantage over the countries in ohicn no such transformation took
place, cJia taus moke it unprofitable fox- entrepreneurs - acting
individually - to bx*ing it about*
Those countries >,hi.ch realisea this, ©r rather their government s^
(17)
took the necessary steps, 'with corresponding rise in their standards
of living. Other countries, for various reasons, uiu not snow any
undue haste, and even, rather than swept a neutral policy of laiasea-
fairefostered, forced, or h«u it forced upon them, a false develop¬
ment -which transformed their economies, to the extent that they were
transformed at all, to mere sources of fcoa and raw materials to
highly industrialised'countries. The result is a worlu much poorer
i
then/
(lu) This is rather a simplification of entrepreneurial motives. There
is also the sense of power and of achievement,
(17) For the extent cf government support cf German -jau French develop¬
ment , cf. J,H. Clapham; "The Economic Development o- Fraace said
Germany" Chapters III, IV, X, XI. For Japan: G.C. Allenx "A Short
Economic History oi Japan", pp. £7-31$ b,B, Schumpetei' (ed,) "The
Industrialisation of Japan una Manchukuo" , pax*t II.
fvv-
the®, it might have been,
Hot cnl} bid. economic development in these countries take a
one slued turn quite unwarranted b„.. the £unuameatul relation between
the siae of their populution and their natural x-esources^") and least
conducive to autonomous economic progress $ tbeix share in the fruits
of that limited - in relation to world neeus unu world potentialities -
amount of progress which took place elsewhere is much less than pure
theory would lead us to believe• This is duo to a sot ei eircumsianc««
not taken into account theory. The imperfect market for manu¬
facturers made it possible tor producers to withhold? in the form of
profits? interest, and, later on, with the development ox trade
unionism in industrial countries? highex- wages, the benefits of
technical improvements rather than pass them over to c- ->outers in
cheaper prices,^0^While agriculture and rxia material production,
unless the latter required mouem tecini^ue, in which case it
in/
(18) For a comparative study of different national income levels,
their rates of growth, and the correlation between levels of income
and the distribution of population between prim&ry, secondary, and
tertiary industries eft Colin Clark "Conditions of Economic Progress",
Chapters I - III.
(lb) Cf the following paragraph.
(20) This tendency was accentuated by the growth of international
cartels? for which estimates range from two honored anc fifty to twelve
hundred in- interwar period, controlling among themselves about 4S$ of
world trade (cf. "International Cartels", United Nations publication,
Vajft, pp. 2-3) "Raw material cartels alt/ough of primary importance
in world economy ? constitute only a small fraction of the total number
there being a comparatively small range ox raw materials compared with
the wide variety of manufactured industrial goods" (ibid, p.3). The
Vast majority of international cartels, wnieh include^ several important
raw materials, were, as far member countries are eoocexntd, European,
(ibid, p.4) One of the chief purposes of these cartels was to secure
by/ 7
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in the honus of nationals of highly inuustrialiseu countries, are of
such a nature that any improvement scon finus its way to consumers.
The capital coat*of such improvements as canals, dams, aid various otter
or
irrigation schemes ore borne by the community «C3- not entereu into the
price 01 the product} -na the lack of familiarity ..ith .«ou«rn account¬
ing methods prevents producers lr*~m entering into these prices an
interest-charge for the considerable time-lag between input ana output.
The pressure of population on the land makes it impossible/to organise
4 t>r<jor)''st thelf
labour/ ana thus keeps wages and earnings of peasant farmers at sub¬
sistence levels. On the monetary slue, prices ox industrial products
were prevent£4 from failing with the increasing volume of proauction
by the increasing use of banking money in advanced economies, while
the limited use of this type of money una the absorption of precious
metals for non-monetary purposes in under-developed countries, ^wrtfents
foreign demand fox- their products from bearing on their prices in the
( W± } \
manner portrayed by the self-regulating gola-flow theorem* ' anu «cte
in/
by the division of expert areas, a monopoly position for the supplying
producers in the territory ulloted to them, and, "whilst in the pro¬
ducing countries the respective governments may counteract monopolistic
exploitation by price controls or by abolishing protective traue re¬
strictions , no such action can be taken by ore expkdteu export area.
Perhaps the gravest objection to division oi export markets is that
they place the can-u»#r entirely at the mercy of the supplying country,
especially when it is/possible, for technical or economic reasons,
for the importing country to start producing the commodity at home".
This holes especially for backward countries with respect to a wide
range of industrial products, (ibid.p.15).
(21) Professor Taussig wrote in connection with a discussion of this
theorems "I wculu not be suppose*! to maintain or even suggest that the
trade between Europe anu the East furnishes a ready verification of the
theory of Intemutiorwi #Traoe. The subject is one Usacig, jm.ny such)
for which we need laborious examination of the historical course of
events una careful scrutiny ofmats'*/al...." , " international Trade " P. 160.
in the same way as "the neutralisation oi golu iii Fort-Knox uiu in
U,SJV, in the inter-war periou. An evidence oi the cumulative
effect of these factors is the increasing tendency, contrary to
what one Blight expect on theoretic ..1 g-ounus^of the terms of trade
between manufacturers una pximury gooas to change since the eighteen
/ iji, %
seventies, in favour of former.
IV. The urge for industrialisation in countries prouueing mainly
foodstuffs ana primary products is sometimes explained by this contin¬
uous worsening of the terms at which they can obtain manufactures in
exchange for their products. This may be ehe case fox* these countries
to
v^hose sparse population ana abunaant natural resources point outgone
possibility of securing a high level of income by such specialisation,
though, in view of the considerations referred to in section II of
this chapter, ana provided that their population is hi& enough to
secure the benefits oi large-scale ^i-ouuction, it be taut tnev can
obtain an even higher income if they aevelcpeu their 0..1; basic industries
Whether1 they will make available to the worla at large the benefits
of their vast natural resources or not will depend on whetuer the
present tendency towards monopoly in manufacturers will be reversed or
continued/
(EE) For figures, cf "Industrialisation and Foreign Trade" (League
of Nations publication, 1945), diagram 4 p.18, where the price inuex
for manufactured goods as percentage* of that for primary ,„oous (1913
taken as base j ear) is shown to rise from about 95 in 1876- *80 to
about 135 in 1936-'38. Naturally >the decline in the purchasing power
of primary goods in international trade was not uninterpreted. Prices
of primary goods tena to fluctuate violently over vhe duration of the
business cycle and after wars. This amy give a misleading piccure
of the extent to which unuerdevelopeu countries benefit from the post¬
war position. According to a United Nations study "delstive Rices 01
dxports and Imports of Underdeveloped Countries", 1949, the post-war
price/
price indices for primary goods relative to manufactured goods,
and, therefore, for export prices of underdeveloped, countries,
relative to their import prices, would generally be more favour ^tie-
to them by comparison with the depresses 1832 or 1833, 'but not by
comparison with 1920*s or It13. (ibid. p. 8). In 1847 ana lb-itfe
the pi-ice relation of primary goous in general. to capital ^oo«s w-s
substantially more favourable than in 1937 and 1938, but this lumping
together of foodstuffs ana other primary products uoes not give an
accurate view of the situation. The relative terms on which primary
goods could be exchanged for capital goous in the post-war period,
compared with the. immediate pre-war period, depended upon the ^-articular
goods exchanged in the traue between unuer-deveiopeu anu industriuliseu
countries. Those unuer-developad countries »hich exported primary
non-food materials, tecdeu to be considerably worse of* th.»n whose
which exported food. If 1837 is tae standard of coasp orison, it ceases
to be true, even in general, that exporters of primary materials -
as distingui hea from foodstuffs - obtained their capitJL goods on iwox-e
advantageous terms. Also, capital goods may be a large part ©* total
imports, but they do not form so predominant a part as primary
commodities among exports. Other manufactures, especially texnil«s
and food, may be equally or more important. The United Hutiona study
indicates that "the ibices paia by underdeveloped countries for
imports of gcous other than capital gcous increased so much more tuan
those of capital goous that in one over-all picture, th» sharply
improved price relations, compared with capital goous, was weakened
into a general, but by no means uniform,.(te|p,denjjw( fthe total terms
of traue of underdeveloped countries to^tnem "than in 1938} there
was no discernible tendency for them to be better lawi in 1837".
(ibid. pp. 8-13).
The long-term deterioration in the terms of trade of primary
products cannot be explained by a more rapid increase in productivity.*■
•Although statistical data on differential rates of increase in pro¬
ductivity of primary production in under-aevelopea countries alia
production oi manufactured articles in industrialised countries ore
almost entirely lacking, this explanation of the long-term changes
in terras of trade . , . may be dismissed. There is little acubt
that productivity increased faster in the industrialised ccuntries
than in primary production in under developed countries. This is
evidenced by the more rapid rise in standards of living in industrial¬
ised countries in the long period covered, from 1870 to the present
day. Hence, the charges observed in terms of trade uc not meor* that
increased productivity in primary production was passed on to in¬
dustrialised countries} on the contrary, they mean that the under¬
developed countries helped to maintain, in tne prices which they paid
for their imported manufactures relative to those which they p«ia for
their own primary products, u rising standard of living in the in¬
dustrialised countries, without receiving, in the price ox their own
products, a corresponding equivalent contribution tow&ras their own
standards of living." (ibid. p. 13d). for a similar opinion cf.
also H.U. Singer, "The Distribution of (Sains between Investing Md
Borrowing Countries", A.E.K., May 1950, p. 477.
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continued and on whether or net envelopment in low-income , uenseiy-
populated, countries will proceed at such a rate as "to result in a
large enough increase in effective demand for their products. as
for densely-populated countries, this deterioration in their terms
of tr&ue is only one of the reasons for industrialisation, for even
if this tendency were reversed, it c~n hardly be maintained that any
change in tneir favour can raise their standard of living to any
considerable extenti the sheer weight of numbers corisiaered in
relation to the siwe of the population in highly Industrialised
countries, rules out such a possibility. For the same reason, even
if we abstract from the considerations ox section II above, it is
most unlikely that highly inuustrialisea countries will bo Aula to
satisfy the long-run current requirements of underdeveloped countries
of capital gooes, if these requirements are to be at tne scale uemanaeu
by a high level of income. Also, as the standard of living of the
former countries continues to rise, their demand for foodstuffs, raw
material and articles of simple manufacture will rise to a much smaller
extent, if at all. "Technical progress in manuiactorlog actually
largely consists of a reduction in the amount of raw materials uaea
par unit of output, which may compensate or even over-compensate the
increase in the volume of manufacturing",(23) and the development
of synthetic industries increasingly transforms the supply of raw
materials from the countryside to the factory, with the rise in
income-levels, more and more people will be engaged in the supply
of services and other gooas which have to be produced locally and
cannot/
(b&) H.W. Singerj loc. . cit, p, 477
/ft
cannot be imported from abroad, arid a smaller numbox ox' people c^a
be spared for export, industries* Ibis line ci thought is reiiiforceu
by the tendency of population to have a slower rate ox growth in
highly industrialised countries th«n in underuevelo*-<*d countries. It
is usually argued that, because of the relative abundance ox cheap
unskilled labour in these latter countries, they shoula special!; e in
those products which re.,ui.fe little capital anu men unskilled labour.
This is u short-run argument the implications ox waich will be con-
siaered in the following section. Fox- long-run puxposes, we must
remember that labour is cheap because ox the relative scarcity ox
capital, that is, because labour is not re-organised more efficiently ,
while the development of skill is one of the 12-in meanS of raising
income, and its fruits accrue as much - ix not more - to producers «s
to consumers. More important still, technical progress - as agutsu
in section II - in my one industry in a given country is uepenuent
for its emergence on the existence in that country of a number of
industries which supply this industry with materials, Capital ^oods,
ana a human store of technic kxX '+.* JbtXXX tilia knowledge, and of a number
of other industries which tnis industry supplies wita* its ^.xtuuctsj
also the application in my given industry 01 the technical progress
which initially takes place in another country is dependent ior its
swiftness, ease, and economy, cn a similar set of circumstances. For
all these reasons, it would seem that there is a complimentary outfit
of basic industries which densely populated under-developed countries
should sc-ek eventually to acquire.
/cy.
Those underdeveloped countries which are too small for such an
outfit will always have a lower income than bigger countries in the
same stage of development. Unless they have a special advantage
such as the possession of highly demandea natural rescurces or
proximity and access to big markets which they can supply with
specialised kinds of manufacture, their income-levels may well remain
very low.'24) Much will uepend on the extent to which international
trade will be revived and on the possibility of reversing monopolistic
tendencies in the outside world. The chief remedy, however, will
remain the creation of larger economic units through political.
(2b)
amalgamation.
V. The suggestion of antithesis between international traue and
economic development is a false one, left over from the days when
fiscal measures - taxes ana subsides - were thought to be the
orthodox measures of State interference in accordance with a limited
(24) Countries such as Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweeten and
Switzerland, which have only between four and nine million inhabitants,
"belong to an integrated European inuustrial economy which developed
during a period when tariffs were relatively low while the tenaeney
towards large-scale production had not yet come into full play.
They are situated between or near bigger inaustrial states, of which
the United Kingdom actually aamitted manufactured articles duty-free
up to 1932$ Austrian products, moreover, were until 1919 admitted
free of uuty over the whole formex^Austro-Hungariun Empire, with
several times the population of Austria of the inter-war period" They
were able todevelop highly specialised manufacturing industries
dependent on a wide export market, ana enjoyed large incomes on account
of "invisible items" in their balance of payments such as^olonial
investments, tourist trade and shipping. ("Inaustrialisation and
Foreign Trade", pp. 40-41),
(25) Mr. T. Balogh, considering the perpetuation of the present
inequality of opportunity the most objectionable feature of the post¬
war international economic arrangements which, he fears, will freeze
an/
an international division of labour- unfavourable to the poorer and
smaller countries - he apparently had in mind the sdullness of the
U.K. market and population as compared with those of the U.S.A. -
argues that, unless smaller countries are permitted to combine
in co-ordinated planning of their economic reconstruction, their
inferiority will in all probability be perpetuated, ("Britain's Foreign
Trade Problem: A Comment" , E.J., March 1948). Mr. G.D.A.
MacDougall, while accepting this argument in theory but limiting
its applicability to countries much smaller than Britain, refers to„
Mr. Rothschild's opinion that the industrialisation and welfare
of these countries may be prejudiced rather than aiaed by membership
of a bloc containing stronger neighbours, ("Britain*Foreign Trace
Problem: A Reply", E.J., March 1948). Mi'. Rothschild's argument,
however, is restricted to the case where a laisser-faire policy
is pursued. The creation of a federal union will then tend to
reinforce and perpetuate the economic structure of its constituent
members, "The greater inaustrial countries will become the centres
of heavy ana other monopolistic inuustries. The smaller countries
will find opportunities in the small scale industries and in
agriculture. Backward countries will remain backward just because
they were backward before}" ("The small Ration ana World Trade",
E.J., April 1944), It does not necessarily apply in the case
where the federating countries are at the same level of development
and loses its relevance where there is complete political integration.
number of exceptions to a general rule of lcdsaez-fc-J.ro x for
between encouraging internal development toy tariff protection or by
subsidies, many practical considerations virtually limited the choice
to the former method, and the Question therefore usually took the
form of whether to develop toy tariff protection or not to develop at
all. Laissez-faire - in the popular sense of the term - was thus
the major obstacle to laisseg-naoser. With State action along the
lines indicated in the previous chapter, this antithesis need no
longer toe maintained, ana development toy protection should toe seen
for -what it is; a clumsy method which encourages the growth of
sheltered monopolies and which, if adopted toy every nation, would
lead to the shrinkage of profitable international exchange.
The most obvious reason why international traue is beneficial
is the fact that countries differ widely in their natural resources,
taken in relation to their population, No country can procure from
its own endowment all the material it needs - even More1s Utopia had
to import iron - and no country can produce all its requirements of
many materials with the same facility as they can be produced else¬
where. No less in importance is the fact that, for historical
reasons, different countries are at different stages of development.
We have seen that, toy itself, unrestricted international trade between
highly-developed and underdeveloped countries is not a substitute
for internal development and may even be a hindrance to the economic
welfare of the letters. This does not mean that underdeveloped
countries should restrict their imports to foodstuffs and raw materials
and proceed forthwith to produce all the manufactures they need.
No economy can toe transformed overnight, and international trade may
/s~c.
help to shorten the pei loci of transformation and lessen the sacrifices
associated with any given period. Many commodities, consumers'
goods as well as producers' goods, particularly those which require
much capital per unit ox" product, complex machinery, elaborate
organisation, much skilled labour of all grades, or which are more
amenable to mass-production 'but a sufficiently big demand for which
requires a high level of income, may be very expensive to produce
in under-developea countries in their initial eutages of development.
At the same time, the existence of a large supply of unskilled labour
in these countries gives them an immediate advantage in the production
of those commodities which require much unskilled labour, or fur
which labour can be trained after a brief period, and it would seem
that the most advantageous course for them would be to move gradually
in their production from the latter type of commodities to the former.
It is not possible to lay any detailed rules as to how ana at what
rate this transformation shoulu take place , but it would seem that it
is in this sphere that the free play of market forces - whether the
participants in the exchange are public bodies or private traders -
should be allowed full sway. This may not necessarily lead to a
world optimum, but in a world composed of independent political
uniug, the best any country coula do if it is to avail itself of the
opportunities offered to it by the outside world is to follow in
disposing of its resources the indications of world prices. Since,
however, only by trial and error can industrial organising ability
be acquired, ana since the training of special kinds of industrial
skill and engineering talent is a long term process which cannot be
undertaken without finding gainful occupations for the trainees, we
may expect underdeveloped countries to plunge rapidly into many-
kinds of limited - in relation to requirements - projects whose
products may be obtained more cheaply from abroad but which would
serve as jugping boards for the long-run expansion of the mere
complex types of industrial activity. These projects would be part
of the economic overhead costs.
VI. Import duties on consumers' goods, however, as well as
quotas, exchange controls. , . , etc., may be resorted to, not xo
give protection to particular inuustries, but to increase the
amount of foreign exchange available for the purchase oi capital
goods from abroad and thus speed up Hie process of development.
T&is would be a parallel action in the feela of international trade
to the decision as to how much of a country's resources would be
devoted to investment i.urposes, and wcula be influenced by the same
consideration; the population factor. Since many of the goods
C
imported in underdeveloped countries are luxuries ana sem-xuxuriws,
income redistribution would to some extent divert con.sumption from
foreign products to heme ^rooucts, but this might be offset by the
grovrth of managerial, professional and other highly-skilled labour
classes which would be attracted to better-quality foreign prouuets
and to the novel articles of consumption which only high-income
countries can produce at a large scale. The extent to which under¬
developed countries can increase their receipts ox foreign excharge
by expanding their exports is quite limited* the demand of highly
industrialised countries for raw materials is fairly inelastic, and
there are fairly rigid limits to the quantities they can absorb of
IS?.
simp^
low-quality or sdngie articles of manufacture in which unoerdevloped
countries ctn hope to compete with them in their own domestic markets.
In the past, the difficulty was partly solved by inuustrialising
countries exporting their manufactures to other low-income countries
whose demand was similar in structure to that of the industrialising
countries themselves and using the receipts to buy capital goods
from highly inaustrialised countries, hut if all, or the greater
part of, low income countries are to industrialise at the same time,
the same inaustries will be developed in each of them una the greater
part of international traae between them will take the form of
exchanging raw materials and foodstuffs against raw materials and
foodstuffs, A flow of investment funds from highly inaustrialised
countries which would enable underdeveloped countries to purchase
capital goods therefore seems to be a necessary cunuition for the
removal of restrictions on international trade, if this is to be
compatible with a speedy and simultaneous development in them all.
/SI.
CHAPTER 7.
IKTdhhATIQnAL IhVhSf;IfNT aim ECONOMIC DaVhx.OPi.^.ul.
I. ¥»e refeired in a pxevious chapter to the widely held view that
high-income (highly-industrialised) countries which rely mainly on
private enterprise for directing their economic activities would
finu it, as their incomes continue to rise, increasingly difficult
to secure a state of full employment.
The deficiency of effective demand which is responsible for the
difficulty may be remedied by distributional measures or by measures
designed to increase the rate of investment. It was also argued in
the previous chaptei that a flow of investment funds from highly
industrialised countries is required if economic development on a
world wide scale is to be compatible with the removal of international
trade restrictions in underdeveloped countries. Neeuless to say,
this flow will also speed up the process of development in these
countries ana enhance their chances of winning the race against
population increase. International investment m^y thus serve the
treble purpose of contributing to the maintenance of full employment
in high-Income capitalistic economies, speeding' up the rate of
development in under-developed countries, ana reducing the obstacles
to the flow of gocus and service© between nations.
The effective use of foreign investment for full employment
maintenance by high-income countries 3 equires that its volume should
indefinitely increase 5 otherwise the earnings of the investment
U o.
will eventually exceed the net outflow of capital and require the
creditor country to import more goous ana services than it exports J1-*
It would not be proper to over-stress the role of foreign investment
as an instrument of full employment policy - in the last resort full
employment is an organisational problem - tut it mist also be pointed
out that the aevelopment of an import surplus resulting from the
cessation of the growth of net investment would by itself create
transfer and employment problems of its own. In the nineteenth
century, "an essential conuiticn of the tolerably smooth working of
international lending... was that it facilitated an increased output
by borrowing countries of commodities for which there was a rapidly
increasing world demand. So long as this condition was fulfilled,
the subsequent payment of interest and sinking fund charges gave
rise to no transfer problem of foreign exchange difficulty,..
The cessation of the need 10 open out new agricultural areas to meet
a growing demand for foodstuffs on the part of industrial countries
(which was caused by technical progress in agriculture, together
with the slackening of population growth in Western Europe) removed
what had previously been the main motive force of large-scale
international/
(1) Cf. W.S. Salant: "The Domestic Effects of Capital Export under
the Point Pour Programme," A.E.R. May 1U50, pp.504 et suite, Mr.
Salant however, calculates that if the U.S. invests 5 billion dollars
next year- at an average return of 4%, then to avoid developing an
import surplus, net foreign investment should have to increase by 4%
a' year. It would reach about 35 billion dollars a year by the end of
the century. If the gross national product increased in the next
fifty year's at the same rate as between 187' to 192', it would reach
about 2 trillion dollars by the end of the century. On that
assumption, the 35 billion dollars of net foreign investment would be
only 0.^/ of the gross national income.
/u
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international investment."v The present distribution of natural
resources in relation to population does not point o;ut to the
possibility of such or similar division of labour between present
densely-populated underdeveloped countries and highly industrialised
countries. As to the structural unemployment which would follow
the process of developing an impoit surplus, the rapid growth of
population in the nineteenth century did not make it the difficult
problem which it might now bee one.
I do not pretend to have any clear picture of how these long-
run problems may be solved. It may not, however, be inapposite
to turn in this chapter to short-run considerations, and we may ...
this
perhaps be encouraged in'departure from the procedure so far adopted
in this study by the reflection that in the long-run either we will
all be dead or the peaceful solution of the issues which now threaten
to destroy the world will have brought in its wake a change in the
perspective against which long-run prospects can be discussed.
It/
(2) "Report of the Economics Committee", Papers of the Royal
Commission on Population, p.17. The report then continued, "From
the world standpoint the future of international lending presents
in the light of this experience a difficult and uncertain problem.
There may well be large scope for it for new pui-poses, e.g., for
the industrial development of agricultural countries, and for
securing international exchange stability. But if it is to fulfil
these purposes, it will need to take very different forms from those
characteristic ox the nineteenth century and may need to be under¬
taken through a different mechanism,"
/£/
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It would also seem that non-economic considerations may transfer
the nature of the problem. In these days of fast moving events,
history, which is not tied to the rigid tracks which limit the
speculations of theory, is overtaking theory, ana the latter any
with gain give her the right oi way.
II. The rest of this chapter will therefore be confined to a
discussion of the conditions under which a great flow of investment
funds for development purposes can be maintained, and we may start
by reviewing the present tendencies in this field.
At present, most European countries have pluceu direct restric¬
tions on the outflow of capital, usually for the purposes of relieving
pressure on the balance of payments, limiting the volume of total
investment at home ana abroad by domestic concerns as part of an
anti-inflationary policy, maintaining a fluid domestic capital market
and reducing tne rate at which the government may borrow on it, or
reducing the cost of capital to uomestic industry. Controls are
also imposed for political and economic reasons,^'
Fr'gures for 1947 and 1948,^^ including expenditure for
recn nstruct ion in the Far East, showed that total amount of long-term
funds, grants ana donations moving from different sources into
underdeveloped/
(S) "Survey of policies Affecting Private Foreign Investment", a
study prepared by the United Nations Secretariat, March 1950,
document E/1616/Eev.,1, pp, 9-10.
(4) For the information contained in this and the following paragraphs
cf the Unitea Rations "World Economic Report 1948", pp. 241 et suite.
underdeveloped areas, including grants for purposes of reconstruction
in the Far East, were in the neighbourhood of loQO million dollars
in 1947 and 1800 m.d. in 194S, not counting reinvestments by sub¬
sidiary enterprises out of earnings obtained in one countries in
which they operate. Because the data for the U.3, are more readily
available and are more comprehensive and detailed than for other
countries, and because the U.S. has cccie to be by far the most
important source of investment funds in the post-war* period, it will
suffice to refer to U.S. investment in order to see the channels and
directions in which the funds flow. Generally speaking, U.S.
participation had been in the form of government loans and grants,
private portfolio transactions, direct investment and private uni¬
lateral transfers. The total amount of funds provided by the U.S.
directly to underdeveloped areas -was 1,202 m.d. in 1947 and 1940 in
1948. In both years almost half of these amounts rnoveu through
private channels. The information by principal areas, however,
shows a striking contrast between the Far* East and the other unuer-
developed areas. In the latter, the outflow of private capital
constituted the major jart of the total amount of U.S, funas going
to them, whereas in the Far East, mainly Japan and Korea, the bulk
was in the form of government grants. Taking both government ana
private capital into account, Latin America received 22§ of the total
sum, the Middle East, Africa and India 23% ana trie Fax* East 65%.
Of the total outflow of private funds from the U.S. in 1947,
which amounted to 1230 m.d., 653 m.d., or about 46% had been directed
to economically underdeveloped ax*eas, of which 452 in direct
investment./
investment. Partly oxfsetting those investments there had teen
a net inflow of 66 m.d., consisting of interest, amortisation ox-
liquidation. In 1948, the total outflow of private funds reached
1498 m.d,, of which 582 m.d. went to underdeveloped areas, with a
total of 450 m.d. x*epresenting direct investment. Net inflow in
1948 amounted to 4o m.d. In both years thus 902 m.d. or about
90% of total private investment, was in the form of direct invest¬
ment , largely in foreign subsidiaries and branches of U.S. corpora¬
tions, of which 521 m.d. went to Latin America, 294 to Africa ana
the Miodle-East, and 87 to the Far East. The typ~ of enterprises
to which these funds were directed is no less interesting. Sixty
per cent of the private investment was concentrated on the develop¬
ment of the petrolium industry, particularly in Venezuela, Suadi -
Arabia and Kuwait, and most of the remaining amount was invested
in public utilities and manufacturing industries in Brazil and
Argentina, and in mining in Mexico and the Union of South Africa.
III. The most important feature of these figures is the
meagre amount, proportionately to population, of total private
investment funds received^ by densely-populated under-developed
countries. This is not a novel feature oi the post war period.
In the period 1919-1928, India and China, for instance, which
together represent for about 40% cf the world's population, each
accounted for an inflow similar to, or less than that of Argentina
and Australia, with only 1% of world population,^)
CF "International Capital Movements During the Inter-bar Period",
United Nations publication, October 1949, p. 17.
No less in importance is the preponderance of direct over
portfolio investment. The tendency of investment in all countries
to take this form started with the Great Depression. The upheaval
and dislocation <f international economic relations which followed
the destruction of the system of triangular and multilateral traue
on which portfolio investment depended for its smooth functioning,'
/ "
the uncertainties about exchange-rates, and the growth of prctecuion-
ism in all countries led investor's to restrict their operations to
enterprises whose products - usually foodstuffs ana raw materials,
since manufactures were usually protected by high tariff walls -
were meant for use in the creditors1 country rather than for sale
in the world market. Even when the goods were sold to a third
party, no "transfer of payments was then involved, since the trade of
the venture as well as the control of production were in the hands
of the investors and the sale was likely to take place in tne
creditors* country and be invoiced in its own currency. Investment
in railways and public utilities, which absorbed part of direct,
investments before the Depression, could no longer profit from the
particular advantages of avoiding transfer difficulties enjoyed by
the former type of projects.^0-' So far as underdeveloped countries
are concerned, however, this concentration on direct investment is
also/
thfS
(6) For a detailed study of/shift away from portfolio to direct
investment in the thirties and its causes, cf the study mentioned
in the previous footnote, p. 48 et suite.
/U-
also not a novel feature. Thus while in the nineteen twenties
total direct and portfolio investment funds of both U.S. and U.K.
were of approximately equal value, no capital issues for the account
of either China or India were floated in the U.S., and the British
issues for India account were small and for China were negligible.^7)
Direct investment, even before the dislocation in international
economic relations which followed the Depression, tended to be dis¬
connected with the economies of the recipient countries. A United
Maoions Siudy^£l) of the channels to which it was directed in the
191b-1928 period has shown that it had a tendency largely to be
absorbed in public utilities and transportation, distributional
trade, finance, primary production (chiefly agricultural and mining
and usually for export) and processing oi primary raw materials,
rather than in manufacturing, particularly for consumption in the
countries in which investment is made. Investment in finance
generally aim primarily at facilitating the sale of imported goods
within these countries^) Of the American direct investment
during that period, only a fifth represented manufacturing proper;
of this 842 was invested in developed or semi-developeu countries
(Canada, Western Europe, Argentina, Australia and Mew Bealand, arid
eyen/
(7) ibid, pp. 27-29.
(S) ibid, pp. 32-33,
(9) Foreign investment in transportation also generally aimed at
facilitating the export trade. Railway lines were likely to fan out
from sea ports to producing areas leaving inadequate connections
between the lines serving different ports or between potential
manufacturing and consumption centres. Cf the League of Nations
"Industrialisation and Foreign Trade," pp. 43-47.
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even there to a certain extent in manufacturing for export), and
British direct investment showed similar characteristics. Only to a
very small extent, the study concludes, did direct investment enter
into manufacturing for the domestic market of underdeveloped
countries; and the same tendency is noticeable in the post-war
period, as we have seen from previous figures.
IV. This tendency of private investment to b«s direct and of
direct investment to shun manufactures, particularly in underdevelop-
^Lr about
eu countries, should make us somewhat sceptic of the view that all
that is needed to attract foreign capital for the purpose of develop¬
ment is that these countries create a congenial climate for* private
enterprise activities.Exchange restrictions, nationalisation
programmes, discriminatory practices and political unrest which are
often held responsible for the failure of private foreign capital
to participate in their development were not always a feature of the
pre-war period; on the contrary, through political subordination,
exterritorial rights, free-port treaties, most-favoured-nation clause^
or any combination of these circumstances, owners of foreign capital
often enjoyed a privileged position in most of these countries,
sometimes amounting to total immunity from taxation. Direct
investment, however, need not be discouraged, for though its
importance in contributing to development is bound to remain
secondary, it can serve certain limited purposes, such as providing
the receiving countries with foreign currency through the earnings
of workers, taxes and royalties, particularly in these enterprises
which/
(10)/
(10). Sees for example, Vs.A. Brown Jr., "Treaty, Guarantee ana
Tax Inducements for foreign Investments", A,I.E. , May IJoQ.
In his opinion "the sooner the underdeveloped countries create a
climate favourable to private American investments the better it
will be for their programmes of economic development", p. 487.
According to him also a bill was introduced into the House of
Representatives on August 1949 which provides that before an
underdeveloped country shall be eligible to receive technical
assistance from the U.S. under Point Pour it shall meet a series
of stringent requirements, including adherence to F.C.N, treaties,
tax conventions and convertibility treaties^ satisfactory to U.S.
It provides al. o that after two y®ars it shll not "be the policy of
Export-Import Bank to make loans to countries which have not met
these ccnuitions except by special authority of the President,
In his view, its underlying philosophy is that Point Four prcgram
is essentially a program for developing under-developed countries
by the use of private/and know-how. Consequently, it would
be wrong for the U.S. government to give technical assistance to
any such country if ix, does not demonstrate by some form of
•suitable performance1 that it is willing to accord reasonable and
equitable treatment to private foreign capital.
The views of the U.S. Administration seem to be less definite.
Its representative at the United Nations Economic and Social Council,
while reiterating his Governments belief in the special contribution
that private capital coulu make to the process ©f economic develop¬
ment through foreign investment and its hope that the process of
defining the position of foreign investment by means 01 treaty
arrangements would be greatly extended, declared that there was
every reason to expect that as successive projects were integrated
into over-all development plans they wculu receive sympathetic
consideration as the time came for their financing, and that it
•was the policy of the U.S. Government to encourage the expansion
of the activities of public institutions. Cf the"Official Records
of the Economic anu Social Council", Fifth year, Tenth Session,
369th meeting.
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which, because they requiie complicated oiganisution, much mouein
technology or prolonged and expensive preliminary Investigations-,
cannot be undertaken by under-developed countries at their present
stage of development. Even for this limited purpose, agreement
between investing and receiving countries for the purposes of
avoiding double taxation, guaranteeing the right of investors to
transfer their earnings and securing fair compensation in case of
nationalisation, are required to attract capital to flow from one
country to another and "attempts,.,, to negotiate international
agreement affecting foreign investment have confirmed the existence
of a substantial area of conflict between the policies of capital
importing and capital exporting countries. The emphasis of
the former tends to fall on committments by the debtor countries
relating to the non-discriminatory treatment through assurances of
•national* or 'most-favoured nation' treatment, rights to transfer
income and capital, ana to equitable compensation in the event of
expropriation. The less developed countries tend to be concerned
primarily with maintaining control over the entry ana operations of
-CConowlesfafa/nsl~ whit they rejard
direct investments in order to safeguard their'exploitation ana to
achieve various positive objectives of economic development.)
In the opinion of the United nations Sub-Commission on Economic
Development, the crux of the problem is not in agreement on appropriate
guarantees nor the principle of maximum freedom from restraints.
It/
(11) The United Nations Secretariat "Survey of Policies Aifecting
Private Foreign Investment," p. 4b.
trto
It is i*ather in the question of how to provide the practical cleans
for making good on the required guarantees, particularly with regard
to the transfer question. Also, they point out, in the case of
the countries which are members of the X.M.F, it is doubtful if
they could implement such guarantees without resorting to differential
treatment of claims to foreign exchanges,^12' The reason,
however, seems to go deeper than that. Foreign investment would
naturally be attracted only to those enterprises capable of earning
high profits, and they usually contain a large element of monopoly,
that is, to those areas which are usually chosen for nationalisation
and naturalisation.^1^) Moreover, present information shows that
the development programmes of most of the underdeveloped countries
formed part of general long-range plans, whose application came
largely under the control of the State. This is a historical
fact against which it would be wrong to protest, for theory's
support, as we have seen in previous chapters, can be claimed for
it. As the French delegate to the United Nations Social and
Economic Council, who drew attention to these ele ents in the
situation, has put it, "if that reasoning were carried to an
extreme/
(12) Cf, "Report of the Fourth Session of the Sub Commission on
Economic Development", May 1950, paragraphs 28-29.
(13) Cf "Survey of Policies Affecting private Foreign Investment",
p. 25.
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extreme, a i*eaxly tragic contradiction would be found in that
phenomenon, for the mere a country were to make a vigorous,
rational and co-ordinated effort, the more private capital would
tend to by-pass it."
V. The above analysis doeshot apply to portfolio invest¬
ments, which would allow foreign capiual to be assimilated into the
general schemea'of development of underdeveloped countries. At
present, however, the flotation of loans in foreign capital markets,
except through high risk-bearing agencies such as the International
Bank of Heconstruction and Development appears to be out of the
questionand we may turn to this Bank to see how far it has
discharged its responsibilities.
VI. One of the chief functions of the Bank as laid down by
its constitution,C16) is u> promote private foreign, investments by
means of guarantees or participation in loans and other investments
made by foreign investors, and when private capital is not available
on reasonable terms to supplement private investment by providing, on
suitable conditions, finance for productive purposes out of its own
capital/
(14). Official Records of the Tenth Session, 369th meeting.
(16). Cf: "Survey of Policies..,." p. 24. Tie U.S. Import-Export
Bank of Washington may have certain potentialities in this field.
It must be remembered however, that it is a single government's
agency, ancr such may be influenced by political or other considera¬
tions from which an international organisation would be free.
(lo). United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, Final Act,
Ciad. , 6646.
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capital funds raised by it and its other resources.
In discharging this duty, the Bank has committed of its
resources 497 rn.d. in 1947 anu 28 p m.d, in l'94c. Actual dis¬
bursements out of U.S. dollar funds were 300 m.d* and 193 an
respectively, in addition to the equivalent of 6 m.d. in Swiss
francs and Norwegian currency. The total committments up to 31st
December 1948 included two development loans totalling 13 million
for hydro-electric equipment machinery in Chile, which became effect¬
ive onlyat the beginning of 1949, so that no disbursements were made
in 1948. Early in 1949, a loan agreement was signed with Mexico
(34.1 m.) arid Brazil (75 m.) for hyoro-electric development.
At the same time, negotiations were in progress with a number of
(17 )
various other countries. ' This rate, as Mr. Kalaor had stated
in his evidence before the United Nations Economic and Social
Council,is a long way from the minimum of 2000 m.d, necessary
each year for a satisfactory solution of the problem of development.
He also points out that if the Bank lent at the required rate, its
current resources would be exhausted in less than a year. The
scantiness of the Bank's resources does not, for the present, seem
to be the main reason for its failure to lend at a considerable
. /
rate./ As its representative has declared before the Economic end
Social Council, ^id Bank has not yet exhausted its funds
The/
(17). United Nations "World Economic Survey 1948", p. 247. These
amounts are included in t he total investment figures reported in
Section II of this chapter,
(18) "Official Records", Eleventh Session, p. 78.
The Bank, relying as it is for the hulk of its funds on private
investors who are expected to subscribe to its loans or to loans
guaranteed by it, is tied to banking standards of soundness, whereas
the social and economic overhead investment projects, for which under¬
developed countries are in most pressing need, provide little or no
yield in foreign exchange, «nd require a considerable period of time
before their yielu Can be realised in financial terms*
According to its representative before the Economic and Social
Councilthe Bank accepts the premise that basic resources
projects should be assessed in long-range terms, and with reference
to secondary economic development, ana within that framework, would
consider the financing of what has been termed economic overhead
projects within one of its activities, It recognises that cases
might occur where it would be appropriate for it to provide foreign
exchange to cover part of the local currency costs of a project,
thus also in part covering the indirect impact on the country's
balance of payment, provided that the country was sufficiently credit"
worthy, that the projects are of such urgency to justify foreign
borrowing, that local-currency costs of the project could not be
reasonably met by available domestic resources, ana that it was
clearly demonstrated that the execution of the projects involved
indirect foreign exchange requirements arising from loss of exports
or increased imports of raw materials or essential consumption goons
to prevent investment having inflationary effect, though it would
not/
(lb) ibid, p. 74 et suite,
\
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not regard such operations as the normal procedure. It is also
pointed cut that though a great many projects might seem sound enough
in terms oi local currency, the country concerneu mty not still be
in a position to service foreign debts on all of them, ana that,
consequently, priorities on the basis of productivity and a general
pattern of economic development have to be worked out which was
consistent and well integrated. As for social overhead projects,
the Bank would not necessarily reject considering them, provideu teat
they were demonstrably productive and linkea to projects of an
economic nature j also if the Bank made a contribution to privately
financed industrial projects and to overhead economic projects, the
country itself may be able to meet the cost ox social overhead ^rojecls
This explanation of the Bank's policy was made in connection
with certain proposals aavux ced by the United Nations' Group of
Experts on "National and International Measures for Full Employment",
who, observing that the Bank's resources are far too small to meet
the needs of long-term investment programme, that its ability to
borrow from private investors is likely to vary with the state of the
capital markets oi* the lending countries, and that, except in special
circumstances, the Bank is now restricted to lending on a specific
project basis, have suggested a modification of its Statute and an
extension of the scope of its activitiesThe Group of Experts
thought that, though rhe difference between the activities they
recommended/
(20) Cf "National and International Measures for Full Employment",
Report by a Group of Experts appointed by the Secretary-General,
United Nations publication, p. 56.
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recommended for the Bank ana its current act.lvit.iss outlined in the
previous paragraph? may be one of degree? it was so great that it
became a difference in icind^1^ Since in framing their proposals
they took account of seme factors which were not dealt with in the
previous discussion? and since they have come forward with a set oi
71 recommendations which^in the present student's view? ccula hardly
be improved upon? it may be fitting to close this study with a
summary of the relevant parts of their argument and proposals.
The Group recognises in the fact that a large part, of the
population of underdeveloped countries cculd be directea from
agricultural occupations without any decrease in agricultural output
a form of disguised unemployment which results from a lack of
capital equipment ana other complementary resources required to
keep wage-earneiv at work. The only remedy for this form of unem¬
ployment is economic development? which constitutes the major
economic problem of the world. They ore of' the view that the
problem of full employment cannot be solved except in the context
of an expanuing world economy of which the economic development
of underdeveloped countries woulu form the most important single
element.
They did not attempt? however? to deal extensively with the
probtem of development as such: their assignment was to report on
national /
(21) Cf. Mr. Kaldor's evidence before the Economic and Social
Council? "Official Records"? Eleventh Session p. 73.
(22) "National and International Measures for Full Employment"?
paragraph 20.
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national ana international neasures required to a chieve full
employment. For this they prepared an elaborate set of recommenda¬
tions dealing with both aspects of the problem. On the inter¬
national side, they consider that the objective of full employment
policy is to create conditions under which any particular country
will so behave as not to prevent other countries from maintaining
the stability and prosperity of their economies. Attainment of
this objective requires bouh the achievement of over-ail equilibrium
ana the maintenance of stability in international relations.
For this, they consider it necessary that some method be devised for
ascertaining the general policies of countries with respe ct to the
way in which they intend to re-establish balance in their inter¬
national transactions, so that each country can bring itself into
line with the future pattern arm structure of world trade, that
lending countries should stabilise the flow of their international
investment over considerable periods, ana appropriate measures be
taken for facilitating this process, and that some procedure be
introduced whereby the international propagation of cyclical
fluctuations and a coisequent cumulative contraction in world trade
may be most effectively prevented, and they present three sets of
recommendations for achieving these objectives!^4-1 Only the second
set will be referred to here, though it should be noticed that the
recommendations form an interrelated whole , ana that some of those
which are left out have a close bearing on the problem of
development/
(23) ibid, par. 98.
(24) ibid, par. 99.
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development^4 ^
The stabilization of the flow of international investment
ever substantial perioas, is considered to be essential, both for the
attainment of structural equilibrium in internetionai traae and for
efficient development. If governments are to make a rational use
and co-ordinated approach to the adjustments required for the
achievement of international financial equilibrium, it is essential
that they should be able to foresee the level of external currency
disbursements of the major lending countries for a considerable
period ahead. And from the point of view of the underdeveloped
countries, the cnaracter of the development programmes which they
will be able to plan ana execute will depend in large part upon the
extent to which th€y can anticipate a steady flow of capital from
the lending countries.
"Past experience" the Group observes, "has shown that foreign
investment, if left to private initiative, tends to be extraoruinar-
ily unstable: it tends to dry up in periods of depression - at
the very time when its cessation aces the greatest damage to the
maintenance of world prosperity. It is hard to see how this could
be prevented without direct government action. Furthermore, the
conditions for a revival of private foreign investment on any large
scale have become less favourable. Quite apart from the political
instability that is inimical to a revival of private lending, the
underdeveloped countries themselves have strong feelings on the
conditions/
(25) Cf, for example, pars. 95-38, which deal with fluctuations
in the demand for primary products.
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conditions under which they will admit foreign capital. Quite
understandably5 they do not want a repetition of the nineteenth
century, ana they want to retain a substantial amount of control
over capital invested in their own ten-itcries. Thus, while
private investment can continue to play an important role, its
extent is likely to be limited, It is evident, on the other hand,
that the interests not only of the underdeveloped countries, but cf
the world economy at large depend heavily on a substantial and steady
outflow of capital from trie leading industrial countries. The only
practicable solution of this problem is to organise a large part of
long-term foreign lending through an international organization.
The International Bank for reconstruction anu Development is soundly
conceived from this point of view. By placing an international
buffer between the lending end the borrowing countries, it can
achieve the economic advantages of foreign investment and at the
same time avoid its disadvantages,"
The Bank, however, as at present constituted, is precluded
from bringing about a stable flow of international investment of
major dimensions by the scantiness of its funus, its dependence on
private lending ana the restriction of its activities to lending,
except in special circumstances, on a specific project basis.
The group therefore suggests that, in addition to its present
activities, it should be empowered to obtain funds by borrowing
directly from governments and to lend directly for general develop¬
ment purposes, not only in special circumstances, but generally.
Governments of the lending countries should take direct responsibility
for/
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for a considerable volume of future international investment, and
in particular, they should announce in advance the total annual
volume of international investment which they consider appropriate
in the light of the i«ndi% capacity of their countries. Govern¬
mental loans to the Bank would consist of two parts: a pre¬
determined amount depending on the long-run lending programmesj
and a (smaller) fluctuating amount that would offset fluctuations
in private investment. The Bunk, which would borrow from
governments on the terms on which they themselves were able to
raise funds on their own markets ana lend directly to governments
at rates no higher than inquired to cover the cot of the loans,
Its operatiig expenses, arid a fixed allowance for the risks of
aefault, would act as an Intermediary between lending and borrowing
governments. Those losses which cannot be met out of its
reserves would be apportioned among all lending governments by a
proportionate writing down of their outstanding loans* Boons
are to be made available for the financing of any imports that
are directly or indirectly necessary for the execution of an over¬
all developmental programme, and it would be the responsibility of
the Bank to investigate the programmes ana follow up their execution.
To facilitate this supervision, borrowing countries should set up
capital budgets which would show in detail the disbursements under
the programme. The U. Nations should use every endeavour to
provide the technical assistance Wi ich countries will require in
framing their development programmes and in making their loan
applications to the Banki^)
(id) ibid, pars,111-116
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VII, These suggestions have "been put forward by the group
of experts in the form of concrete and detailed rec cmmenoations,
which are, at the time of writing, in the hands of the Economic
ana Social Council, Their acceptance, alongside with other
national and international measures aiming at securing conditions
of full employment within the framework of an e xpanding world
economy, would mark a considerable step towards solving the problem
of economic development. Whether they are accepted or not, the
major part of the responsibility for development - ma in terms of
human aspirations the ends aimed at mean much more than this colour¬
less term can convey - remains with the underdeveloped countries
themselves. Ho amount of outside co-operation will be of much
avail, if not matched by corresponding internal efforts, ana no
amount of outside discouragement will absolve the governments of
these countries from the penalties of failure, for the problem is




SUMMARY AftD SQMd G£i<RRAL QLSKhVATXOhS^1J
This study is primarily concerned with low-income densely-
populated countries, which cannot hope to obtain a high income-level
by specialising in supplying world markets with highly-demanded
goods in the production of which they have a special advantage
based on natural resources. In these countries, all of which have
a high birth-rate, the most important single factor affecting the
long-run prospects of raising the standards of living is the pressure
of population on limited resources, ana the whole study is over¬
shadowed by this element in the situation.
In Chapter One, an introductory discussion of recent demographic
tendencies in them presented against the background of western
demographic history, brings us to the conclusion that, for purposes
of policy, the population factor assumes the role of an effect rather
than a cause of poverty aid would be remedied by measures assigned
to raise the standard of living. The (larger that a limited or
gradual improvement may be swallowed up by an increase in numbers is
pointed out and its appreciation sets a note of urgency which is
maintained throughout the rest of the work.
Chapter II provides a theoretical framework within which the
discussion can be conveniently organised and in terms of which the
purposes/
(1) The order of presentation of a few points has been changed in
this summary.
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purposes of development can be stated in a general form. The
limitations of the Doctrine of Consumers1 Sovereignty, which forms
the cornerstone of the welfare aspect of modern economic theory, are
set out, and it is claimed that sane of these limitations are better
dealt with from the side of income distribution, in accordance with
the familial' proposition that, to the extent that redistribution
does not lead to a reduction in the siae of the national income,
maximum satisfaction will be achieved if income is equally shared.
The welfare propositions of economic theory are based on the
equilibrium technique of analysis, and it is claimed that two great
limitations on the valiuity of these propositions,particularly
pertinent to trie conditions of underdeveloped economies, are set
by the use of this technique. The first is the unuue emphasis
on the problem of the optimum allocation of resources to their
alternative uses, ana the comparative neglect of the equally important
problem of securing an optimum supply of these resources, each taken
in relation to the others. The second relates to the general
presumption that positions of competitive equilibrium are optimum
positions: it is argued that, for countries faced with a vast
store of inter-related technical knowledge waiting for application,
there is no A priori demonstration that if each entrepreneur
utilised the technical possibilities lying within his immediate
field of vision, a total optimum position will be reached. In a
/
sense, the optimum supply resources (or factors) is, for purposes of
welfare policy, merely one aspect of the central problem of their
optimum/
in
optimum allocation, but this aspect is less amenable to Uie
equilibrium technique which is usually applied to the general problem
of allocation, and is dealt with separately in Chapter III, while the
implications of the second limitation are, together with allied
points, taken up in chapter V, on "Optimum Distribution of Resources
and Economic Development". Beside solving the two problems of
factor supply and allocative efficiency, an efficient system must,
also ensure full employment for its members. The question of employ¬
ment is therefore taken up in an intermediate chapter.
Natural resources are necessarily given and the acquisition of
existent technical knowledge ana of skill is a special form of
capital formation. The study of factor supply, undertaken in
Chapter III, is therefore limited to a discussion of capital ana
population, particularly with regard to their possible interactions.
In the course of an attempt to understand the nature of capital
formation, in which what may be called the "proof by parable" method
of demonstration was used, it is shown that for an isolated individ¬
ual with constant wants, the rate at which he diverts his time from
production for immediate consumption to production for future increas¬
ed consumption^which would maximise his total satisfaction over time;
is probably a decreasing one, and transferring the argument to the
case of a community and assuming that the satisfactions of future
generations are held to be of the same value as those of the present
generation, this inference, if anything, will be strengthened.
The/
///.
The assumptions are too sweeping for this particular' result to be
of any practical importance, but the approach used in this chapter
will have served some purpose if it draws attention to sane
features of capital formation which are not brought into prominence
by the received methods of analysis, namely, that it is essentially
a processjof diverting resources from production for current con¬
sumption to production for future increased consumption, that the
sacrifices incidental to this continuous process o£ re-organisation
are temporary while the gains are permanent, ana that, at least in
theory, in considering the optimum rate of capital formation,
account must be taken of the process as a whole, I.e., up to the
stage where a maximum amount of production has been reached.
Turning to the population factor, it is argued that, through their
effects on the age-composition of the community, the effects on
welfare of changes in the size of population are more important
and more ascertainable than those of absolute size, that an increase
the size of population woulu have a retarding effect on the rate of
capital formation if this increase is of the type which leads to a
reduction in the average age of the community, and that in such a
situation, there may be a case for over-riding the preferences or
even the interests of present generations in favour ox future ones,
by speeding up the rate of capital formation and/or interfering with
consumers' preferences, between various lines of expenditure. The
received theory of Optimum Population is examined in a concluding
section.
In Chapter IV it is argued that though the problem of unemployment
01
in the form in which it is experienced in highly industrialised
countries is not likely, at least in their initial stages of
development, to be a major problem in underdeveloped countries,
population pressure, wnich is detrimental to a high rate of economic
activity, is likely to have a depressing effect on potential new
investment in a predominantly private enterprise system* This
consideration provides an adaitioa«l argument for 3t&te-control
of the rate of capital formation.
Chapter V deals with the narrower aspects of the problem cf
the optimum allocation of resources to their alternative uses, ana,
in its latter part the discussion is related to the wiuer aspects
of factor supply and to the question of full employment, In
sections I » VII, an attempt is made to map out those ureas where
public enterprise is more likely than private enterprise to bring
about an optimum distribution of resources. She discussion is
based on the widely accepted rule that an optimum will be reached
if each commodity is sold at a price egual to its marginal cost.
This rule will be automatically enforced by private enterprise
only under conditions of perfect competition* To secure the
technical economies of Integration, it is argued that all stages of
production whose integration would cause an increase in efficiency
should be taken into account, when determining the relation between
coat and size of the firm, ma to avoid the wastes of sub-
optimum sizes which may result from private entrepreneurial timidity
or/
or lack of resources, private enterprise woulu secure an optimum
distribution of resources only if it can reach an optimum size
directly and not by gradual steps. The conditions for the optimum
distribution of resources by private enterprise are that there be a
number of firms so large that none of them will be conscious of the
effects of ixs scale of output on the xirice of the product ana that
they fixed factors of an optimum size will be directly e stahLished.
The spheres where these conditions are not likely to be fulfilled
in underdeveloped countries are then outlined, though only in
general theoretical terms, anu it is argued that where they do not
obtain public enterprise is preferable to public interference by
fiscal measures, and that where demand ccnciltions are such that one
unit of proauction of 3e ss than optimum size is required a unit
larger than that indicated by market conditions should be establisned
and output sola at a price less than average total cost# A general
view of the total picture which emerges, given in Section XI, is
prepared for by sections VIII - X. In Section VIII, the economic
limitation on the general principle of equality of income distribu¬
tion is discussed with respect to rent, labour earnings ana entxe-
preneurial earnings. The difficult subject of interest is consider¬
ed in section IX, where it is argued that, for the comratnity as a
whole, interest on already existent capital is in the n&uire of a
surplus, and in section X, where reasons ore given for doubting the
the
sufficiency of institution of privately organised markets for loans
to/
to secure an optimum balance between present sacrifices and future
gains, ana the conclusion is therefore deriveu that there is no
reason why savings should earn a reward equal to the marginal
productivity of capital. The summing-up in section XI is opened
by a consideration of how the rate of investzaent should be determined
and it is argued that that rate of taxation beyond which people's
ability or willingness to work is impaired is, in Malthus-ridaen
countries, as gooa a determinant of the total rate of investment as
any that can be found, and that, if, even with this rate, national
income increase lags behind population increase, it i still
possible to accelerate the rate of income increase at some time in
the future by directing more of the available investment resources
towards what has been calleu "social and economic overhead projects •!»
Though economic overhead projects are usually those which fall within
the sphere of State action as outlined in earlier parts of this
chapter, the decision as to the proportion of total investment
resources devoted to them ana to social overheau projects is bound
to be somewhat arbitrary. Economic overhead projects will give
rise to various "prime investment" opportunities, which are directly
related to consumers' demands for different commodities, and a
tvil-h
scheme is suggested for determining which of these, in accordance to
previous analysis, will be taken up by the state ana which will be
left to private enterprise.
It will be seen that, in the previous analysis, the State is
expected to play a major role in the development of underdeveloped
countries/
Iff.
countries, end a few comments on two points usually raised in the
ag#-old controversy about State activity may not be out of place
here. The first relates to the efficiency of the State in the
economic sphere, or rather to the more specific question of
incentives, since, except in the few cases which, it was argued,
by their nature require an arbitrary, that is ,1 political decision,
the State is expecteu to follow the objective rules which would
control the activities of private enterprise, had it been operating
competitively. The question of incentive only arises in the case
of those activities which would earn profits for their pursuer®, for,
as Sidgwick^^ pointed out & long time ago, the problem of initiative
is the same for State as for private employees when these are wage-
earners or even managers working for joint-stock companies, As
for profit-earning entrepreneurial activities, his remark that the
Government has more incentive for the encouragement of private
initiative at its disposal than private enterprise, in the way of
honours, distinctions, security of employment etc,, seems also to
apply. In fact, so far as initiative is concerned, State activity
in the special circumstances of underdeveloped countries-, are=e=en-
-eemed, seem to offer far greater possibiliuies than private enter¬
prise, if the State succeeds in filling people's imagination with
visions/
(2) Cfs S. Moss: "Laissez-faire, Planning and Ethics" E.J,,
Ib'afj, p. al.
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visions of social ana economic progress and rousing and maintaining
their enthusiasm anu support for schemes of development, ana it is
this dynamic force, with its unlimited potentialities, which may
prove to he the most decisive factor in the situation. It cannot
be tapped by a rallying cry of enrichez-vous; people need some¬
thing bigger than themselves no give out of their best. In under¬
developed countries, the need for and possibilities of utilising
this latent force are greater than elsewhere, for only such a vision
can make them willingly bear the hardships incidental to the
impending process of social ana economic transformation, ana, I
venture to generalise, it can be more easily synchronised with exist¬
ing values and attitudes. Where a rural community has a long
history behind it, it will have C-me to grips with the law of dimin¬
ishing returns from land, and is reduced to subsistence level. Where
there is no tradition of rapia change in productive technique, and
because of the limitations on acquiring wealth by one's own efforts,
attempts to increase one's wealth will always be at the expense of
the essential neeas of others and to some extent by appropriating
the fruits of their labour. Since values, at any given level of
technique, usually embody what is best for society as a whole, we
find that in rural countries living at subsistence levels, popular
values invariably stress the necessity and aignity of hard work ana
at the same time disparage the spirit of acquisition. It was not
perhaps an accident that Adam Smith formulated his theory of social




unpx'ecedented change in technique* The capitalist ethics, it will
be remembered, are of a recent origin, ana there are signs that the
continuity of the olu systems of ethics which they have interrupted
in vhe V»est is being slowly resumed, even in those countries where
the resumption is least required. There is also another important
consideration. The early stages of industrialisation in the West,
even with the favourable and historically exceptional circumstances
under which they took place, were not always an unmixed blessing to
many people, particularly wage-earners, and it was net until traae-
union movements were developed ana the State took various actions
to mitigate the harshness of economic forces unaer a system pre¬
dominantly run by private enterprise that the antagonisms which this
system a roused began to lose their disruptive and destructive
character. Now though useful to their members, trade unions, as
every nineteenth century economist knew, have their own dis¬
advantages j they create special privileged positions for their
members, the^r* interfering with certain beneficial market forces,
ana they obstruct labour mobility. Also it may well be doubted
whether they can function in underdeveloped countries, in the context
of the present historical situation, with the same comparative
smoothness and the same effectiveness which characterised, say, the
labour movement in England. Trade unions, however, are the
specific reaction of workers to a predominantly private enterprise
system, and they lose their raison d'etre if forstalled by State
activity in the directions indicated above.
The/
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The second point is that of inuiviuual freedom of choice in on
economy in the uirectifl3 of which the State plays a major p*rt.
There is nothing to ada here to the familiar arguments by which
advocates of planning explain that such an extension of State
activity constitutes an extension of the area and content of
economic freedom for the majority of the people. Since however,
in one particular instance, we went further than most of them would
care to go, a reference to it m^y be required. It was argued in
Chapter III that there may be a case for the State pushing ahead with
a rate of investment greater than that indicated by individual
preferences arid which may even sacrifice the immediate interests of
the present generation for the sake of future ones. But there is
no contradiction between such an apparent violation of individual
preferences and the gain of popular support for such a measure $ in
fact, except under authoritarian regimes, such support is an indis-
pensible condition for its enforcement. Individuals act in
society in different capacities, end they may vote for a greater
rate of investment than they would care to bring about by their own
individual actions as savers and consumers. No claim is oaue for
such a vote to be a "spontanious manifestation of people's will",
but then the concept of democracy, even where tne electorate have
reached a high level of general education arid political maturity,
does not exclude wise leadership ana technical advice.
No doubt the State of the administrative machinery in under¬
developed countries, of which, in these pages, so much is expected,
leave/
J°>2
leave much to be desired} this is one of the causes of under¬
development as well as a symptom of it. Also, there is always,
the danger that, armea with slogans 01 development anu social
improvement, a greater control over the economic life of a country
may be used to secure selfish or unworthy ends by those who control
the state-machinery. The approach used here - it is difficult
to see how a^tudy cf welfare can proceed under different assumptions -
was to take the bona fide of the State for granted ana, assuming that
its machinery is capable of improvement, to leave non-economic
aspects of its activity to other tranches of the social sciences.
The economic relations between underdeveloped countries ana
the outside world are taken up in Chapters VI and VII, which aeal
successively with international trace anu International investment;
international debts, grants and immigration being left cue in this
study. In Chapter VI, sections I arid II, the exceptions to the
general rule of free trade are stated. In addition to the two
usually acknowledged cases where the production of a given commodity
gives rise to more than average external economies in tire producing
country ana where an increase in the production of a commodity in
which a country has a comparative cost disadvantage results in a
reduction in cost so great that it is transferred to the comparative
cost advantage class, a thira exception is pointed out which is
based on the fact that seme costs, particularly interest charges on
already formed capital and the extra earnings of skill of all kinas,
which enter into entrepreneurial calculations ?are not, in eke long
run/
/") 3
run?costs from the point of view of the community. The application
of these exceptions is not easy in practice, tut it is arguea in
section III that, generally speaking, they all group together on
the side of manufactures, and in section IV it is suggested that
the low-standards of living prevailing in unuerdeveloped countries
are partly explained ty past failure to take account of this fact.
In section V it is argued that, with state action along the lines
indicated in the previous chapter, and given an a actuate flow of
investment funds from highly industrialised countries, development
by protection should be seen for what it is* a clumsy method which
encourages the growth of local monopolies and which, if adopted by
each country, woula lead to a shrinkage in profitable international
exchange.
Injsection I of Chapter VII, the benefits of international
investment as a measure of full enployment policy in highly
industrialised countries, as a means of speeding up development
and reducing the sacrifices which may be associated with it in
underdeveloped countries and as an instrument for removing restric¬
tions on international trade are pointed out, arid the long-run
transfer and unemployment problems which its cessation in the future
may cause are also noted. The rest of this chapter, however,
is concerned solely with the conditions under which a great flow of
investment funds for development purposes may be axpectea to take
place. A review of past aria present tendencies shows that
proportionately/
proportionately little amounts of private tunas go to underdeveloped
densely-populated countries and that this little usually takes the
torsi of direct investment in raw-material production for the export
trade (section#-^). The conclusion is drawn that though direct
private investment e^s exve certain limited purposes, its role in
developing underdeveloped countries is bound to remain secondary
(section^), Private portfolio investment seems to be out of
the question under present circumstances, (section vC ) and the past
performance of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop¬
ment is therefore reviewed in order to see if it has adequately met
the present need for an intermediate link between borrowers and
landers. The result is shown to be negative and the study is con¬
cluded by a detailed summary or the United Nations' Group of Experts
on National and International Measures for Pull Employment analysis
the Bank's
of the situation and their recommendations for a modification of its
Constitution and an extension of the scope of its activities.
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